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Résumé 
Cette thèse s'appuie sur la littérature spécialisée en études latino-américaines et en 
criminologie pour étudier les moyens licites à travers lesquels les citoyens défavorisés 
s'organisent au niveau communautaire pour gérer les problèmes quotidiens qui causent 
l'insécurité dans un contexte caractérisé par l'échec de la justice et de la sécurité 
publique. l'examine différentes formes de participation citoyenne dans les réseaux de 
sécurité locale au Brésil et en Afrique du Sud, et emploie une méthodologie idéal-
typique pour mesurer l'envergure du pouvoir d'action que ces programmes de micro-
gouvernance permettent aux citoyens en tant qu'individus et en tant que communautés. 
La recherche se base sur les résultats de deux projets pilotes, sur un sondage réalisé 
auprès des citoyens dans les sites pilotes, et sur un sondage national sur les « systèmes 
alternatifs d'administration de conflits» pour démontrer et expliquer pourquoi les 
programmes locaux de (micro )gouvernance au Brésil ne parviennent généralement pas à 
habiliter les communautés avec la capacité d'action nécessaire pour agir sur l'insécurité. 
L'analyse comparative des réseaux de sécurité locale au Brésil et en Afrique du Sud 
démontre qu'au Brésil, les réponses communautaires à l'insécurité soumises à une 
forme de régulation institutionnelle ne permettent aux citoyens qu'une forme minimale 
de participation puisqu'elle demeure limitée à la consommation de services pour la 
plupart monopolisés et fournis par des acteurs institutionnels non-communautaires. Je 
propose des arguments qui proposent que les échecs des programmes de micro-
gouvernance au Brésil résultent de la prévalence de normes conservatrices sur la 
régulation de la justice parmi les acteurs étatiques, internationaux, et extra-
communautaires au sein des réseaux de sécurité locale. Ces normes génèrent des coûts 
humains et financiers très élevés pour les partenaires publics et privés. Par ailleurs, les 
normes conservatrices minent la réalisation des objectifs pratiques et normatifs de 
l'agenda de la sécurité humaine en déplaçant le centre de prise de décision à l'extérieur 
de la communauté, créant un paradoxe où la gouvernance communautaire est effectuée à 
travers des acteurs non-communautaires. Ma recherche démontre que les citoyens 
défavorisés sont exclus de la participation à ces projets communautaires en tant 
qu'agents légitimes capables d'agir sur la justice et la sécurité par des bureaucraties qui 
cherchent à les « aider» plutôt qu'à les habiliter, d'une part, et, d'autre part, par des 
chercheurs et spécialistes de politique publique qui prennent pour acquis que dans un 
contexte d'échec de la sécurité publique, les pauvres ont typiquement recours à des 
moyens criminels pour résoudre leurs problèmes. Cette étude aborde des questions clefs 
sur la sécurité citoyenne, de comment réduire l'insécurité dans les bidons-villes à 
pourquoi les normes et valeurs ayant trait à la régulation de la justice déterminent les 
résultats en termes de sécurité humaine. 
Mots-clefs; Sécurité humaine; Réseaux de sécurité locale; Insécurité; Accès à la 
justice; Etat de droit; Résolution alternative de disputes; Société civile; Droits de la 
citoyenneté; Bidons-villes/favelas; Connaissances locales. 
Abstract 
This doctoral dissertation builds on the "misrule of law" literature in Latin American 
studies and recent scholarship on "nodal governance" in criminology to study the lawful 
means through which the poor, in a context of failing justice and public security, are 
organized at the community level to address everyday problems that cause real and 
perceived insecurity. 1 examine different forms of citizen participation in local security 
networks in Brazil and South Africa, and employ ideal-typical methodology to measure 
the extent of agency micro-governance programs enable citizens to exert on insecurity 
as individuals and as communities. The research draws on results from two pilot 
experiments, and uses survey data from the pilot sites and from a national mapping of 
"alternative systems of conflict administration" to demonstrate that, and explain why, 
local (micro )governance programs in Brazil generally fail to empower communities as a 
means of security. Comparative analysis of local security networks in Brazil and South 
Africa shows that in Brazil, lawful, regulated community-based responses to insecurity 
enable citizens to exert only a limited, consumptive form of agency as the majority of 
local programs remain monopolized by non-community actors. 1 argue that the failures 
of micro-governance programs in Brazil result from the prevalence of conservative 
norms about the regulation of justice on the part of state, international, and other non-
community actors working within local security networks. These norms generate 
unnecessarily high tinancial and human costs for public and private partners. They also 
undennine practical and normative objectives of the human security agenda by shifting 
the locus of decision-making outside the community, creating a paradox of what can 
best be described as "community governance from above." My research shows that the 
poor are disempowered as legitimate agents of Justice and as a means of security by 
bureaucracies that seek to "help" -as opposed to empower- them, on the one hand, 
and, on a different level, by scholars and policy-makers who take for granted that the 
poor's usual means of problem-resolution in the context of failing public security 
typically involves a criminal element. Ultimately, the research tackles key questions 
from how to reduce insecurity in shanty-towns to why norms and values in the policy-
area of justice regulation determine human security outcomes. 
Key words: Human Security; Local Security Networks; Insecurity; Access to Justice; 
Rule of Law; Alternative Dispute Resolution; Civil Society; Citizenship rights; Shanty-
towns/favelas; Local Knowledge. 
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Introduction 
This doctoral dissertation builds on the "misrule of law" literature in Latin 
American studies and recent scholarship on "nodal govemance" in criminology to 
study the lawful means through which the poor, in a context of failing justice and 
public security, are organized at the community level to address everyday 
problems that cause real and perceived insecurity. 1 examine different forms of 
citizen participation in local security networks in Brazil and South Africa, and 
employ ideal-typical methodology to measure the extent of agency micro-
govemance programs enable citizens to exert on insecurity as individuals and as 
communities. The research draws on results from two pilot experiments, and uses 
survey data from the pilot sites and from a national mapping of "alternative 
systems of conflict administration" to demonstrate that, and explain why, local 
(micro)govemance programs in Brazil generally fail to empower communiLies as a 
means of security. Comparative analysis of local security networks in Brazil and 
South Africa shows that in Brazil, lawful, regulated community-based responses 
to insecurity enable citizens to exert only a limited, consumptive form of agency 
as the majority of local programs remain monopolized by non-community actors. 
1 argue that the failures of micro-governance programs in Brazil result from the 
prevalence of conservative norms about the regulation of justice on the part of 
state, international, and other non-community actors working within local security 
networks. These norms create unnecessarily high financial and human costs for 
public and private partners. They also undermine practical and normative 
objectives of the human security agenda by shifting the locus of decision-making 
outside the community, creating a paradox of what can best be described as 
"community govemance from above." My research shows that the poor are 
disempowered as legitimate agents of justice and as a means of security by 
bureaucracies that seek to "help" -as opposed to empower- them, on the one 
hand, and, on a different level, by scholars and policy-makers who take for 
granted that the poor's usual means ofproblem-resolution in the context offailing 
public security typically involves a criminal element. Ultimately, the research 
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tackles key questions from how to reduce insecurity in shanty-towns to why 
norms and values in the policy-area of justice regulation determine human 
security outcomes. 
When citizens suffer from c1ass, gender, ethnie, racial, religious, and/or 
cultural discrimination from the police and courts and are victimized by abusive 
and arbitrary state practices -and this is especially true for the poor- then how 
and to whom can they make any Flaim to any right? How do the poor deal with 
and respond to everyday problems of insecurity when insecurity itself often 
directly results from the state authorities who are supposed to protect citizens 
against insecurity in the first place? The emphasis on the organizational capacities 
of the poor is justified in the context of extreme inequality that characterizes the 
socio-economic Jandscape in Brazil, where millions of citizens living in poverty 
are not only victimized on a daily basis by severe social injustices, but are also the 
principal victims of arbitrary and corrupt practices by law en forcement 
authorities. Moreover, the probJem of problem-resolution in a context of urban 
poverty, failing public security, and discredited judiciary institutions is 
compounded by the fact that many of the daily problems (e.g., disputes between 
neighbors, failing to reimburse personal loans and\or to make alimony payments, 
bar fights, gambling, loud music late at night, etc.) that cause insecurity do not 
constitute crimes per se, but when left un-addressed, can lead to violence and 
actual crimes, thus creating greater insecurity. 
Low-income communities in Brazilian cities are often concentrated in 
"favelasJ" (Portuguese word for shanty-town). Favelas are densely popuJated 
ilIegal (or un-regularized) squatter settlements typically located in the periphery 
1 The word "favela" refers to a small tree found in the region of the Sertao (Iocated in the 
interior of Bahia), where, in the late 191h cent ury, the residents of Canudos revolted 
against the social and economic exclusion associated to the new Republican government. 
As their seulement was set up in "Alto da Favela," the word "favela" came to be 
associated to their insubordination and the first squaUer seulement in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro in the early 20th century received the name "Morro (hill) da Favela" (Goirand, 
2000). 
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of urban centers, where precarious habitations improvised out of recycled 
materials, of which the construction is usually incomplete, are piled up one on top 
the other (Goirand, 2000: 69-70). Favelas are marginalized spaces that lack the 
most basic infrastructurès and are notoriously infamous as centers of crime, 
violence, and daily insecurity. 
Insecurity refers not only to the lack of security and to the absence of safety, 
but more significantly, insecurity is a state of its own characterized by 
vulnerability, fear and want. The experience of insecurity is associated to feelings 
of powerlessness, or lack of agency, to act upon circumstances and effect change 
in the course of events. In the context of failing justice and public security, 
citizens and communities must develop alternative ways to exert individual and 
collective agency to deal with local security issues as democratic authorities are 
not only faling to provide these public goods, but are often further considered a 
bigger part of the problem than of the solution. 
The concept of agency refers to the capacity of actors to make and impose 
choices, and to the means by which they accomplish this. That is, agency is about 
the ability of individuals "to become actors and shapers of their own destiny" 
(Manz, 2003: 328). While the question of agency has to do with the relative 
power of individuals and communities to act and to shape outcomes, governance 
is about the principles and mechanisms that frame and regulate these actions 
within a specified context. Broadly defined, governance refers to "the 
management of the course of events in a social system" (Drahos, Burris and 
Shearing, 2005), or to "the traditions and institutions by which authority is 
exercised" (Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 2003, c.f., ibid). 
Micro-governance community programs work through state, society, 
international and/or private sector partnerships, commonly referred to as Public-
Private Partnerships or PPPs, to empower individual citizens and/or local 
collective actors with knowledge and capacities to exert agency over problems 
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that undennine the quality of daily life, whether rooted in social injustices and 
underdevelopment, the misrule of law, or the private, domestic realm. The 
community programs examined as part of this study ail fall within the broad 
policy area of Human Security, and· were implemented in underprivileged 
communities via PPPs with the programmatic objective of reducing daily 
insecurity through access to justice. More specifically, these micro-governance 
initiatives can be conceptualized as community-based systems of dispute 
resolution that enable citizens to resolve daily conjlicts and crimes and address 
real and perceived sources of injustice and insecurity at the local level, through 
local channels, outside the formai justice system but within a lawful, regulated --
framework of action. 
Micro-governance enables the exercise of citizen agency at the community 
level through institutionalized networks that are developed and implemented in 
collaboration with non-community actors, with the purpose of regulating a 
specifie issue-area, such as security. These networks, also commonly referred to 
as "local security networks," involve varying levels of participation by citizens, 
communities, state authorities, international organizations, aid agencies, NGOs, 
and epistemic communities2 who provide funding, knowledge, and institutional 
and logistical support according to each actor's relevant and relative capacities. 
Broadly, studies on local security networks are interested in the relevance and 
efficiency of local knowledge and capacities in governance arrangements, and are 
concerned with the distribution of power and resources within the network as weil 
as with the institutional configurations regulating the interactions of its multiple 
actors. 
Dupont (2004) defines local security networks as initiatives that seek "to 
harness the public and private resources available in local communities in order to 
overcome complex crime problems that find their origins in deteriorating social 
2 Haas (1992) defines the concept of epistemic commumtles as "networks among 
professionals with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge". 
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conditions [ ... ] Local security networks act as information exchanges on local 
crime problems and on the resources that can be mobilized to solve them [ ... ] 
They rely on local knowledge and solutions that transcend institutional 
boundaries." 
In local security networks, the "community" is constituted by individuals 
bound by the neighborhood's territory. Individual local residents exert collective ~ 
community agency when they participate in the network as a group (or "node") 
and work together in collective decision-making processes to help community 
members resolve conflicts and address shared problems of insecurity experienced 
within the common physicaJ place of residence. 
Inspired by Weber's ideal-type, my research shows that individual and 
community agency in local security networks can take six distinct forms, ranging 
from consumption (based on private individual agency) to real agency (based on 
collective community agency). Building on the ideal-typical model, 1 further 
demonstrate that the relationship between citizen agency and micro-govemance is 
not only causal but also constitutive, and explain how ideas and norms about who 
can have agency on justice determine the relative power of outside-community 
actors (the bureaucracy) within local security networks, and thus the extent of 
citizen agency. The cases examined in Brazil and South Africa conclusively 
indicate that the more conservative the predominant institutional actor (or 1 
"node"), the lesser the extent of citizen and community agency on insecurity 
within the network, and the more heavily bureaucratized and costly the program. 
Conversely, the more liberal the predominant institutional actor, the greater the 
extent of citizen and community agency within then network, and the less 
bureaucratized and costly the program. 
In a nutshell, conserva/ives seek to conserve the status-quo and are opposed 
to change. They seek to preserve sorne form of state monopoly over justice 
because they believe social conflicts must be arbitrated and/or monitored c10sely 
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by formai experts and authorities related to the justice system. A common 
perception in Brazil is that only professionally-trained individuals with 
recognized academic and institutional credentials have the necessary expertise to 
arbitrate social conflicts, and thus should be the only ones recognized as 
legitimate agents of justice and means of security. This elitist bias will be referred 
to as "credentialism3," which can be generically defined as emphasis on 
credentials to be conferred social status and/or employment. As a result, the 
majority of "community govemance" programs in Brazil with a justice andtbr 
security focus are heavily bureaucratized and mostly operated by outside-
community professionals, which not only disempowers community residents as 
legitimate actors in supposedly "community-based" programs, but further creates 
unecessarily high human and financial costs for public and private partners. 
Indeed, following functionalist logic, the outside-community bureaucracy needs 
the community project to safeguard the positions and salaries it was attributed for 
the project within its own institutional framework. In other words, the jobs of the 
project management team (coordinators, secretaries, assistants, etc.,) are 
threatened to become oblivious if more decision-making power and 
responsibilities are entrusted to community actors in the community projects they 
support. Moreover, the conservative position presupposes that the state can and 
has been providing acess to justice and public security in communities where 
micro-govemance programs are implemented, which are usually precisely those 
areas where acess to the formaI justice system is the most difficult and where state 
authorities have been most notoriously known to not only fail to provide public 
security but to contribute to greater insecurity with police violence and corruption. 
Other local security networks examined in Brazil and South Africa indicate, 
in contrast, that when the principal institutional actor adheres to "Iiberal" norms, 
local security networks can be operated at low cost through local community 
actors based on local knowledge. Liberais advocate for change. This normative 
3 The concept of "credentialism" was initially developed by Weber, who noted the 
increased concern for fonnal education and qualifications in modern society. 
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position challenges the status-quo and the traditional state monopoly of justice. 
Liberais believe social actors can play a predominant role in the regulation of 
social conflicts, outside traditional state institutions. When liberal norms pervade 
the local security network, the community program succeeds in empowering local 
citizens as both private individuals and as a community to solve problems that 
cause daily insecurity at home and in the neighborhood. From a practical 
position, the problem with the liberal position is that to ensure the financial 
integrity of community project activities and thus safeguard long-term funding for 
the projects they support, professional members of its institution must monitor 
closely each case for which financial rewards are attributed. Even liberals do not 
empower local communities with completely autonomous collective decision-
making power in their community program as administrative activities remain 
monopolized by outside-community actors. 
Research Design 
J investigate the question of citizen-based security In Brazil on three 
epistemological fronts, and seek to explain not only the causal dynamics, but also 
to understand the constitutive and normative dimensions. Vhe heuristic objectives 
of this study can be conceptualized broadly in terms of three sets of concems, 
which provided the analytical framework within which the three research 
questions discussed further below were formulated: 1) How has the problem of 
citizen-based security been formulated and studied in different disciplinary 
fields?; 2) What do we know and what can we know about the lawful forms of 
citizen-based security in Brazil?; and 3) What should be done about it-that is, 
how can this knowledge be translated effectively into useful theory and concrete 
political action? iJJ\\~ ~ \ru... ').LoP'<?\ ~~. 
To begin, J examine how the problem of citizen-based security has been 
studied in mainstream scholarship in Latin American studies and criminology. 1 
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argue that the literature in Latin American studies fails to provide a complete and 
accurate picture of alternative, citizen-based forms of security in Latin America's 
infamous urban sIums by taking for granted that the poor are more violent and 
typically resort to criminal means to compensate for the failures of public 
security. 
~Working with the relevant scholarship in criminology, this study aims to 
help fill the gap in the literature by shifting the theoretical attention and empirical 
focus on lawful forms of citizen agency and community organization, and does 
not take for granted that the poor obtain justice and security through criminal 
means when state institutions and authorities are not accessible, unwarranted, or 
discarded as a viable option. The introduction of key insights from the 
criminology literature and the use of a "nodal" framework of analysis, which 
focuses on social actors, their institutional partners, and the networks in which 
they are embedded, addresses the more interesting questions about the conditions, 
the cooperative arrangements and the specifie mechanisms that enable social 
conflicts to be regulated outside the formai state system. 
examme the institutional configurations regulating 93 local security 
networks in Brazil (68) and South Africa (25). 1 also investigate their normative 
structures, which, 1 argue, determine the shape of institutional configurations at 
the onset. lt will be demonstrated that the normative structure of local security 
networks is essentially made up of ideas about the state's exclusive monopoly of 
justice, which, pending on the predominant ideational position within the 
bureaucracy, undermines or empowers different forms of citizen agency. 
1 further put the theory to the test and conduct two pilot experiments in 
Brazil inspired by the South African Zwelethemba model of conflict resoJution 
and community development. Based on empirical results, 1 develop a critical 
theory of citizen-based security that seeks to effect ideational change within 
BraziJian Bureaucratia- that is, within the virtual network of state authorities, 
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international organizations, academic institutions, and NOOs involved in local 
security networks. 
Research objectives are three-fold. Specifically, this study seeks to answer 
three related questions and demonstrate three research hypotheses for Brazil. 
First, in the context of failing justice and public security, how do citizens 
overcome real and perceived sources of insecurity in underprivileged 
communities? In stark contrast to mainstream scholarship4 and policy papers5, this 
study does not take for granted that in the context of failing security, ordinary 
citizens in low-income communities -the majority of which are under- and un-
employed workers- obtain justice and security by caHing upon local thugs and 
vigilantes. The literature has ignored, if not obscured the more constructive role of 
citizens and communities --{)f civil society- in the governance of security in 
favelas (or what policy-studies commonly refer to as 'urban siums'). The body of 
research on nodal governance and local security networks in criminology 
indicates the existence of important gaps in maÎnstream social science scholarship 
on Latin America. 
Local security networks represent a form of civil society organization that 
warrants the attention of political scientists. The administration of security outside 
the formai state system is not new, for private security and retribution are 
universal and timeless. What is new are the institutionalized forms in which 
societal, state and international actors collaborate through networks and public-
private partnerships to regulate security (and justice) lawfully and accountably at 
the community level. From a Foucauldian perspective, the "story" of citizen-
4 See, for example, the edited volumes by Prezworski and Maravall (2003); Eckstein and 
Wickham-Crowley (2003), and by Mendez, Pinheiro and O'Donnell (1999). See also 
Holston (2006); Oxhom (2004 and 2003); Caldeira (2000); Prillaman (2000); Holston 
and Caldeira ( 1998). 
5 See for example, discussion pa pers from the Human Security Research and Outreach 
Program of Foreign Affairs Canada and from the Canadian Consortium on Human 
Security. 
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based security in Brazil (and Latin America more generally) is incomplete. The 
construction of a discourse in the literature that focuses only on unlawful and 
private forms of citizen agency leads to misconceptions about how security is 
regulated outside the formaI state justice system in low-income urban 
communities where public security is failing. To (re)construct the other, lawful 
side of the story, l employ opinion survey data on institutional (mis)trust and the 
usual means of probleni-resolution in two low-income communities in Brasilia 
and demonstrate empirically that in the context of the 'misruJe of Jaw,' 
residents of low-income communities do not, as the mainstream Iiterature 
depicts, usually have recourse to private vengeance and security to solve 
daily problems of insecurity, but more typically to micro-governance 
programs (where available) and to authorities from the formai justice 
system, even when they do not trust them. 
Second, what kind of agency do micro-governance programs enable the 
poor to exert on real and perceived sources of insecurity? Based on comparative 
results for 93 local security networks within Brazil and between Brazil and South 
Africa, ] demonstrate that in Brazil, micro-governance programs do not 
empower citizens as a collectivity -as communities- to identify and 
implement solutions to shared problems of insecurity, but rather enable 
individuals to solve private problems tbat cause insecurity within the 
boundaries of their communities, provided witb tbe assistance of profession al 
outside-community experts. 
The nature of citizen and "community" participation In local security 
networks matters: To empower communities as a means of security, it is not 
sufficient for citizens to individually consume services provided locally by 
outside-community experts. The comparative analysis of the technology (e.g., 
knowledge-base), the resources (human and tinancial), the institutional structure, 
and the mentalities regulating 93 local security networks in Brazil (68) and South 
Africa (25) indicates that not ail micro-govemance programs enable citizens the 
Il 
same kind nor the same extent of agency over insecurity. The use of pro gram 
services administrated by outside-community experts by individual community 
members does not enable the collective, community-based governance of security. 
Individual recourse to community program services empowers citizens to resolve 
private problems at the community level rather than through state authorities and 
channel s, but is not equal to "community governance" as the locus of decision-
making remains outside the community, and actual residents from the community 
are only allowed a limited form of participation in their community program. In 
Brazil, "community" programs are institutionally configured to enable a 
consumptive rather than participative model of (micro )governance, which 
undermines citizen agency because it exc\udes local participation from any real 
decision-making processes and limits the exercise of direct agency to the 
consumption of services provided by outside-community experts. As a result, 
local security networks work to empower citizens to identify and implement 
solutions to individual problems, but largely fails to meet the general human 
security objective of "empowering societies as a means of security" (UNDP, 
1994). 
The logic informing these initiatives is counter-intuitive in two important 
ways. First, "community governance" by definition involves that members of the 
community "manage the course of events," or that "authority be exercised" 
through community traditions and institutions. Second, because they aim to 
improve access to justice and reduce insecurity through bottom-up, participatory 
pro cesses of citizenship, community governance programs are intended to work 
principally through local actors, who, it is further argued, also have a comparative 
advantage (over police agencies and traditional operators of the justice system) 
given their local knowledge of the people, the daily problems, the language, and 
the usual ways and traditions of the community. When the spaces for participation 
in local security networks are monopolized by public andtbr private partners from 
outside the community, and local residents are only allowed to participate in the 
network as consumers of services provided andtbr c\osely monitored by 
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professionals, th en the community program may arguably be conceived as second 
class justice system for pOOf. 
Third, this study seeks to understand how do norms and ideas about Ihe 
slale 's exclusive monopoly of justice influence local security networks? 1t will he 
demonstrated that local security networks have their own normative structure 
constituted by ideas about the legitimacy of the state's exclusive monopoly of 
justice, which determines their institutional configuration, the choice for 
technology, and resource distribution within the network. In Brazil, 
conservative norms pervade institutional cultures and have translated into a 
programma tic bias in the form of credentialism that undermines both citizen 
and community agency in local security networks. 
The normative structure of local security networks determines the choice for 
the knowledge base (e.g. local versus expert) according to which the network 
operates daily, and how power, resources, and labor are distrihuted between 
community actors (the people) and outside-community actors (the hureaucracy) 
within the network. The prevalence of given norms and ideas about who can have 
agency on justice (and how) within the principal outside-community goveming 
institution (or node) determines the extent of citizen agency within the local 
security network. ] argue that the variations observed within Brazil and between 
Brazil and South Africa can he explained hy the different normative structures of 
the local security networks examined. Based on two years of field research in 
Brazil, where used ethnographic methods (discussed further in the 
methodological chapter) to collect data on the institutional configurations, the 
relevant actors, and the prevalent norms within local security networks, l identify 
different ideational trends on the regulation of justice. Using ethnographic data 
and building on results from two pilot experiments, it will be demonstrated that 
the more "conservative" the project management, the more credentialized, heavily 
bureaucratized, and costly the community govemance program, and the lesser the 
extent of citizen agency within the network. Conversely, the more "Iiberal" the 
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project management, the more the community program operates based on local 
knowledge and through local actors, the less it is costly and bureaucratized, and 
the greater the extent of citizen agency within the network. 
The micro-governance initiatives examined in Brasilia and in Brazil more 
generally were, for the most part, regulated by conservative norms, which reduce 
citizen agency to the private consumption of services provided by profession al 
outside-community experts. In the cases examined in Sao Caetano do Sul and 
South Africa, micro-governance programs were regulated by mostly liberal 
norms, which empowers both citizens and their communities as legitimate and 
effective means of security. The prevalence of conservative, elitist norms reveals 
an implicit assumption that the poor don't have the knowledge and capacities to 
identify and address the sources of insecurity affecting their own lives and 
communities. The monopolistic tendencies of outside-community partners and 
especially of the judiciary power strengthen the state's exclusive monopoly of 
justice by favoring "community-based" approaches to insecurity designed to 
empower professionals from the justice system working at the community level, 
rather than actual local residents as the principal agents of justice and as a means 
of security. By refusing to allow citizens to participate more actively in 
community programs, conservatives are tacitly acknowledging their disbelief in 
the relevance of the capacities and knowledge of local residents to identifY and 
address the sources of insecurity that affect their daily existence. Moreover, when 
commmunity governance programs are mainly operated through salaried outside-
community experts rather than local actors, then these initiatives do not promote 
participatory citizenship but instead create a second-c1ass justice system for the 
pOOf. 
The research is divided in tive chapters. To explain citizen organization in 
local security networks, it is necessary to understand the context of the misrule of 
law that prompted their development in the tirst place, as weil as the institutional 
arrangements with state, international, private, and other social actors that enable 
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their operationalization. The comparative analysis of local security networks 
within Brazil and between Brazil and South Africa further points to the 
importance of nonns and ideas as a principal explanatory factor to account for the 
variegated levels of success -<lefined in terms of citizen and community 
empowerment- of similar community programs. 
The first chapter discusses methodology. The second chapter provides a 
critical review of the relevant literature in political science, Latin American 
studies and criminology, and develops a theoretical framework to study citizen-
based security within a po]itical science perspective, focusing on civil society 
organization, power relations between state and social actors, and the role of 
nonns and ideas. Chapter 3 defines the context of insecurity in Brazil and 
demonstrates the first research hypothesis. Chapter 4 compares the institutional 
configurations, resources, and technologies of local security networks in Brazil 
and South Africa to demonstrate the second research hypothesis. The fifth chapter 
examines the normative structure of local security networks, and demonstratres 
the third research hypothesis. 
ln conclusion, 1 discuss the role of the state as a factor for both the failure 
and the success of community programs in Brazil. 1 argue that "state support" is 
an abstract construction that, when made con crete and personified in the very real 
form of a project management team or project coordinator, with quasi unlimited 
authority over a community program, free to act subjectively according to 
personal worldviews and biases, has had very different results for local security 
networks. ] further assess the implications of research findings for policy studies 
in the areas of "human security." My research provides solid grounds to criticize 
the human security approach, which fails to take into account the importance of 
the nature of participation in local govemance processes, and erroneously assumes 
that the poor are inherently more violent and typically resort to criminal means to 
compensate for the failures of public security. The evidence presented in this 
study suggests that theoretical thinking about the problem of hum an insecurity in 
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urban sIums and )ow income communities in Latin America needs to be refined to 
understand how different forms of citizen participation in community-based 
responses to insecurity produce diverse human security results. 
Methodology 
This mixed methods study is designed to demonstrate the existence ofboth causal 
and constitutive relationships between citizen agency on insecurity and micro-
governance programs. The dissertation combines two quantitative data sets (an 
opinion survey conducted with 1000 respondents in Brasilia and a national 
database on alternative systems of conflict administration) together with 
qualitative data gathered in the form of personal interviews (and to a lesser extent, 
analyses of official and internai project literature, and of scholarly publications 
from project coordinators). Hypotheses are also demonstrated using comparative 
case-study analyses, ideal-typical construct, and results from two pilot 
experiments conducted in Brasilia (in the communities of Taguatinga and 
Ceilandia) and Silo Caetano do Sul (in the neighborhood of Nova Gert y). Thus, 
this dissertation is a multi-method study, defined by the new Journal of Mixed 
Methods Research as "research in which the investigator collects and analyzes 
data, integrates the findings, and draws inferences using both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches or methods in a single study or program ofinquiry.,,6 
The dissertation employs four main data sources to test the three hypotheses 
about citizen-based security and micro-governance programs: 
1. Data derived from a national database on programs of "Access to justice 
through alternative systems of conflict administration" (Brazil Ministry of 
Justice, 2005). 
2. Data derived from a survey study on "Community Justice, Institutional 
(Mis)Trust, and Main Causes for Daily Concerns" In two communities in 
Brasilia (where the 1 st pilot project was conducted). 
3. Daily interactions and a series of in-depth interviews (formai and informai) with 
project coordinators, local community actors, and key institutional partners in 
Brazilian local security networks. 
6 The Journal of Mixed Methods Research. A vailable on-I ine at: 
http://www.sagepub.com/joumal.aspx?pid= ] ] 777 
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4. The conduct of two pilot project experiments in Brazil (Brasilia and Silo 
Caetano do Sul), with support provided by the Brazilian Ministry of Justice, 
UNDP-Brazil, the IdeasWork organization, the local Tribunals of Justice in 
Brasilia and Silo Caetano do Sul, the Military Police of Silo Paulo, and the Civil 
Police and Municipal Civil Guard of Silo çaetano do Sul. 
The first two data sources, which were collected as part of two years of 
fieldwork and research consultancy activities for the Brazilian Ministry of Justice, 
are linked in a powerful and unique way that provides grounds for causal 
inference about citizen agency on insecurity and micro-governance programs. The 
third data source, daily interactions and a set of personal interviews with local, 
state, and international actors in 4 micro-governance programs, is also unique, as 
political scientists and scholars of Latin American studies have sel dom consulted 
(and so extensively) with such a diversified array of local, state, and international 
actors about their own understandings of and strategies for citizen-based security 
and micro-governance. The fourth data source, from the results of two pilot 
experiments in the communities of Tagautinga and Ceilandia in Brasilia (Federal 
district) and Nova Gert y in Silo Caetano do Sul (Silo Paulo), and from participant 
observation in another similar pilot experiment in the favela of Jardim Angela 
(Silo Paulo), is also unique, as social scientists rarely have the opportunity to test 
theories in real-live experiment settings that can be controlled for. Each of the 
data sources is described in greater detail below and in Fieldwork Appendixes ] 
and 2. 
To demonstrate the first and second research hypotheses, 1 employ two data-
sets. The first inc\udes the 67 micro-govemance projects identified in the national 
database on programs of "Access to justice through alternative systems of conflict 
administration" conducted by the Secretariat of Judiciary Reform of the Brazilian 
Ministry of in 2005. 1 was invited to participate in the design and creation of this 
national data-base, which was was published in a government report, where 1 am 
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referenced as a principal contributing researcher7• The survey was. carried out 
nationwide to identify: The number of micro-govemance programs operating in 
the country; who started them; who funded them; who administrated the 
programs; who provided the services; what kind of training was required to 
become a service provider; who trained the service providers; who the target 
audience was; and who actually used the services. Results will be discussed at 
length in Chapters 2 and 3. 
The second data-base was created as part of my research activities for the 
two pilot projects. The data-base includes resuts from an opinion survel 1 
designed and for which the Brazilian Ministry of Justice generously provided 
funding for local community agents to carry out with neighbors and community 
residents in Taguatinga and Ceilandia9• The survey comprises a series of multiple-
choice questions designed to provide data on: The usual means employed for 
problem resolution; levels of institutional mistrust in the police and the judiciary 
power; satisfaction with the quality and usefulness of program services for 
respondents who had prior exposure to the community program; the principal 
sources of daily concems; as weil as data on the respondents (gender; age; self-
7 Acesso à Justiça por Sistemas Alternativos de Administraçiio de Conflitos. Mapeamento 
nacional de programas publicos e niio governamentais Brasilia- D.F.: Secretariat of 
Judiciary Reform - Ministry of Justice of Brazil and United Nations Development 
Programme). 
8 For survey questions, see Methodological Appendix 1; For selected survey results, see 
Statistical Appendix. 
9 The communities of Taguatinga and Ceilandia present similar socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics with the community of Nova Gert y in Sao Caetano do Sul 
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and the neighboring sIums where the second pilot project was successfully implemented. 
Standard chi-square tests detremined high levels of statistical significance between 
specified socio-economic characteristics of survey respondents (most importantly race 
and social c1ass) and survey results, suggesting that important findings for Brasilia can be 
expected to hold true for Sao Caetano do Sul and other similar low-income communities. 
While the survey was also conducted in Sao Caetano do Sul by community agents with 
both local residents who had had recourse to community program services as weil as with 
residents who had not, the sam pIe was much smaller (13 respondents) and thus not 
representative. The survey in Nova Gert y, however, was expanded (see Methodological 
Appendix 2) with new questions to determine the perceived importance of formaI state 
support for community govemance programs for service users, which produced 
interesting results that will be discussed briefly in conclusion. 
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attributed socio-economic status; race and ethnicity). The survey was conducted 
by (40) community agents with 1000 respondents over a period of two months. 
Community agents were instructed to randomly select adult respondents amongst 
neighbors and community members (door-to-door, in shopping mails, at chluch, 
in public sqares, etc) based on the sole criteria of their physical residence (within 
the territorial boundaries of Taguatinga and Ceilandia). Respondents were 
instructed by community agents of the confidentiality of their responses, of the 
strictly scientific purposes of the survey, and of their right to not answer a 
question or quit responding at any time. Respondents were provided with three 
alternatives to fill out the questionnaire: 1 )Fill out the questionnaire themselves 
and return it immediately to the community agent; 2)Have the community agent 
read the survey questions out loud, respond verbally, and let the community agent 
fill out the questionnaire; 3)If previously acquainted with the community agent, 
fiU out the questionnaire themselves and return it to the agent at an ulterior time. 
The large sample of respondents includes both community program service users 
and non-users, and thus ensures control for potential selection biases lO• This 
methodological rigor is crucial for questions relatcd to institutional (mis)trust and 
usual mcans of problem resolution. While it certainly would have been more 
simple to conduct the survey with community members who had used community 
pro gram services and provided contact information, there would have been no 
JO Standard Pearson's chi-square tests were used for tabular analyses to determine the 
level of stati sti cal significance of specified socio-economic characteristics of respondents 
(e.g., race, c1ass, gender, and age). The chi-square test is based on a comparison of 
observed cell frequencies with the cell frequencies one would expect if there were no 
relationship between the variables. The larger the differences between the actual cell 
frequencies and those expected assuming no relationship, the larger the value of chi-
square and the more Iikely that the relationship exists in the population. If the differences 
between the observed and expected frequencies are so large as to occur only rarely (5 
percent or l percent of the time), we can conclude that a relationship does exist in the 
population at large. In the other words, the relationship we observe in the 1000 sample in 
Taguatinga and Ceilandia can be generalized to other low-income and/or favelized 
communities in Brazil where micro-govemance programs were implemented.Test results 
indicate how Iikely or probable it is that the relationship between two variables observed 
in the sample might have occurred by chance and might not exist in the population from 
which the sample was drawn. The lower the probability that the relationship observed 
between two variables has occurred by chance alone the higher the level of statistical 
significance. 
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way to know if the answers were not due to the fact that individuals who have 
recourse to community program services, because they have recourse to the 
program in the tirst place, would be unlikely to resort to crime for problem-
resolution, and would be likely to not trust the police and the justice system. 
Specitically, the tirst research hypothesis, which postulates that "in the 
context of the 'misrule of law,' residents of low-income communities do not, as 
the mainstream literature depicts, usually havse recourse to private vengeance and 
security to solve daily problems of insecurity, but more typically to micro-
govemance programs (where available) and to authorities from the formaI justice 
system (the police, attorneys, and judges), even when they do not trust them," will 
be demonstrated with results for survey questions on: 
1. Main sources of daily concem (survey question #15 11 ), which corroborates 
the existence of important public security and justice failures (i. e., theorized 
context of the 'misrule oflaw'); 
2. Usual means of conflict resolution (survey questions number 7 12 and 813), 
which indicates that alternatives to the formaI justice system and the police 
Il What do you see as the biggest problem in your community? (more than one choice 
possible -list according to priorities). As most respondents did not follow the instruction 
to prioritize their responses, for clarity purposes, results for the 16 possible choice 
answers were sub-c1assified in the following three categories: 
1. Delinquency, crime, and violence: a) insecurity and crime; b) drug trafficking and 
use/ local gangs; 1) disrespect and destruction of public property; n) Noise coming from 
bars and clubs; 0) fights and arguments; p) alcoholism 
2. Misrule of law: g) police violence; h) lack of police presence; i) lack of access to the 
formaI justice system 
3. Local developmental issues 1 quality of life in the community: c) inappropriate 
housingl insufficient private space; d) lack of public green spaces; e) lack of sports 
centers/entertainment facilities; f) urban decay; j) lack of adequate lighting; k) lack of 
public transport; m) Lack of basic sanitation (water, sewage). 
12 If you did not have the possibility to have community justice agents help you resolve 
your problem/conflict, who would you go to? For c1arity purposes, results for the 
7 possible choice answers were sub-c1assified in the following three categories: 
1. Formai justice system: b) the police; c) a public defense attorney; d) a private lawyer; 
e) a Sm ail Claims Court Judge 
2. Priva te justice: f) take matters into your own hands; g) people from the community 
(i.e., community leaders, youths from the neighborhood, people from your church, etc.); 
i) other 
3. No action; h) no action 
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typically involve lawful rneans of conflict resolution in low-incorne 
cornrnunities; 
3. Institutional (rnis)trust in the police l4 and the fornal justice systern l5 (survey 
questions nurnber 9 and 12), which corroborates the theorized context of the 
'rnisrule of law', and further indicates that citizens have recourse to formaI 
authorities to solve conflicts ev en wh en they do not trust thern. 
These survey results are also subrnitted to the chi-square test to determine 
the level of statistical significance of race/ethnicity I6, c1ass17, gender l8, and age l9 
for each ofthe (dependent) variables. 
The second research hypothesis, which postulates that "in Brazil, rnlcro-
governance prograrns do not ernpower citizens as a collectivity -as 
cornrnunities- to identify and irnplernent solutions to shared problerns of 
13 In general, if you have a problem/confliet, who would you ask to help you resolve the 
situation? For c1arity purposes, results for the 8 possible choice answers were sub-
c1assified in the following four categories: 
1. Formai justice system: b) the police; c) a public defense attorney; d) a private lawyer; 
e) a Small Claims Court Judge 
2. Community justice: a) community justice agents 
3. Private justice: f) take matters into your own hands; g) people from the community 
(i.e., community leaders, youths from the neighborhood, people from your church, etc.); 
i) other 
4. No action; h) no action 
14 Do you trust police offieers to proteet citizens, provide security, and help you when you 
have a problem? For c1arity purposes, results for the 4 possible choice answers were sub-
c1assified in the following two categories: 
1. Trust: a) very much; b) somewhat 
2. Mistrust: c) not much; d) not at aIl 
15 Do you think that every citizen has equal access to the justice system, independently of 
wealth, race and gender?) 
16 Survey question #17. What is your race/ethnicity? For clarity purposes, results for the 5 
possible choice answers were sub-c1assified in the following four categories: 
1. Caucasian: a) White 
2. Afro-descendents: b) Black; c) Mixed descent ("Pardo") 
3. Indigenous; d) Indigenous 
4. Asian descendents: e) AsianlOriental ("Amarelo") 
17 Survey question #16. Which social class do you consider yourselfto be part of? For 
clarity purposes, results for the 6 possible choice answers were sub-classified in the 
folJowing two categories: 
1. Upper-half: a) the wealthy ; b) the upper-middle-class; c) the middle-class 
2. Lower-half: d) the Jower middle-class; e) the working class; f) the poor 
18 Survey question #18. What is your gender? 
19 Survey question #19. What is your age group? 
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insecurity, but rather enable individuals to solve private problems that cause 
insecurity within the physical boundaries of their communities, provided with the 
assistance of professional outside-community experts," will be demonstrated with 
comparative results of network components (e.g., technology-base, 
institutionalization, resources, and normative position) for 93 local security 
networks within Brazil and between Brazil and South Africa. 
Data sources inc1ude questions related to program characteristics20 from the 
national survey of "alternative systems of confl ict adm inistration," which indicate 
that the majority of micro-govemance programs in Brazil rely on profession al 
expertise (rather than local knowledge and capacities) and are highly dependent 
on govemement agencies and its staff to operate. Data sources also inc1ude the 
question related to user statisfaction with community pro gram services21 from the 
opinion survey conducted in Brasilia22, which indicates that the majority of 
respondents who had had recourse to services provided through the community 
justice program were satisfied with the outcome, providing evidence that the 
micro-govemance program works to empower individuals to solve private 
problems (provided with the assistance of professional outside-community 
experts.) Data from the IdeasWork organization on the number of cases 
successfully solved (with a Plan of Action) in selected (Zwelethemba) pilot sites 
in South Africa, indicates that these micro-govemance programs work to 
empower both citizens and communities as a means of security. The analysis of 
(official and internaI) annual budget allocations for the Brasilia and Viva Rio 
projects provide corroborating evidence that su ch micro-govemance programs, 
common in Brazil, are very costly to operate yet do not benefit community actors 
in terms of participation opportunities and self-direction as they depend on a 
20 For the specifie program attributes included in the data-base, refer to Table 5 on 
"Technologies, Resources, and Institutional Arrangements in 67 Community-Based 
'Systems ofConflict Administration' in Brazil" (p. 92). 
21 Survey question #5. lfyou used the services of the community justice program, were 
you satisfied with the outcome? 
22 Survey results are also submitted to the chi-square test to determine the level of 
statistical significance of socio-economic characteristics of respondents. 
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panoply of salaried (outside-community) experts to provide community mediation 
services (and in sorne cases to facilitate access to formai authorities) to local 
residents, who, as a result, are only allowed a limited and mainly consumptive 
form of participation in their community program. Other data sources include 
information on the four network components of the 25 Zwelethemba pilot projects 
obtained through in-depth interviews with the South African project coordinators. 
Interviews and daily interactions with community agents and project coordinators 
in Brasilia and Silo Caetano do Sul (through the two pilot experiments discussed 
further in this chapter), and to a lesser extent with community agents and project 
coordinators for the Viva Rio project and the Jardim Angela pilot, also provided 
important qualitative data to demonstrate the research hypothesis. These 
qualitative and quantitative data sources served to construct an ideal-type of 
citizen agency, which is further built upon to demonstrate the third research 
hypothesis. 
The third research hypothesis, which postulates that "local security networks 
have their own normative structure constituted by ideas about the legitimacy of 
the state's exclusive monopoly of justice, which determines their institutional 
configuration, the choice for technology, and resource distribution within the 
network. ln Brazil, conservative norms pervade institutional cultures and have 
translated into a programmatic bias in the form of credentialism that undermines 
both citizen and community agency in local security networks," will be 
demonstrated building on findings for hypotheses one and two, and based on 
results from the two pilot experiments and from interviews and daily interactions 
with the local and international actors discussed above. This research hypothesis 
does not seek to establish causality but to situate the causal relationships observed 
(with hypotheses ] and 2) within their ideationaJ contexts, which shows the 
existence of a constitutive relationship between the extent of individual and 
collective citizen agency in local security networks and the normative positions 
(on the state's monopoly of justice) ofbureaucratic actors within the network. 
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It should be emphasized that this research follows Weber in the German 
verstehen23 tradition, which focuses on the participatory and subjective role of 
social scientists. As a participant observer of Brazilian local security networks, 
my role implied "conscious and systematic sharing, insofar as circumstances 
permit, in the life activities, and on occasion, in the interests and effects of a 
group of persons" (Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000), which meant, in the context 
of this study, that 1 observed and participated in the daily activities of the 
community agents and of the Bureaucratic partners involved in four local security 
networks: The favela of Jardim Angela in Sao Paulo; the satellite-cities of 
Taguatinga and Ceilandia in Brasilia; the neighborhood of Nova Gert y in Sao 
Caetano do Sul/Sao Paulo; and to a lesser extent, the favelas of Leme and Rocinha 
in Rio de Janeiro. 
Due to logistical and financial constraints, it was impossible to do in-
depth case-study analyses for the Il local security networks24 in Brazil that rely 
on local residents to provide services to community members. 1 was, however, 
able to do a comparative study of the two projects coordinated by judges (e.g., 
Community Justice Project in Brasilia and the Restorative and Community Justice 
Project in Sao Caetano do Sul), and, to a lesser extent, oftwo projects coordinated 
by social actors (e.g. Viva Rio Project implemented by the Balcao de Direito 
NGO in Rio de Janeiro and the Jardim Angela pilot implemented through the 
Center for the Study of Violence), which were ail further compared to the original 
Zwelethemba experiments in South Africa. 
These case-studies constitute an interesting and diversified sample of local 
security networks: They operate with different resources and technologies and are 
regulated by different institutional configurations and mentalities. The networks 
23"Verstehen" is the German term employed for "empathy," in the sense of 
"understandi ng." 
24 These Il local security networks were identified in the national survey on "Access to 
Justice through Alternative Systems of Conflict Administration" conducted by the 
Brazilian Ministry of Justice in 2005. 
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are also located in different areas of the country and, while they ail operate in 
highly urbanized and underprivileged areas, they operate within very different city 
cultures: Sao Paulo is a megapolis and the financial capital; Rio de Janeiro is the 
cultural heart of Brazil and the capital of camival; Brasilia is the administrative 
capital and the center for power politics. Moreover, these local security networks 
were implemented and are administrated through institutional partnerships with 
both corn mon and diversified outside-community actors. While they share 
common basic programmatic objectives, the networks operate according to 
different principles and procedures based on variegated institutional 
configurations and ideational premises. 
Without the experienced knowledge of "the persons involved, their values, 
rituals,. symbols, beliefs, and emotions" in these local security networks 
(Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000), it would be difficult to appreciate the 
complexity of the relationship between citizen agency and participation in micro-
govemance programs, on the one hand, and, on the other, to grasp the significance 
of norms and ideas about who can have agency on justice for local security 
networks. 
Ethnographic studies require fieldwork and traditional qualitative methods 
of data collection. As Reinharz (1992: 46, c.f. Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002: 308) 
explains, "contemporary ethnography or fieldwork is multimethod research. It 
usually incJudes observation, participation, archivaI analysis, and interviewing." 
Ethnography involves interactions with live human research subjects25 and 
requires researchers to "put themselves in the place of the subject ofinquiry ... [to] 
grasp both the historical dimension of human behavior and the subjective aspects 
25 For which l was issued an Ethics Certificate, following permission granted by the 
Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Université de Montréal 
(CERFAS - Comité d'éthique de la recherche de la Faculté des arts et des sciences). This 
research strictly adheres to the ethical norms and procedures stipulated by the Tri-Council 
(Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Medical Research 
Councîl of Canada, and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of 
Canada) and by CERFAS for research involving live human subjects. 
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of human experience." (Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000). This study places the 
analytical focus on the worldviews of the individuals observed/interviewed and 
seeks to uncover how they make sense of their experiences, which presupposes 
the recognition that reality is socially constructed (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002: 
307) and thus warrants the choice to emphasize the role ofnorms and ideas26• 
Norms can be defined as the "broad c1ass of prescriptive statements -rules, 
standards, principles, and so forth- both procedural and substantive [that are] 
prescriptions for action in situations of choice, carrying a sense of obligation, a 
sense that they ought to be followed" (Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 65, c.f. Hurrell, 
2001: 143). Hurrell's (2001) review of "Norms and Ethics in International 
Relations" provides a most insightful conceptual frame to understand how norms 
influence political outcomes: 
"[Norms] play a number of fundamental roles. They may weil serve 
as regulatory rules designed to constrain choices and/or parameters 
within which individual agents pursue their own preferences. But the 
critical point is that they do far more than this. In the first place, they 
help explain how actors are constituted. [ ... ] Second, they help us 
make sense of the identity of actors and hence of the sources of their 
preferences. [ ... ] And third, norms do not simply constrain but also 
enable and empower action." (pp.142-143) 
As this study will demonstrate empirically with results from two pilot 
experiments, the latter point is especially relevant to understand and explain the 
contradictory effects of state support for community-based governance initiatives 
in Brazil. After two years of field research involving extensive interactions with 
the project coordination team and institutional partners of the local security 
26 In political science, constructivists have made a similar daim and focus on the role of 
norms and ideas in the construction of international life. See, for example, Pettman 
(2001), who employs what he calls "a constructivist approach based on common sense" 
to demonstrate that it is the way in which ordinary people perceive international relations 
that structure international relations and the institutions of the international system. 
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networks examined in this study, l identified different ideational trends in local 
security networks, schematized below in Figure 1. 
Figure l.ldeational spectrum of Justice regulation 
Credenffalism Sfafus-quo 
State monopoly Conservative 
of justice 
Change 
Liberal 
Local 
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Outside-state 
regulation of 
social conflicls 
As iIlustrated above, bureaucratie actors in local security networks can be 
ideationaJJy positioned based on their conception of the state's exclusive 
monopoly of justice. Specifically, conservative and liberal normative positions 
were determined according to the position of the institutional actor towards 
change and challenges to the state' s traditionaJ monopoly of justice, based on the 
level of credentialization required for participation and the extent of citizen 
agency each oftheir programs enables, as weil as on public statements, published 
material, interview results, and professional communications with individual 
project coordinators. As will be demonstrated further in Chapter 4, normative 
positions are important for community programs because they influence the three 
other components identified by Shearing et al. (e.g., institutional structure, 
technology, resources) constituting the local security network. first, normative 
positions influence the choice for technology, or the knowledge-base employed 
for daily operations in the community program (e.g. traditional professional 
knowledge vs. local knowledge). Second, normative positions influence the 
allocation of resources, or the distribution of financial resources for daily progam 
operations (e.g. relative budget allocations for bureaucratie vs. community actors). 
Third, normative positions influence the institutional configuration of community 
program, or the distribution of participatory and decision-making opportunities 
between bureaucratie and community actors within the local security network 
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(Le., a heavy vs. light bureaucracy detennines who can participate in daily 
program activities and how). 
As discusseâ briefly in the introduction, on one end of the ideational 
spectrum, conservatives are in favor of the status-quo and characterized by their 
opposition to change. Conservatives seek to preserve, albeit to different extents, 
sorne fonn of state monopoly over justice. Conservatives believe that social 
conflicts should be arbitrated by state authorities through formai state institutions 
(Le., the police and courts), or at minimum in close collaboration with formai 
authorities and experts. Conservatives do not believe that communities have the 
basic knowledge and capacities to govern local security issues -that is, to solve 
daily problems and conflicts that affect quality of life in their homes and 
communities themselves- nor that they should be entrusted as a means of 
security. 
More "Iiberal" conservatives may be open-minded to sorne degree of change 
and denounce the state's exclusive monopoly of justice. They believe 
communities can have a role to play in the local governance of justice and 
security, but that local actors require continuous assistance and monitoring from 
professionals from the justice system 10 carry out their program activities within 
the community. 
Situated at the opposite end of the ideational spectrum, liberals are favorable 
to progress and reform. LiberaIs are principaHy defined by their opposition to the 
status-quo and their open-mindedness to change regarding the regulation of social 
conflicts outside traditional state institutions. Challenging the traditional state 
monopoly of justice, liberals believe that social conflicts can be arbitrated 
efficiently outside the fonnal state channels within a lawful, regulated framework 
of action in low-income communities where public security is failing and access 
to the justice system is limited. Liberais seek to empower cÎtizens and 
communities with as much agency as possible to address the causes of conflicts 
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that cause daily insecurity before they have spillover effects. Citizen agency is 
created by providing communities with tools (e.g. knowledge to identify the 
context-specific and root causes of insecurity, and technology to prioritize 
community needs and carry out peace-building activities) as weil as a basic 
infrastructure (e.g., the formaI establishment of citizen committees who are 
provided with minimal funding for peace-making and peace-building activities) to 
mediate conflicts at the community level. 
More "conservative" liberals may also keep a close institutional relationship 
with the community projects they support. Unlike conservatives, however, liberals 
do not believe local actors require continuous monitoring and assistance from its 
own, outside-community professional staff and maintain instead synergetic (as 
opposed to vertical) ties with the community project they support through case-
forwarding mechanisms and regular meetings and follow-ups with the community 
agents. 
The case-study on the pilot project ln Brasilia will illustrate that the 
prevalence of conservative norms on the state's monopoly of justice amongst 
bureaucratic actors at the local tribunal of justice results in the "de-
communityzation" of the eommunity pro gram as the bulk of services remain 
administrated and provided through professional (outside-community) staff 
members from the tribunal of justice. In stark contrast, the case-study on the pilot 
project in Sâo Caetano do Sul will show that the preval en ce of liberal norms on 
the state' s monopoly of justice arnongst bureaucratie actors in the local tribunal of 
justice results in a truly community-based governance prograrn, operated mainly 
through community residents. 
Explaining and understanding citizen-based responses to insecurity, on the 
one hand, and the paradox of "eommunity governance from above," on the other, 
requires basic knowledge of Brazilians "acting in the natural course oftheir daily 
lives" (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002), which entailed participant observation in 6 
30 
communities where mediation programs operated27, but as importantly for the 
purpose ofthis study, within their broader bureaucratic environment28 • As will be 
demonstrated, local security networks are constituted not only by community 
actors, but also by a panoply of outside:'community partners (e.g. a 
"bureaucracl9,,) who provide the necessary institutional infrastructure, 
technology, and resources for community programs to operate on a daily basis. 
The web of outside-community public and private partners in local security 
networks is constituted by the autonomous bureaucracies30 of state authorities, 
international organizations, academic institutions, local associations, NGOs, and 
private corporations. In the case-studies examined in Brazil, the bureaucracy of 
local security networks was constituted mainly through an array of partnerships 
involving the following institutional partners31 : 
27 For a detailed time frame and description of fieldwork activities in the communities 
investigated, see fieldwork Appendix l, 
28 The particular characteristics of the Bureaucratic context will be discussed at length in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
29 It is noteworthy that Weber was one of the first social scientists to take interest in the 
bureaucracy, which he defines broadly as a (Iegitimate) fOTIn of legal domination. He 
started the scholarly debate in his pioneering work on "the Bureaucracy" in Economyand 
Society. In this study, he employs ideal-typical methodology to demonstrate that "rule by 
office" (e.g. bureaucracy) is more efficient and rational than more traditional and 
charismatic fOTIns of domination legitimized in previous historical periods29 because it is 
based on a rule of law that is legitimized both by the moral values upon which it was 
edified and by the procedures through which they were institutionalized (e.g. codified 
into law). 
30 The teTIn "bureaucracy" was coined by Frenchmen in the] 8th century and literally 
means "office rule" (the place of office, or workplace, is commonly referred to as 
"bureau" in French), or the rule conducted from an office through daily routinized 
administrative activities such as documentation, record-keeping, and communications. In 
the most generic sense, bureaucracies are hierarchical organizations operated according to 
standardized procedures by salaried staff: They are administrative systems designed to 
divide and execute labor, on the one hand, and to enforce legal rules, on the other. 
Speci fi cali y, according to Weber (c.f. Watson, 1980), bureaucracies are fundamentally 
characterized by the continuous conduct of official business based on written documents, 
according to strictly (pre)defined rules, and following a hierarchical division oflabor and 
responsibilities that ensures the accountability of the professional salaried staff (i.e., 
bureaucrats) and the separation of official and private business and income. 
31 To identiry the relevant actors in the local security networks examined as part of this 
study, 1 employed the "positional approach" traditionally used in structural analysis 
(Lemieux and Ouimet, 2004). Concretely, this involved selecting relevant actors based 
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1. The judiciary power: the Federal District and Territories Tribunal of Justice in 
Brasilia and the Sao Paulo Tribunal of Justice in Sao Caetano do Sul; 
2. The executive power: the Ministry of Justice's Secretariat of Judiciary Reform, 
Special Secretariat for Human Rights, and National Secretariat for Public 
Security; 
3. Law enforcement agencies: the Municipal Civil Guard, the Military Police, and 
the Civil Police; 
4. International organizations: the United Nations Development Programme for 
Brazil; 
5. Academic institutions: the IdeasWork organization and the Center for the Study 
of Violence (University ofSao Paulo); 
6. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs): The BaJcao de Direitos' Viva Rio 
organization in Rio de Janeiro 
These research findings are based on two years of fieldwork in the country, 
where 1 used participant observation to collect data on: The nature of citizen and 
community participation in local governance programs with a justice and security 
focus; the role of outside-community partners --of "the bureaucracy"- in 
underrnining or promoting micro-governance programs and citizen-based 
security; and the prevalent norrns and ideas about the state's monopoly of justice 
within the local security networks. 
Working from within governmental and academic institutions not only 
enabled me to secure access to local residents and community agents in 
neighborhoods with community programs, but further enabled me to investigate 
the customs and beliefs of the institutional actors responsible for the community 
programs examined. First, the time 1 spent as a researcher affiliated to the Center 
for the Study of Violence in Sao Paulo enabled me to know the community, the 
community agents, and the community residents in the favela of Jardim Angela, 
as weil as to understand the impact of academic (mis)management for community 
governance programs. Second, provided with the institutional support the 
Brazilian Ministry of Justice and the IdeasWork academic organization, 1 was 
on their status and their junetion within the (local seeurity) network. This was 
accompli shed mainly through participant observation in the communitycase-studies and 
through interviews with project coordinators and local service providers. 
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able to become well-acquainted with the communities, the community agents, and 
the community residents in Taguatinga and Ceilandia (Brasilia, D.F.), in Nova 
Gert y (Sao Caetano do Sul, S.P.), and to a Icsser extent in the favelas of Rocinha 
and Leme (Rio de Janeiro). These institutional linkages further enabled me to 
observe how government agencies from both the executive and judiciary powers, 
as weil as non-governmental and international organizations, support policies to 
promote micro-governance initiatives at the same time as they invest in highly 
credentialized community programs that undermine citizen and community 
agency. 
Pilot Projects 
My affiliation to the Brazilian Ministry of Justice enabled me to secure 
institutional support and funding for two community pilot projects 1 co-designed 
with professor Clifford Shearing, which provided an actual, real-live experiment 
setting that could be controlled for -a luxury afforded to few social science 
studies. Indeed, as King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 21-22) aptly point out, pilot 
projects are "very useful, especially in research where data must be gathered by 
interviewing or other particularly costly means. Preliminary data-gathering may 
lead us to alter the research questions or modify the theory. Then new data can be 
gathered to test the new theory, and the problem of using the same data to 
generate and test a theory can be avoided." 
Based on best practices from the Zwelethemba experiments in South Africa 
and on what had been learned on the reasons for its failure in Jardim Angela32, 
prof essor Shearing and 1 conceptualized a flexible and minimalist Zwelethemba-
inspired model of community governance that could be fused at minimal cost to 
preexisting state-supported community programs of conflict mediation. The 
fusion-model was implemented in two preexisting state-sponsored corn munit y 
32 Explanatory factors for the failure of this tirst Zwelethemba pilot experiment in Brazil 
will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
justice projects coordinated by two judges: the Community Justice Project in 
Taguatinga and Ceilandia (Brasilia), and the Restorative Justice Project in Sào 
Caetano do Sul (Sào Paulo), which was renamed Restorative and Community 
Justice project in 2006 after the fusion was successfully operationalized. 
The South African Zwelethemba Model of Conflict Resolution and 
Community Development 
The Zwelethemba model was developed through trial and error in South Africa by 
professor Clifford Shearing, and is inspired from a successful policing strategy he 
helped design during the transition to democracy in South Africa. Based on the 
idea that there is no one better fit than demonstrators themselves to police 
demonstrators, the massive protests at the end of the Apartheid regime were 
carried out mostly peacefully with limited incidence of violence through an 
innovative strategy that employed locals -themselves part of the protests-
rather th an private security guards and police officers associated to the old 
repressive regime to police demonstrators and ensure the peaceful conduct of 
protests. 
The strategy proved remarkably efficient, and professor Shearing, who had 
been a member of the advisory Commission33 responsible for the initiative, was 
shortly after commissioned by the new Ministry of Justice to push the experiment 
further and apply these principles to conflict mediation in townships notorious for 
their high levels of crime and violence. The first pilot experience in 1998 was 
conducted in the community of Zwelethemba ("place of hope" in the Xhosa 
language), and following its demonstrated success, the model was subsequently 
implemented and has been running for almost a decade in over thirty 
underprivileged communities in South Africa and five other countries34• The 
Zwelethemba model traveled from the townships of South Africa to the shanty-
33 For a detaiJed account of the innovative policing strategy, see Goldstone (1993) and 
Heymann (1992). 
34. See Froestad and Shearing (2005); Cartwright and Jenneker (2005); Shearing and 
Wood (2004); Wood and Font (2003); Shearing (2001a and 2001b). 
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towns of Argentina, to rural Uganda and Australia, to working c1ass and favelized 
communities in Brazil and more recently, to low-income areas in Canada. 
The Zwelethemba model of conflict resolution and community development 
functions formally according to princip les of nodal governance, based on the 
belief in the superiority of decentralized governance and the "added value" of 
local knowledge for problem resolution. The Zwelethemba community projects 
mobilize and organize the capacities of local residents to empower citizens and 
communities to address daily sources of insecurity though confl ict mediation in 
low-Încome residential areas where public security is failing. 
While the deve\opment of an international network of "Zwelethemba-
inspired" micro-governance programs is undoubtedly the work of academics, 
researchers did not "invent" the Zwelethemba mode!. The Zwelethemba model 
was developed organically through trial and error by the residents of the 
Zwelethemba community. The word spread to other townships, who requested a 
program be implemented in their own community, and so on, until word got to the 
ears of Scandinavian international aid agencies, who thought the idea was quite 
c1ever and decided to invest in longer-term strategies to support and disseminate 
the Zwelethemba mode\ as a best-practice in citizen-based security and 
community governance. 
The role of researchers working on the Zwelethemba experiments has been 
to develop methods and mechanisms that most effectively mobilize local 
resources- that is, local knowledge and capacities- to enable residents of low-
income communities where public security is failing to act as individuals and 
communities on the daily sources of insecurity. As Shearing et al. (2005) explain, 
"residents in Zwelethemba had as a group the capacity to govern security and 
development in the collectivity but lacked a node in which this diffused capacity 
could be coordinated and mobilized. The [Zwelethemba] intervention was 
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designed to respond to this governance deficit by facilitating the creation ofthese 
nodal arrangements." 
In 2006, the Zwelethemba model of conflict resolution and community 
development was formally recognized by the South African Ministry of Justice as 
a best practice in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). ADR "describes a 
number of methods used to resolve disputes out of court, including negotiation, 
conciliation, mediation and the many types of arbitration [ ... ] The common 
denominator of ail ADR methods is that they are faster, less formalistic, cheaper 
and often less adversarial than a court trial" (Nolo, 2006io. 
What fundamentally distinguishes the Zwelethemba model from most ADR 
models, however, is that the former operates based on local knowledge and 
capacities, while ADR does not necessarily involve local citizen participation 
beyond service "consumption" and usually relies on university-trained experts to 
provide mediation services, not necessarily free of charge. 
Moreover, the Zwelethemba model, unlike more traditional ADR and the 
vast majority of these ADR community programs in Brazil, functions within a 
non-hierarchical and non-retributive culture of justice. As opposed to ADR 
practitioners, who tend to reproduce the structure of the justice system (e.g., a 
plaintiff, a defendant, and a third party to arbitrate the dispute), Peace Committees 
members (e.g., the local community agents who provide program services21 ) do 
not usually work with the traditional offender/victim dichotomy. 
20 ln Brazil, Law 9.307/96 ("Mediation Law") and Decree 2.411/97 regulate ADR 
mechanisms, but there is no specifie institution responsible for the overall regulation of 
ADR: "Any person over twenty one years old, who is trusted by the parties involved, 
may serve as a mediator/arbitrator" (World Bank, 2006). 
21 While in South Africa ail local service providers are referred to as "Peace Committee 
members," the nomenclature varies from one project to the other in Brazil. For example, 
in Brasilia, local service providers are referred to as "community justice agents." ln Sao 
Caetano do Sul, they are called "justice facilitators," and "agents of citizenship" in Rio de 
Janeiro. 
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Instead, Peace Committees conceptualize conflict as a dynamic process with 
different "parties" involved. The role of Peace Committee members -who do not 
work as individuals but rather in small teams- is to constitute neutral "parties" to 
help disputants come together to discuss and solve the root causes of a specific 
problem, and to identify and engage relevant community and family members to 
participate in the contlict resolution process. 
Peace Committees facilitate rather than impose the reaching of a mutually 
satisfactory solution. The aim is to "repair" harms and resolve immediate 
problems so that they will not re-occur rather than attributing blame and 
responsibility for past actions on which there is no agency, which is consistent 
with a future-oriented conception of justice. 
In everyday practice, the Zwelethemba model of contlict resolution and 
community development comprises two fundamental dimensions to regulate 
justice and security at the community level: Peacemaking35 and Peacebuilding. 
Peacemaking activities are carried out by Peace Committee members in 
teams of usually 3-6 individuals and consist in contlict mediation. Peace 
Committees operate according to a "Code of Good Practice36:" Their role is nol to 
solve the problems presented to them themselves, but rather to arrange a meeting 
35 For a detailed description of the 19 steps of the Peacemaking process (dispute-
resolution methodology) in the Zwelethemba projects in South Afiica, which the Sao 
Caetano model a1so broadly follows, refer to Fieldwork Appendix 2. 
36 The Code of Good Practice, which is also followed by the community agents in Sao 
Caetano, inc1udes the following 10 principles (IdeasWork, 2005): 
1) We help ta create a safe and secure environment in our community; 
2) We respect the Constitution; 
3) We work within the law; 
4) We do not useforee or violence; 
5) We do not take sides in disputes; 
6) We work in the eommunity as a co-operative team, not as individuals; 
7) Wefollow procedures which are openfor the community to see; 
8) We do not gossip about our work or about other people; 
9) We are committed in what we do; 
10) Our aim is to heal, not ta hurt. 
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and to facilitate the discussion so that the disputants can find a solution. Peace 
Committee members are also trained to identify the right people to invite to the 
gatherings whose participation is likely to help solve the dispute. These third 
parties, who 1 cali "active citizen-bystanders," are people who were either directly 
or indirectly affected by the conflict, and/or who can help find a mutually 
satisfactory agreement (e.g., neighbors, family members, friends, co-workers, 
etc.) by participating in the mediation process. 
For each conflict they mediate, regardless of the number of gatherings 
required, but not pending on the actual "resolution" of the conflict, Peace 
Committees receive a small payment (for example, 10$) they divide amongst 
themselves, that is, according to the number of members who participated at ail 
the gatherings for this contlict. Peace Committees fill out basic standard;zed 
forms for each (of the 19) steps ofthe conflict mediation process to ensure that the 
basic rules and procedures ofPeacemaking are followed, and to gather data on the 
conflict resolution process (participants, nature ofproblem, plan ofaction, etc.). 
Peacemaking is an important part of Peace Committees' activities, but it 
does not constitute the only means through which citizens exert direct agency on 
sources of injustice and insecurity. The peace-building dimension of the 
Zwelethemba model further enables local residents to actively participate in 
community development37• 
Peace-building activities are financed by a community fund (itselffunded by 
international partners) and are administrated by Peace Committees, but not carried 
out by them. The peace-building fund is used to address the root causes- social 
37 While it is true that the Zwelethemba model of contlict resolution and community 
development constitutes an integrated approach to insecurity designed to enable citizens 
to solve daily contlicts as well as to address their origins rooted in social injustices, and 
that sorne critics have expressed skepticism regarding the likelihood of success of 
peacemaking activities in the absence of the peace-building dimension of the model, the 
success of the Sfio Caetano project, of which the activities remain limited to contlict 
mediation, indicates the model works even in the absence of a peace-building community 
fund. 
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and economic- of daily problems in the community, to avoid their occurrence in 
the first place. Dealing with local contlicts on a regular basis, Peace Committees 
identify a pattern of common social and economic problems stemming From 
poverty that cause daily problems within families, amongst neighbors, and at . 
school, such as unemployment and under-employment, youth idleness, lack of 
basic infrastructures, urban decay (e.g., lack of electricity and adequate street 
lighting, graffiti, lack of parks and diversion areas, etc.). These problems can be 
prioritized and addressed with resources from the community fund. The 
Zwelethemba model provides simple procedures for Peace Committees to 
determine what are the most urgent security priorities and thus how and where to 
spend the money. 
The only rule the Peace Committees must abide to (and local academic 
partners ensure the rule has been respected before issuing the tùnds) is that funds 
must be spent entirely in the community where the project operates. For example, 
if the Peace Committee decides to create a local soccer team, then the uniform and 
ail the sports equipment must be bought and/or fabricated in local formai and 
informai businesses. The objectives of the peace-building fund are both practical 
and theoretical. It serves not only to create work locally, but to improve the 
quality of life by addressing the social and economic causes of insecurity before 
they create insecurity. In sorne cases, the community fund may also be used to 
resolve specific disputes between neighbors, for example, by investing in the 
construction of a fence between 2 habitations. 
The operating concept for the peace-building fund is relatively simple: For 
every "10$" received by Peace Committees for their Peacemaking activities, the 
same amount is donated by an outside-community partner to a community fund 
that is managed by the Peace Committees collectively and accountably. While 
Peace Committees retain ail the decision-making power regarding the 
administration and spending of the community fund, the fund remains physically 
hosted within academic institutions to avoid corruption problems. Academic 
partners are responsible for ail the financial issues: They apply for grants, 
administrate the funds, and distribute payments to Peace Committees and for 
peace-build ing activities. 
The tools and procedures of Peacemaking and Peace-building which 
comprise the Zwelethemba model of conflict resolution and corn munit y 
development were copyrighted and beJong to Clifford Shearing's IdeasWork 
organization. The registration of intellectual pro pert y rights is not intended for 
profit purposes --the ZweJethemba model was never 'for sale" and IdeasWork is a 
virtual network of scholars- but rather to work as a safeguard against potential 
abuses and misuses of the technology, as unfortunately happened with the first 
pilot experiment in Jardim Angela. 
The Zwelethemba experiments in Brazil 
In the case of Brasilia, the Zwelethemba-inspired fusion-model was developed 
building on pre-existing linkages with the judiciary power through the local 
tribunal of justice, as well as on lessons learned from the failed Zwelethemba 
experiment in Jardim Angela, which Iike the original Zwelethemba model in 
South Africa lacked these institutionalized linkages to the justice system. In Sao 
Caetano, we refined the fusion-model based on lessons leamed from the two prior 
failures to operationalize a ZweJethemba-inspired community program in Jardim 
Angela and Brasilia. The fusion-model implemented in Sao Caetano also built on 
preexisting linkages to the local tribunal of justice, but further strengthened and 
widened the scope of collaboration with the state by developing new partnerships 
with the police as weil as institutionalized mechanisms enabling the forwarding of 
cases between the tribunal, the police, and the community program. 
The Brasilia and Sao Caetano do Sul projects were selected, first and 
foremost, because both judges, having heard of the Zwelethemba model, 
expressed interest in integrating sorne of its basic tools and princip les into the 
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daily operational structure of their respective projects. The projects were also 
chosen for pragmatic reasons. The project in Brasilia, coordinated through the 
Federal District and Territories Tribunal of Justice (in collaboration mainly with 
the Ministry of Justice's Special Secretariat of Human Rights), was chosen 
because of its pre-existing institutional structure established in 2000, and because 
of its physical proximity to the Secretariat of Judiciary Reform and UNDP offices 
(who provided funding for the fusion). In a nutsheJl, the original, pre-fusion 
project was designed to provide conflict mediation services and promote rights 
awareness in two large neighboring, low-income and parti y favelized 
communities (Taguatinga and Ceilandia) located on the outskirts of Brasilia, far 
outside the main "pilot plan," where the city of Brasilia is concentrated. This 
micro-governance project operated daily through a complex (and costly) 
Bureaucracy involving psychologists, lawyers (and law intems from the pilot 
plan), as weil as social workers, who provided expertise and daily assistance to 
local community agents, who in tum transferred the expert advice back to the 
community for each case received from the community. 
The Restorative Justice Project in Sào Caetano do Sul, coordinated through 
the Sào Paulo Tribunal of Justice, was selected because of its linkages with the 
Secretariat of Judiciary Reform and UNDP-Brazil, who funded the 
implementation of the pilot project in 200438• The project was also selected to 
expand its scope of action to enable community mediation for the adult 
population. Before its fusion wÎth the Zwelethemba model, the project in Sào 
Caetano operated exclusively with juvenile offenders brought to Justice after 
encounters with the police, and was designed to empower adolescents to solve 
conflicts within their school environment rather than court. The cases, after 
38It should also be noted that the project in Silo Caetano, which was implemented in May-
June 2006 with funding provided by the Secretariat of Judiciary Reform and UNDP-
Brazil and technology provided by IdeasWork, was vouched for by the author as a solid 
basis for a pilot experiment after having ensured, through extensive consultation with the 
judge coordinator, the prevalence of at liberaJ norms to regulate daily operational 
activities. This addition al criteria of selection was added to safeguard the community 
project from a hostile Bureaucratie takeover, as unfortunately happened with the pilot 
experiment in Brasilia. 
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arriving in the judge coordinator's court, were selected based on two criteria: 
1 )the disputants have to recognize the occurrence of the event; 2)the disputants 
have to agree to attempt to solve their problem out of court, in a restorative circle 
at school, with the presence other youths from the school who acted as (trained) 
conflict mediators, family members, and a social worker from the Tribunal. The 
encounters are focused on feelings, needs, and responsibility, as opposed to 
blame, shame, and retribution. The purpose of the circles is to find a solution 
satisfactory to ail the parties, which is expected to ensure that the conflict will not 
re-occur in the future (the relationship between justice and (in)security will be 
discussed further in the next chapter). 
Beyond practical concerns, the two projects were chosen for the two pilot 
experiments because in their pre-fusion form, both community initiatives lacked: 
1)a strong community development element (community agents acted as 
individuals, not as a team); 2)investments in the communities; 3)a clearly defined 
and functional model of conflict resolution; 4)a wider scope of action (including 
criminal matters); and 5)self-sustainability (both projects faced daily bankruptcy). 
The two judges responsible for the projects at the time believed that adopting the 
fusion version of the Zwelethemba model would be able fix these problems at 
once. 
The fusion-model was to be operationalized in five basic steps39. To begin, 
it would involve the transfer of Zwelethemba technology (e.g. knowledge and 
standardized forms for mediation and peace-building activities) through training 
workshops for community agents, judiciary staff and police personnel 
39 for a detailed description of the procedures and steps involved in the fusion-project in 
Brasilia, which further served as the blueprint for the pilot experiment in Sao Caetano do 
Sul, see fieldwork Appendix 2. In the case of the pilot in Sao Caetano do Sul, the fusion 
involved the creation of an entire1y new project for adults and as su ch did not require 
adaptation to existing operational procedures. Rather, the fusion entailed combining 
Zwelethemba tools and methodology with the principles and case-forwarding structure of 
restorative justice (as operationalized for youth off end ers), in a new synergetic model that 
enabled the forwarding of cases between the community, the community project, local 
authorities, and civil associations. 
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administered by experts from South Africa and Canada. Second, it would involve 
the development of new institutional partnerships between local and international 
partners, as weil as the establishment of new mechanisms of case-forwarding 
between community members, the community program, and local state agencies 
(e.g, the tribunal of justice, the Military Police, the Civil Police, and the 
Municipal Civil Guard). At the same time, it would involve active dissemination 
of the fusion-models both within the communities where they were implemented 
through various advertising strategies involving local associations and businesses, 
and within the wider Bureaucratic community with conference presentations, 
scholarly publications, and media exposure. Fourth, it would involve the graduaI 
expansion of mediation services: the scope of action would be expanded to deal 
not only with civil matters but also with cases of criminal nature. Finally, the 
fusion would involve the institutionalization of new channeJs to enable the 
creation and financing of a community fund for local peace-building activities that 
would be carried out by the program's community agents. 
The pilot experiment in Brasilia was a failure, and only the first step of the 
fusion was operationalized with the transfer of Zwelethemba technology in 
October 2005, which ultimately was not integrated in daily operational activities. 
ln Sào Caetano do Sul, on the other hand, the first four steps of the fusion project 
were fully implemented, and, despite serious financial problems (i.e., lack of 
funding), the project has been yielding most promising results since its 
implementation in May-June 2006. As will be argued in Chapter 4, the pilot 
project in Sào Caetano represents one of the few (if not only) victories of the 
community interests over the bureaucracy's in Brazilian local security netwOTks. 
The starkly opposite results for the pilot experiments in Brasilia and Sào 
Caetano, which were both developed in close collaboration with judges, under 
similar conditions, with a number of common partners, point to the relevance of 
norms to explain why similar micro-governance models promote self-direction 
and others fayOT dependence on the Bureaucracy. Results for the two pilot 
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experiments will be discussed at length in the fourth chapter, which identifies 
opposing norms and ideas about who can have agency on justice (and how) as the 
principal explanatory factor to account for the variegated results, which are 
measured and compared in terms of the relative " capacit y of each local security 
network to utilize local capacities to enable both individual and collective citizen 
agency on daily sources of insecurity. To make sure 1 got it right, however, and 
that the variations observed were not caused by something else, such as 
geography or history, 1 further compared the results of the two pilot projects in 
Brazil with results for similar Zwelethemba-inspired projects in South Africa, 
which yielded not only variegated patterns of individual and community agency, 
but also, interestingly, different collaborative partnerships with police agencies 
and local tribunals. 
Brazil and South Africa provide especially fertile grounds for 
comparison as both democratizing countries are currently experiencing similar 
challenges in terms of security despite very different historical legacies. In both 
cases, citizens at the bottom of the social ladder tend to be darker and ghettoized 
in densely populated underprivileged urban communities and sIums ("favelas" in 
Brazil and "townships" in South Africa) with endemic levels of crime and 
violence. In both countries, public security is failing in these areas and criminal 
organizations are able to dictate a parallel rule of law, at the same time as access 
to the formaI institutions of the justice system for lower-income citizens remains 
limited by a number of factors that will be discussed in the next two chapters. 
lt should be emphasized, however, that the purpose of this dissertation is to 
study citizen-based security in Brazil, not to do a comparative study of citizen-
based security in Brazil and South Africa. The comparative analysis concerns the 
three case-studies in Brazil, as weil as the 67 community programs identified in 
the national mapping on "alternative systems of conflict resolution," which are 
further compared with the Zwelethemba model in South Africa for verification 
purposes. 1 employ Weberian methodology and build on these comparative 
findings to develop an ideal-typical model of citizen agency. 
Ideal-Type 
The Zwelethemba model of conflict resolution and community development is 
especially interesting for research purposes as it is not only weil documented40, 
but more importantly, because the experiments which led to its "invention" were 
guided by sound theoretical precepts of "nodal govemance," which will be 
discussed at length in the theoretical chapter. 
The Zwelethemba experiments constitute a tried and tested model of micro-
govemance that enables citizens and communities to exert direct agency on 
insecurity: ln 98% of the cases41 examined in South Africa, disputants were able 
to solve their conflict lawfully and peacefully, and committed to a "Plan of 
Action" to ensure the problem would not re-occur in the future (IdeasWork, 
2007). The Zwelethemba model successfully mobilizes and organizes actors from 
civil society (Peace Committee members and community members), epistemic 
communities (the IdeasWork organization), state institutions (the South African 
Ministry of Justice and the South African Police), and foreign govemments (the 
Finnish embassy in South Africa) into a power-sharing network that works to 
regulate a specific issue area (e.g. security) at the local level in underprivileged 
communities where public security is failing. The Zwelethemba pilot experiments 
thus provided an ideal basis to construct the ideal-type of citizen agency. 
40 See, for example, Dupont (2006, 2004); Wood and Dupont (2006); Wood and Marks 
(2006); Daniëls (2006); Cartwright and Jenneker (2006, 2005); Burris, Drahos and 
Shearing (2005); Froestad and Shearing (2005); Shearing and Johnston (2005); Shearing 
and Wood (2004); Wood (2004); Wood and Font (2003); Dupont, Grabosky and 
Shearing (2003); Johnston and Shearing (2002); Shearing (2001 a, 2001 b). 
41 Sample of 12448 cases, ofwhich: 29% were related to money lending; 8% to assault ; 
27% to property offences; 16% to neighbourhood disputes; 13% to domestic violence; 
6% to drunkenness; and 1 % to rape (1deas Work, 2007). 
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ln Chapter 4, 1 further build on the model to demonstrate the existence of a 
constitutive relationship between ideas about who can have agency on justice (and 
how), the relative power ofthe Bureaucracy within the local security network, and 
citizen agency through micro-govemance. 
The comparative analysis of the institutionaJ arrangements regulating local 
security networks reveals their power structures, and allows us to èxamine the role 
of citizens as individuals and as communities in the local governance of security. 
As the diversified results for Brazil and South Africa indicate, in Brazil 
community govemance programs enable citizens to exert a mostly consumptive 
form of agency, and empower individual citizens "as a means of security," not so 
much communities. 
Comparative results within Brazil further indicate that, contrarily to the 
Zwelethemba experiments in South Africa, in the vast majority of cases in Brazil 
community governance programs have asymmetrical, vertical power relationships 
between actors that bene fit outside-community actors and undermine citizen and 
community agency.· Comparative analysis enables the identification of specifie 
factors and general conditions that enable self-determination in the application of 
conflict resolution models. While the Zwelethemba model helps understand what 
contributes to the success of the initiative, the experiments in Brazil can allow us 
to verity if the presence or absence of given factors (e.g., support from police and 
judiciary institutions, NGOs and civil associations, international agencies, foreign 
govemments, and the private sector; level of community mobilization; prevalence 
of liberal norms on the regulation of justice; extent of outside-community 
partners' involvement; etc.) promotes or undermines the community project. 
Based on these comparative results, ] identify six forms of citizen agency, 
which will be discussed further in Chapter 3: J) Citizen-consumer; 2) Citizen-
facilitator; 3) Active citizen-bystander; 4) Citizen-agent, 5) Citizen-administrator, 
and 6) Citizen-manager. As schematized beJow in Figure 2, the ideal model of 
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citizen agency can be thought of as a scale, ranging ITom minimal participation 
with mere individual consumption of community program services, to limited and 
full participation of community members as a collectivity in the provision, 
administration and management of services. 
Each of the six forms of participation in community governance programs 
translates into a different level of citizen agency, ranging from mere 
"consumption," which enables individuals to solve privale problems, to "self-
direction," which enables the community to solve collective problems of 
insecurity. The more a program approximates the "self-direction" pole (e.g., the 
greater the extent of citizen participation in the program), the more the program 
succeeds in enabling local governance and the more it empowers individual 
community members as agents of justice and communities as a means of security. 
To construct the ideal-type, l compared the institutional configurations of 93 
micro-governance programs in Brazil and South Africa. ln Brazil, the sample 
includes the 67 projects identified in the national databasc on programs of "access 
to justice through alternative systems of conflict administration" and the 
Zwelethemba-inspired pilot project in Sào Caetano do Sul (which was not 
included in the national database as was not operational at the time ofthe survey). 
ln South Africa, the sample includes the 25 Zwelethemba programs of conflict 
resolution and community development. Comparative results will be discussed at 
length in Chapter 3. 
For the purpose of c1arity, it should nonetheless be emphasized that while 
the six forms of citizen agency identified in the ideal-type range incrementally 
from individual agency limited to consumption to collective community agency 
and self-direction and thus represent six distinct levels of citizen agency, the 
categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, ail programs must 
have at least "citizen consumers" to operate. While most of the programs in Brazil 
enable citizens to exert only this limited form of agency, the "exceptions" in 
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Brazil and the programs examined in South Africa provide greater participatory 
opportunities and empower citizens to exert more agency as they become active in 
the provision and administration of program services. Had the comparative 
analysis been limited to Brazil and results not been compared with similar 
programs in South Africa, an important form of citizen agency would not have 
been identified as there are currently no micro-governance programs in Brazil that 
enable local residents to participate in the administration of funds allocated to the 
community project. 
It is important to stress here that following principles of nodal governance, 
and to achieve basic programmatic objectives of the human security agenda, the 
main objective of micro-governance programs should be increased self-direction 
to empower local residents to solve shared problems of insecurity that affect daily 
life at home and in the community. Crime prevention and violence reduction may 
(and are indeed expected to) represent additional beneficial outcomes of the 
community projects, but do not represent their primary goal. Thus, it is following 
this logic that the ideal-typical model presented "culminates" into an ideal 
situation that empowers local citizens as a collectivity with ail the decision-
making power over their community projects. 
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Figu re 2. Ideal-type of citizen agency 
SELF-DIRECTION: 
COMMUNfTY SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE 
PROBLEMS 
Citizen-manager 
- Autonomous management of project 
bureaucracy 
- Coordination of research and evaluation 
- strategie program direction 
- Self-sustainability 
- Remunerated and exclusively local staff 
Citizen-administrafor 
- Participation in the administration of 
communit'{ProQram funds 
Citizen-agent 
- Mediation and case-forwarding and 
follow-ups based on local knowledge and 
capacities 
Active citizen-bystander 
- Third-party involvement in the mediation 
process 
Citizen-facilitator 
- Bridge between experts and community. 
- Mediation and case-forwarding and 
follow-ups based on outside community 
expertise. 
Citizen-consumer 
- Use of community program services 
(mediation/leQal aid) 
CONSUMPTION: 
INDIVIDUAL SOLUTIONS TO PRIVATE 
PROBLEMS 
Weber's ideal-typical approach is particularly useful to understand and 
explain the very different patterns of citizen agency observed within Brazil and 
between Brazil and South Africa. Ideal-types are a key conceptual tool for 
comparison, and provide a unique window for understanding through 
interpretation. Ideal types are "analytical artifices" that construct hypothetical 
profiles of intentions and actions based on the observation of recurrences in the 
fulfillment of social roles (e.g. the capitalist), and seek to provide parameters to 
conceptualize observed phenomena more than to establish causality (Belanger, 
1998: 47). 
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Ideal types enable the researcher to understand broad concepts, such as 
citizen agency, and to explain its distinctive, particular features by measuring how 
much they approximate or deviate from the ideal analytical construct. For 
example, Weber's ideal-type of religions is based on the protestant ideal. Other 
religions are defined according to how much the approximate or deviate from this 
ideal, which is expected to influence the economic mode of production: The more 
a religion approximates the ideal of the protestant ethic, the more likely capitalism 
will emerge. Similarly, 1 argue that the more a micro-govemance initiative 
approximates the South African Zwelethemba ideal, the more likely citizens and 
communities will be empowered as a means of security. As one scholar nicely 
summed it up: 
"An ideal type is an analytical construct that serves the investigator 
as a measuring rod to ascertain similarities as weil as deviations in 
concrete cases. [ ... ] It is formed by the one-sided accentuation of 
one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many 
diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent 
concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to 
those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical 
construct. [ ... ] It is constructed out of certain elements of reality 
and forms a logically precise and coherent whole, which can never 
be found as such in that reality" (Coser, 1977). 
ln none of the 93 cases examined in Brazi 1 and South Africa was there a 
"full empirical embodiment" ofwhat 1 cali real citizen agency. The Zwelethemba 
model relies on local knowledge and capacities to provide and administrate most 
of the services it off ers community members, and therefore enables citizens to 
exert distinct forms of citizen agency. At the same time, however, the 
Zwelethemba model is not "ideal" in that it does not enable "the full empirical 
embodiment" of real citizen agency as sorne administrative tasks remain 
monopolized by academic partners, and no project was able to become financially 
self-sustainable yet. Indeed, as Clifford Shearing puts it, "the Zwelethemba model 
is not a descriptive model ofwhat happens but an aspirational mode!. It describes 
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a set of ideal procedures that are seldom fully realized.,,42 1 further argue that there 
exists a distance between this aspirational model in practice and an ideal 
aspirational model which would enable completely autonomous collective 
communityagency. 
Interestingly, of the cases examined in BraziJ, the community program 
situated c10sest to the "real agency" pole is the Sâo Caetano do Sul project, which 
is largely inspired by the Zwelethemba mode!. Most programs in Brazil are 
situated on the mere "consumption" end. ln the two cases-studies in Brasilia and 
Rio de Janeiro, community programs promote greater citizen agency but still 
enable a very a Hmited form of citizen participation in the provision of pro gram 
services. In stark contrast, whiJe not ail the ZweJethemba experiments in South 
Africa were as successful, ail Zwelethemba experiments enabled quasi-full citizen 
participation in the community governance programs. In other words, the 
Zwelethemba model enables citizen to participate actively not only in the 
consumption but in the actual provision of program services and decision-making 
processes, and thus empowers both individuals and communities as a means of 
security. 
42 Cited from personnal electronic communications with Prof essor Shearing (September 
15,2006). 
Chapter 1. Citizen-Based Security: Theoretical & Normative 
Dimensions 
To explain the variegated empirical results observed within Brazil and between 
Brazil and South Africa, l used a process of analytic induction, which is consistent 
with ethnographie research43 and the Weberian methodology employed to build 
the ideal-type of citizen agency discussed further in Chapter 3. Induction is a 
mode of reasoning that infers general rules (e.g. recurrence) from particuIar cases, 
as opposed to the logic of deduction, which postulates a general rule that is 
applied to particuJar cases (Belanger, 1998: 26). Specifically, the logic of 
induction entails, in the following order, 1 )collecling dala; 2)lesling Ihe 
hYPolheses according 10 Ihe dala; 3)deve/oping a Iheory grounded in the 
particu/ar setting under SIUdy that seeks 10 exp/ain Ihe lotality of the phenomenon 
(Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000). 
This study, folJowing the bottom-up logic of induction, started with the 
empirical observation that in South Africa, the 25 Zwelethemba programs worked 
to empower citizens and communities as a means of security in low-income areas 
where public security was failing, and that this should also be true for Brazil, 
which in recent years had also seen the emergence of a number of similar micro-
governance initiatives. As the field research and pilot experiments in Brazil 
progressed, the original hypothesis was tested, and was both confirmed and 
infirmed as it became apparent that micro-governance programs usually worked 
to empower citizens but not communities. Based on results from the national 
survey on "alternative systems of conflict administration," the failed pilot 
experimenst in Brasilia, and the fact of the bankrupcy of the Viva Rio project in 
2007, 1 found that while it was true that micro-governance programs empowered 
both individual citizens and communities as a means of security in low-income 
areas where public securily was failing in South Africa, it was not so true for 
43 For a sophisticated and insightful discussion on the heuristic value of induction, see 
also Glaser and Strauss' "The Discovery of Grounded Theory" (1967). 
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Brazil, where these programs enabled individual citizens (not communities) only a 
limited, mostly consumptive form of citizen agency. Upon further investigation, it 
became apparent that this paradox could largely be explained by the different 
normative structures of the various local security networks, which are regulated 
by opposing ideas on who can have agency on justice and how. 
To explain why community govemance works weil to empower citizens and 
communities as a means of security in South Africa but not in Brazil, and why the 
Zwelethemba experiments produced su ch different results for Brasilia and Sao 
Caetano do Sul, it was necessary to investigate deeper to reveal the ideational 
foundations upon which the local security networks were built upon. Shearing et 
al. (2005) are right to argue that "mentalities" constitute one of the principal 
characteristics in local security networks, but they may have underestimated its 
importance relatively to the nodes' three other components (e.g., institutional 
structure, technology, resources), as will be demonstrated in Chapter 4. As 
illustrated below in Table l, "mentalities" in the form of ideas about who can 
have agency on justice (and how) determine the local network's other 
components. ln Brazil, conservative mentalities about the state's exclusive 
monopoly of justice are pervaslve and have influenced institutional 
configurations, the choice for technology, and the allocation and distribution of 
human and financial resources in the majority of cases (78%44) examined in the 
country. 
44 Based on results for the survey category "Service providers are outside-community 
professionals with expertise in the areas of Jaw, psychoJogy and/or social work" in the 
national mapping of "alternative systems of conflict administration." 
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Table 1. The influence ofnorms in local security nctworks in Brazil and 
South Africa 
Conservative/Status-q uo Liberal/Change 
Normatiye State monopoly Outside-state 
Position of justice arbitration of social 
mentality") conflicts 
Brasilia pilot & Viva Rio 
project Sào Caetano do Sul 
pilot & Zwelethemba 
Network projects in South 
Component Africa 
Credentials: Formai and/or Local knowledge: Based 
Technology (e.g., university training in law, on shared everyday 
knowledge base) psychology and/or social experiences of 
work. corn munit y life and 
problems. 
Community funds originating Community funds 
from the Bureaucracy are originating from the 
Resources infused primarily to diverse Bureaucracy are infused 
Bureaucratie actors and to primarily to community 
finance Bureaucratie actors and to finance 
activities. corn munit y activities. 
- Heavy and costly - Light and un-costly 
Bureaucracy; Bureaucracy; 
- Hierarchical vertical power - Synergetic and 
Instituti onal structure; horizontal power-
structure - Cases are forwarded from structure; 
social actors through - Cases are forwarded 
community agents to formaI from social actors to 
and informaI authorities of other social actors, 
the justice system working at which are occasionally 
the community level, which th en referred to formai 
are occasionally th en referred authorities of the justice 
to formai authorities of the system. 
justice system. 
As a result of the prevalence of conservative norms within local security 
networks in Brazil, most projects suffer from a programmatic bias and a paradox 
where citizens are, for the most part, only allowed to participate in their 
community's project as consumers of services provided mainly by outside-
community actors on the basis of professional expertise, not local knowledge. To 
explain these unexpected results and the paradox of "community governance from 
above" in Brazil, it is necessary to apply critical reasoning to understand wha! (as 
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opposed to how) we can know of the object of this study, that is, what are local 
security networks "made of'? This question was also the subject of Alexander 
Wendt' s famous Social Theory ofInternational Relations (1989), where he argued 
that the international system was essentially "made of' ideas about organized 
violence and its legitimate use. Building on Wendt's conceptual framework, 1 
argue that local security networks are essentially "made of' ideas about the 
legitimacy of the state's monopoly of justice, and use comparative data to 
demonstrate both the causal and constitutive effects these ideas on the network 
ants its components (e.g., institutional structure, choice for technology, and 
allocation/distribution of resources). 
My research combines a positivist epistemology based on empirical 
verification to investigate the institutional arrangements that enable citizens to 
exert different forms of agency on insecurity, with a constructivist ontology based 
on the recognition that norms and ideas about who should have agency on justice 
determine institutional contigurations and constitute the "stuff' local security 
networks in Brazil are essentially "made of." 
To explain and understand the causal and constitutive relationships between 
citizen agency, micro-governance, ideas about who can have agency on justice, 
and the power of the bureaucracy relative to the community, 1 compare 93 local 
security networks in Brazil and South Africa, and then, having revealed the 
paradox of "community governance from above," 1 investigate their ideational 
foundations, or their "normative structure." 1 build on nodal theory and employ 
Wendt's approach to determine how and why the normative structure of local 
security networks influences citizen agency on real and perceived sources of 
insecurity. 
Based on the demonstrated successes of the Zwelethemba community 
experiments in South Africa, research results for Brazil were expected to show 
that micro-governance programs constituted an efficient means to promote 
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community empowennent and presented an efficient alternative to failing public 
security in the country's infamous favelas. The inductive logic of this study, 
however, led to the discovery that local security networks in Brazil are 
characterized by a paradox, which, after "the two pilot experiments in Brasilia and 
Sào Caetano do Sul, and their comparative analysis with similar experiments in 
South Africa, could not be explained by geography, history, socio-economic 
factors, nor institutional configurations. The theoretical and empirical focus on the 
role ofnonns was mandated by the diversified empirical results for non-nonnative 
elements of local security networks within Brazil and between Brazil and South 
Africa. While the Zwelethemba model proved remarkably efficient in 
empowering both citizens and communities as a means of security in 25 South 
African townships and (its adapted version) in the small community of Nova 
Gert y in Sào Caetano do Sul, the pilot experiments flopped in Jardim Angela and 
Brasilia, and the Viva Rio project, which was one of the few community 
governance programs in Brazil that enabled more citizen agency than mere 
consumption, went bankrupt in January 2007. 
How to explain that community governance was efficient in South Africa 
but overall defunct in Brazil, and that the same Zwelethemba experiment had 
gone so weil in Sào Caetano do Sul while it failed in Brasilia? While the original 
Zwelethemba pilots in South Africa and the Sào Caetano do Sul experiment 
corroborated the research hypothesis that micro-governance could empower the 
poor and their communities as a means of security when the state could not or 
would not provide this public good, the failed experiments in Brasilia and Jardim 
Angela, the bankruptcy of Viva Rio, and the overall defunctness of "community 
governance" in Brazil provided grounds to refute il. Why did the Zwelethemba 
pilot experiments work in Sào Caetano do Sul (and South Africa) but not in 
Brasilia (and Jardim Angela)? How to explain such diversified results for 
initiatives with similar programmatic objectives? Could the starkly opposite 
results have to do with the researcher's involvement with the two pilots? 
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The evidence reviewed in this study indicates that while the active 
involvement of the researcher can work to facilitate citizen agency, as was the 
case with the successful pilot experiment in Sao Caetano, it is, unfortunately, 
largely insufficient to determine research outcomes, as demonstrated by the failed 
experiment in Brasilia. Similarly, while the IdeasWork organization has been 
involved closely with ail the Zwelethemba pilot projects it coordinates in South 
Africa, not ail pilots have enjoyed the same leve\ of success, sorne even forced to 
shut down. Of course, this is because it is actors, not abstract forces, who 
determine the project's outcomes. It makes sense that in local security networks 
where decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of community actors 
(e.g. Zwelethemba projects in South Africa and in Sào Caetano), community 
participants uItimately determine the outcome of the initiative. Conversely, in 
local security networks where decision-making power remains concentrated 
outside the community, within Bureaucratia (e.g. Brasilia and Viva Rio), 
Bureaucratic actors uItimately determine the outcome of the project. 
Moreover, while it is true, as Babbie and Benaquisto (2002) note, that 
"uItimately, anything the participant-observer does or does not do will have sorne 
effect on what is being observed; it's simply inevitable," this does necessarily 
have to be construed as an unfortunate research casualty. The pilot project in Sào 
Caetano do Sul, which has, remarkably, been operating efficiently for over a year 
despite the lack of a sustainable financial basis to finance program activities, was 
conceptualized based on the lessons leamed from the researcher's participation in 
the first two (failed) pilot experiments in Jardim Angela and Brasilia. As Shearing 
argues about the potential biases of studies that directly involve interventions 
from the researcher in project implementation and coordination, the relationship 
between the object of study and its active observer does not necessarily constitute 
a problem and should be conceptualized as a synergetic relationship akin to the 
one between doctors and patients: 
"An analogy would be a medical procedure like and 
operation. What is important is that there are feedback mechanisms 
in place that the doctors find useful that measure the state of the 
patients' progress that can be used to guide doctors in responding to 
what happens to the patient so as to ensure that best procedure. is 
practiced in terms of sorne model of best procedure. Now this data, 
heart rate over time, etc., can be used to study what happened, the 
medical teams response, etc., on a post hoc basis. But the point is 
that this is not something independent of the process ofpractice.,,45 
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The Zwelethemba pilot experiments and the research agenda that informs 
them were formulated in terms of explicitly normative objectives: They aim to 
contribute to the development of simple and un-costly means to empower citizens . 
and communities to improve their protection and well-being themselves as 
ordinary individuals and as organized communities. Research is intertwined with 
the intervention projects in low-income communities with the deliberate objective 
to effect concrete change in the quality of democracy as experienced by ordinary 
citizens on a daily basis. As Shearing explains of the Zwelethemba model46: 
"Our principal desired outcome is self-direction that deepens 
democracy. We want to find ways of promoting self direction 
through deliberative processes. At one level that we do this is self-
evident. Because the practices mobilize knowledge and capacity. 
Now whether this is done as weil as it could be and how it could be 
improved is something for discussion and review. Now if these 
reviews are continuous and ongoing so much the better. Now very 
often people come to us and want to assess what we doing in terms 
of other values and outcomes that they hold dear, for example, crime 
reduction. Now this is another matter. We say this may be a spin off 
effect because bring local knowledge to bear is likely to reduce the 
likelihood of the conflict not continuing. But this is not crime 
prevention in a narrow sense." 
Normative research seeks to intervene in real-live contexts to effect change: 
"Given the many injustices throughout the world, scholarship must not simply 
45 Cited From personal electronic communications with Prof essor Shearing (September 
15,2006). 
46 Cited from personal electronic communications with Professor Shearing (September 
15,2006). 
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content itself with understanding the place of morality in world affairs but must 
also bring the demands of moral conscience to the study and practice of world 
politics" (Falk, 1983, c.f., Wapner and Ruiz, 2000). In other words, as Linklater 
(1999: 165) plainly puts it: " ... normative theory must engage with actual social 
structures and real social conflicts." This is because, these scholars further argue, 
"scholars have a responsibility to use their work to leave the world a better place 
th an they found it, and this includes, when possible, translating one's scholarly 
insights into appropriate political action" (Wapner and Ruiz, 2000). 
Normative theory has a well-established tradition in political science47. 
According to Hurrell (2005: 137), the subject of norms and ethics can be 
approached from three perspectives: "The first considers the role that normative 
ideas play in the practice of politics (how have ideas about what should be done 
intluenced political behavior?); the second seeks to engage in rational moral 
debate as to the nature of ethical conduct (what ought we to do?); the third 
examines the extent to which moral behavior is heavily constrained by the 
dynamics of political life (given the realities of pol iti cal life, what can be done?)." 
This study is concerned with the three lines of questioning. Following the 
inductive logic of inference, the research evolved with concern for the second set 
of issues, to the first, and to the third. It began with the empirical observation that 
public security was failing in many underprivileged urban communities in Brazil, 
and that community governance Zwelethemba-style in South Africa worked to 
empower these communities as a means of security. 8ased on a con cern to what 
ought to be done about the problem, it seemed logical to attempt Zwelethemba 
experiments in BraziJ. After witnessing two failed pilot projects (Jardim Angelq 
qnd Brasilia), however, it seemed there were hidden ideational obstacles the study 
had failed to take into consideration. Indeed, the central question became: How 
have idem; about what should be done influenced political behavior? Only once 
47 For a survey of nonnative studies throughout IR history, see Cochran (1999); Frost 
(1996); Brown (1992); and Thomson (1992). 
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the role of norms about who can have agency on justice (and how) was 
investigated and their potentially negative influence became explicit was it 
possible to move on to the third set of normative issues- that is, given the 
realities of politicallife, what can be done?- from which the third (and more 
successful) pilot project in Sào Caetano do Sul was born. 
As Alexander Wendt argues in A Social Theory of International Relations, 
there are always two central questions to any scientific enterprise. To understand 
and explain the nature of human agency and its relation to social structures, one 
must investigate both causal and constitutive relations. Constitutive theorizing 
means that the researcher should establish "the conditions of possibility for 
objects ( ... ) by showing what they are made of and how they are organized. ( ... ) 
As such, the object ( ... ) in question is an 'effect' of the conditions that make it 
possible, but it does not exist independent ofthem" (Fearon and Wendt, 2005: 57-
58). While Fearon and Wendt compare this relationship to the dynamic betwecn 
masters and slaves, 1 find Shearing's rnetaphor of the doctor-patient relationship 
more appropriate. 
The causal relationship between rnlcro-governance programs and citizen 
agency resolves the problem of what kind of agency local security networks 
enable, but not of why sorne programs enable only limited, consumptive forms of 
agency and others empower citizens and their cornmunities greater agency as 
providers and administrators of their comrnunity programs. The comparative 
results for the pilot experiments in Brazil and South Africa indicate that the 
relationship between citizen agency and the "structure" of micro-governance 
programs is also constitutive. To understand and explain why micro-governance 
works better in sorne cases and places th an others to empower citizens to act on 
the sources of insecurity affecting their daily lives when the state is unable or 
unwilling to do so, one must investigate the nature of citizen agency and of micro-
govemance prograrns themselves. Controlling for tirne and space, the comparative 
analysis of similar micro-govemance experirnents in South Africa and Brazil and 
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within Brazil point to the relevance of ideational factors to account for the 
diversified results. 
Indeed, upon closer re-inspection of the mitigated research results in Brazil 
and between Brazil and South Africa, the only factor that can explain the 
variations in the institutional configurations, knowledge-base and resources in 
local security networks that share the same broad (human security) programmatic 
objectives is ideational. The comparative analysis of the resources, the 
knowledge-base, and the institutional arrangements regulating local security 
networks within Brazil and between Brazil and South Africa explains how micro-
governance works to produce different results in terms of citizen agency, but not 
why, nor does it enable us to understand what accounts for the variations in the in 
the network components in the tirst place. To answer these questions, we must 
investigate the normative components of the network. 
According to Wendt's (p. 21, 40) constitutive theory of international 
relations, to understand a system -the system of states- theorists must seek to 
uncover what he calls "the deep structures" of the system and of its culture, 
which, he further argues, are made up of the common understandings that go vern 
organized violence and its legitimate use. The anarchy48 that characterizes the 
international system, he argues, is not so much an objective reality as what states 
make of it (p.44, 3] 0). The structure of anarchy, he demonstrates, varies with 
changes in the distribution ofideas about the legitimate monopoly of violence. He 
48 Wendt identifies three cultures of anarchy- Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian-
which have been internalized to different degrees (coercion, self-interest, legitimacy) 
throughout history. Controlling for time and place with comparative case-study analyses, 
he demonstrates that the more culture is important, the greater the international stability, 
and concludes the stability of the system reflects a high degree of internalization of a 
given anarchic culture. According to his theory, structural change in the international 
system results from cultural change from one of the three cultures of anarchy to another 
and from the emergence of new collective identities. What gives meaning to anarchy is 
the type of people who live in it and the structure of their relationships. That Wendt 
means "states" when he says "people" because he believes that states are like people and 
attributes them anthropomorphic qualities is certainly problematic, but not enough to 
discredit the validity of his main argument as this conceptual blur is quite common 
among IR theorists. 
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argues that while power and interests do matter for world politics, shared 
knowledge about anarchy determines their significance when states decide to opt 
for balancing, cooperation, or war49• 
Local security networks, constituted by citizens, communities, state 
agencies, international organizations, NGOs and academic institutions can be 
thought of as miniature versions of Wendt's anarchical system. First, as in the 
actual international system of sovereign states, there is no overarchingauthority in 
local security networks to arbitrate conflicts between nodes, nor a centralized 
power to enforce binding rules and ensure compliance to them- that would go 
against the very point of nodal governance, which is operationalized through 
decentralized power-sharing agreements. As Krasner (1999: 6, 54, c.f. Hurrell, 
143) skeptically notes, in decentralized systems of governance, such as the 
international system, "rules can be contradictory ... and there is no authority 
structure to adjudicate such controversies. [ ... ] the international environment has 
been characterized by competing and often contradictory norms, not sorne single 
coherent set of rules." As will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, the case-studies in 
Jardim Angela, Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro indicate that community governance 
programs are prone to hostile bureaucratic takeovers, where, in the c1assic zero-
sum dynamics of Real Politik, the interests of powerful bureaucratic actors are 
secured through explicitly authoritative methods and implicitly normative means 
to the detriment of community actors. 
Second, if the international system of states is essentially made up of ideas 
on the legitimate monopoly of violence, local security networks are fundamentally 
constituted by ideas on the legitimate monopoly of justice. To understand how the 
system/network works and why it works as it does, the research must not only 
491n his polemic "Clash of Civilizations," Huntington (1997) makes a similar claim and 
argues that the distribution of power reflects the distribution of culture and that culture 
follows power. According to his theory, culture and cultural identity are civilizational 
identities, and it is civilizational identities that "form patterns of cohesion, disintegration, 
and conflicts in the post- Cold War world." 
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examine the power relationships between actors and the formai institutional 
arrangements that regulate these relationships, but further uncover the ideational 
premises on which the network was buiIt upon and according to which it regulates 
daily operations. To understand and explain why similarly designed micro-
governance programs limit citizen agency and community empowerment in sorne 
cases and promote them in others, one must take a more critical approach and take 
a closer look at what local security networks are really "made of." 
This study seeks to reveal the implicit, if not deliberately obscured norms 
and ideas underlying each network's concrete operational structure. Hurrell 
(p.l40-41), like Wendt, also argues that "theory should uncover, interpret and 
critically develop understandings of morality that exist within specific 
international historical and cultural contexts." As Cox (1986: 207) famously put 
it: "Theory is al ways for someone and for sorne purpose;" or, as Hurrell (2001: 
148) more blandly put it: "Value systems, after ail, do not just happen. They are 
created by social agents for particular purposes and they are maintained because it 
will often pay people in sorne way to ensure that they are50." 
In this vein, Freeden's (1996) study of American philosophical liberalism 
investigates normative foundations and "seeks to uncover the way in which its 
inherently ideological character is disguised by the methods and styles that it 
adopts" (1996, c.f. Hurrell, p.140). Similarly, in Chapter 4 1 employ qualitative 
data from interviews with project coordinators and community agents, as weil as 
statements in scholarly publications by project coordinators, to demonstrate that 
norms of disbelief in the capacities of the poor to arbitrate social conflicts and 
govern their own community programs are dissimulated n discourses that are 
explicitly in favor of "community governance." While sorne more moderate 
conservatives may officially denounce "the state's exclusive monopoly of 
justice"Sl, in actual fact, however, both moderate and traditional conservative are 
50 A similar argument was made by Barry (1970) and Coleman ( 1990). 
51 See, for example, Falsarelli-Foley, 2006. 
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credentialists, and perpetuate-albeit to different degrees and through different 
means- the status-quo of the state's monopoly of justice. 
The focus on norms and ideas is' consistent with the ethnographic 
methodology employed in this study, which, as discussed previously, presupposes 
the recognition that reality is socially constructed (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002: 
307). As Baylis and Smith (2005) explain, studies that focus on the role of norms 
"are concerned with human consciousness, treat ideas as structural factors, 
consider the dynamic relationship between ideas and material forces as a 
consequence of how actors interpret their material reality, and are interested in 
how agents produce structures and how structures produce agents .... [They 
believe] knowledge shapes how actors interpret and construct their social 
real ity... [and that] the normative structure shapes the identity and interests of 
actors." 
ln his seminal study on the emergence of capitalism52 , Weber was one of the 
first to focus on the role of norms in social and political-economic life in his 
powerful critique of Marx's historical materialism -which he found "naïve"-
and argued that the evolution of capitalism cOlild not be reduced to economic 
interests. For Weber53 , ideas and values are central explanatory factors in the 
history of capitalism, and his analysis seeks to illustrate concretely how values 
and ideas generally became effective in history. 
Weber identified cultural factors (e.g. protestant ethics) as a (principal) 
necessary but insufficient condition to explain the emergence and expansion of 
capitalism, and emphasized the importance of considering the "ideas factor" not 
in unilateral perspective but rather as part of a larger causal configuration, 
constituted by a combination of elements. He explicitly states54 that he is not 
arguing that the "capitalist spirit" could only have been born from the emanation 
52 L'Ethique protestante et l'esprit du capitalisme 
53 Ibid., p.89, 
54 Ibid., pp. 90-91; 253. 
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of certain influences through the [protestant] Refonn nor that capitalism as an 
economic system is a product of the Refonn; rather, he seeks to establish if and to 
what extent religious influences (e.g. ideational factors) have contributed to the 
qualitative edification and the quantitative expansion of the "capitalist spirit" 
throughout the world, and to identify the concrete aspects of culture in which 
capitalism is grounded. 
In more recent social scientific history, constructivists have made similar 
claims. Constructivist scholarship in political science focuses on "the role of ideas 
in constructing social life" (Fearon and Wendt, pp.57), and "puts people, their 
activities, and their social arrangements at the forefront" (Kubalkova, Onuf and 
Kowert, 1998). As Fearon and Wendt (p.57) explain, "the emphasis on ideas is 
meant to oppose arguments about social life which emphasize the role of brute 
material conditions like biology, geography and technology." Indeed, }-Iurrell 
(142) further argues: "Material structures matter, but these material structures 
cannot be understood outside of the shared knowledge and shared understandings 
held by the actors themselves," or, as Kratochwil (2000: 64, c.f. Hurrell, 
2001 : 145) nicely put it: 
"Contrary to Popper and the predominant epistemoJogy, 'explaining' 
does not seem to involve simply the procedure of the 'subsuming' of 
a single case under a general law, but comprises a rather 
heterogeneous set of procedures by which we try to understand 
actions and events. Explaining often means providing a context, such 
as when we make a series of actions and events part of a wider 
narrative. However, explaining an action might also involve us in 
elaborations and justifications of the choices made, or of our reasons 
for choosing certain beginnings and endings." 
Similarly, 1 argue that to understand the variegations in the institutional 
configurations regulating local security networks -which explains how but not 
why micro-governance produces different fonns of citizen agency and thus 
variegated human security results- it is necessary to investigate the ideational 
premises according to which the local security network is operationalized and to 
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compare the ideas of bureaucratic actors about who can have agency on justice. 
That is, 1 do not argue that ideas are a sufficient factor to explain the relationship 
between citizen agency and micro-govemance; rather, 1 aim to demonstrate how 
and to what extent the opposing ideas of project coordinators about who can have 
agency on justice (and how) influences the institutional configurations regulating 
local security networks, and to identifY the concrete aspects of culture (e.g. 
norms) according to which community governance programs are built and 
disseminated. 
ln other words, ideas are part of the larger explanatory scheme ofthis study; 
the comparative analysis of ideas about who can have agency on justice is 
necessary to understand the constitutive relationship between citizen agency and 
micro-govemance. The influence of norms and ideas about the state's monopoly 
of justice for local security networks is not sufficient but necessary nonetheless to 
explain the relationship between citizen agency and micro-governance. The 
discussion on the role of ideas in local security networks follows the basic 
methodological precept set forth by Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986, c.f. Hurrell, 
2001: 145), according to which: 
"Norms may 'guide' behavior, the may 'inspire' behavior, the may 
'rationalize' or 'justify' behavior, they may express 'mutual 
expectations' about behavior, or they may be ignored. But they do 
not effect cause in the sense that a bullet through the heart causes 
death or an uncontrolled surge in the money supply causes price 
inflation." 
Normative research proposes critical theories that question the established 
order of power and seek to challenge the status-quo. Indeed, as one political 
humorist cynically observes, "the world is filled with excellent problematologists, 
but too few good solutionologists" (Quino, 1999). While critical theories may not 
translate so obviously into concrete action, they can etTect change in the real 
world nonetheless by changing how people think about the problem and thus how 
it is "solved." Moreover, while it is true that social science cannot accept the 
extreme claim that history can have no truth because truth itself has a history 
without faltering into epistemological schizophrenia, it does tum out that Foucault 
(1985) was right about how certain regimes oftruth have dominated others. This 
study reveaIs the existence of important gaps in mainstream scholarship regarding 
the lawful means of security regulation in crime-Iaden low-income communities, 
and of biases against the poor who are assumed to support and engage in unlawful 
forms of private justice and security. Chapter 2 demonstrates that the construction 
of only one discourse in mainstream literature and policy papers, that focus 
exclusively on unlawful and private forms of citizen agency, leads to 
misconceptions about how citizens typical1y deal with insecurity in urban siums 
and low income communities. This bias has had repercussions on the orientation 
of research in Latin American Studies, and for policy discussions in the area of 
human security. The choice to emphasize the role of norms and ideas is thus 
doubly justified by the need to (re)construct the other, lawful side of the "story" 
of citizen-based security in Brazil. ]n this chapter, ] develop a theoretical 
framework to study citizen-based security that builds on recent scholarship in 
criminology to address these important shortcomings. 
Access to Justice and (In)Security 
The relevant Iiterature in Latin American studies and criminology that is 
interested in govemance and citizenship in the context of failing justice and public 
security can be situated broadly within the "policy umbrella" of human security, 
which has paradigmatic pretentions and includes both theoretical and normative 
objectives. The human security agenda, the Canadian Consortium on Human 
Security states, "is not simply a research endeavor, it a]so defines an agenda for 
global action 55." As the Brazi]ian Ministry of Justice and the United Nations 
Develmopment Programme for Brazil provided institutional support and financing 
for the two pilot projects to promote broad programmatic objectives of "human 
55 As defined by the Canadian Consortium on Human Security (See Mission Statement 
on-Iine a1: http://cchs.xplorex.com/page179.htm) 
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security," the relative success of each pilot will be analyzed based on the general 
criteria set out as part of the UNDP's human security agenda. The generaJ 
efficiency of each project will be deterrnined in terrns of its capacity to reduce 
human insecurity in' underprivileged urban areas, through cooperative 
arrangements with local, regional, and international state and non-state 
organizations, as weB as with private sect or actors, that build on local capacities 
to enable both individual and coJ1ective citizen agency on the sources of 
insecurity that affect the quality of daily life at home and in the community. 
The human security approach was first adopted by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994 and then championed by Canadian 
foreign policy. The UNDP defines human security as "freedom from fear and 
want," and broadly aims to "empower people and societies as a means of 
security:,56 Because the concept of human security arises much scholarly debate57 
in academia and policy circles, the original, generic definition developed by the 
UNDP will be favored for practical purposes. Human security research focuses on 
"the nexus between violence, development, and governance58." This conceptual 
approach shifts the analytical focus from states to citizens and communities, and 
thus presents a useful way to examine the question of (in)security from a micro-
perspective, focusing on the multiple and un-dissociable roots of daily injustices 
that cause the insecurity this study seeks to explain and understand. 
ln a nutshell, human security embraces a holistic approach to the problem of 
insecurity, which includes seven categories of security that together comprise 
"human security:" Economie security; food security; health security; 
environmentaJ security; personal security; community security; and politicaJ 
security (UNDP, J 994). ln the human security perspective, insecurity is 
56 UNDP (1994). ' . 
57 For an insightful discussion on the evolution of the human security concept and the 
scholarly debate on its analytical utility and definitional issues, see Ketteman (2006). 
58 See Canadian Consortium on Human Security (Mission Statement on-Ii ne at: 
http://cchs.xplorex.comlpagè179.htm) 
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understood as a multi-faceted problem rooted not only in war and violence 
amongst and within states (and increasingly cities59), but also in hunger, illness, 
and crime. 
ln her widely referenced study of "Justice and the Politics of Difference" 
(1990: 37), Young also makes a strong argument in favor of a broad conception of 
justice, which includes important elements of social justice and focuses on the 
question of agency: 
"Justice is not identical with the concrete realization of these values 
in individual lives; justice, that is, is not identical with the good life. 
Rather, social justice concerns the degree to which a society contains 
and supports the institutional conditions necessary for the realization 
of these values. The values comprised in the good life can be 
reduced to two very general ones: (1 )developing and exercising 
one's capacities and expressing one's experience, and 
(2)participating in determining one's action and the conditions of 
one's actions. These are universalist values, in the sense that they 
assume the equal moral worth of ail persons, and thus justice 
requires their promotion for everyone." 
Similarly, the Zwelethemba model, which combines peace-making (conflict 
mediation) and peace-building activities (local socio-economic development) to 
realize broadly defined human security objectives, functions based on the 
fundamental premise that there exists, as Young (1990: 37) insightfully put it, "a 
connection between justice and the values that constitute the good life." The 
"good life" is fundamentally related to the notion of agency, which determines the 
extent to which individuals can act on the course of events affecting their daily 
lives. Beyond the intrinsic connection between justice in the sense of universal 
access to impartial, accountable, and transparent conflict arbitration mechanisms, 
on the one hand, and social justice in the sense of the "good life," on the other, 
59 Ibid. While Brazil is otherwise a stable democracy, ongoing combat operations 
between the police and traflickers in the sIums of Rio de Janeiro and more recently 
(2006) in Siio Paulo, and the failure of the state to provide public security and 
monopolize violence constitute classical elements ofwar, which will be discussed further 
in Chapter 2. 
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there is a close relationship between access to justice and the production of 
security. 
Access to justicéO -to a universal, fair, and institutionalized justice system 
(including the police ~ is one of the most basic rightss of democratic citizenship, 
for the right to justice is the means ~o ail other rights (Holston and Caldeira, 
1998). In Brazil, however, as in most countries of the region,judiciary institutions 
tend to reproduce existing socioeconomic inequalities, denying Rawls' (1971) 
fundamental principal of equality of citizens as legal subjects61 . While law is 
intended to "work as the great equalizer, because rich and poor alike are free to 
vindicate their rights in court in order to obtain 'equal justice under the law,62" 
(Garro (1999), in Brazil these grand principles have yet to translate into daily 
concrete actions. In other words, the law is blind to socioeconomic status in 
theory but not so much in practice, and Brazilians have not been blind to the 
failures oftheir justice system. As Holston and Caldeira wittily noté3: 
" ... in interviews with people of ail social classes, the most common 
response to a question about the judiciary was sorne version of' it' s a 
joke!' The judiciary's overwhelming failures to sec ure and 
communicate a sense of effective justice, fair and timely treatment, 
and reasonable access for ail Brazilians render it an isolated an even 
irrelevant institution for most people. Beyond a very narrow 
professional circle, remarkably little is known about its personnel 
and organization. Even for educated Brazilians, the judiciary is a 
c1osed, conservative, enigmatic institution, protected by practically 
impenetrable bureaucratic formalities and fiercely defended 
corporate privileges." 
Beyond the issue of institutional mistrust, which in itself is a powerful force 
undermining access to justice for low-income citizens, limited knowledge about 
rights and judicial procedures, time constraints, and low income undermine the 
60 For an insightfuJ review of the probJem of access to justice for the poor in Latin 
America, see Garro (1999). 
61 See also O'Donneli (1999), and Hoiston and Caldeira (1998). 
62 Garro (1999) 
63 Holston and Caldeira (J 998). 
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capacity of the poor to pursue a case in the fonnal system of justice. In addition, 
to the notable exception of Rio de Janeiro, poorer neighborhoods in Brazil are 
usually located in the outskirts of urban centers. If they want to present a case to 
fonnal authorities, citizens residing in these peripheral communities must find the 
time and money necessary to travel back and forth to the city to meet with the 
c10sest state agents and officiais. Limited geographical access to police stations, 
courts, and defense attorneys is a real and concrete problem limiting access to the 
fonnal system of justice for the pOOf. The formality of actors (e.g., lawyers and 
judges) in the traditional justice system can also inhibit, if not embarrass, citizens 
coming from more modest backgrounds. As Dona Dora, a community agent from 
Ceilandia put it: 
"Poor people with no education are afraid of fonnal justice, of the 
judge, the treatment is not good. People from the justice system think 
they are better than everyone, when they attend you they don't treat 
you as if you had the same rights - people are afraid to go to the 
service counter [ba/cGo ].,,64 
Moreover, pursumg a case through the justice system involves a lot of 
paperwork, and to obtain documents citizens need a mailing address. Many favela 
residents don't have an address as they are in fact illegally "squatting" the 
premises, and when they do actually manage to regularize their situation and to 
obtain a concrete address number on a street with an actual name, few are the 
postmen who will brave the steep and treacherous maze of roads and unpaved 
alleys in the favela to deliver the mail. 
Simply put, ev en when they do know how and to whom to address their 
grievances in the complex police and judicial bureaucracies, the po or cannot 
afford the endless photocopy and administrative fees to obtain required 
documents, the repeated bus and metro trips to courts and police stations, Jengthy 
64 Translation by the author. 
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judiciaJ procedures where they have to miss out on work, the Jawyer fees when 
public defense attorneys are not available, and, more cynically, corruption fees. 
lndeed, as the low score of Brazil on the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index suggests, corruption is an endemic problem65. 
Opinion data indicates that as much as 81 % of Brazil ians bel ieve almost ail or ail 
public officiais are corrupted (World Values Survey, 1995-1997), and 38% 
believe corruption will never be eliminated (Latinobarometro, 2004). The fact that 
64% of the population reported being asked for a bribe by members of the 
judiciary power and an incredible 83% by the police suggests Brazilians have 
good reasons not to trust the state justice system66. 
Moreover, In Brazil, as in many countries including advanced industrialized 
democracies, free legal aid and government-provided defense attorneys are not 
universally available. Jn a country of extreme inequality and weak social safety 
nets like Brazil, however, the "imperfections" of the public defense system means 
a very significant part of the population is left with no means to address 
grievances in the formaI justice system. A recent study by the Secretariat of 
Judiciary Reform (2004) revealed that only 34% of courts nation-wide could 
"count on the services of the institution responsibJe for providing free legal 
assistance," which means public defense Jawyers are not available in almost two-
thirds of Brazil. 
In a country where the richest 10% capture 47% of the GNP compared to 
2.6% for the poorest 20%67 (World Bank, 2004), it is to be expected that almost a 
third of the population (29%) believes "being poor" is the main reason why 
people are not equally treated in the country (Latinobarometro, 2004). As one 
65 ln 2000, Brazil obtained a score of 3.9 out ofon 10 (compared to 9.2 for Canada), 
which is indicative of high corruption perception as the closer to zero the higher the 
perception of corruption. 
66 Transparency International- Brazil, 2003. Data available on-ine at: 
http://www.transparencia.org.br/docs/perspec-pri vado-2003 . pdf 
67 Data for 2000. 
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distinguished Brazilian intellectual plainly put it (Pinheiro, 1999), "Despite 
significant advances in civil society and democratic governance, the poor continue 
to be the preferred victims of violence, criminality, and human rights violations." 
More interestingly, Goirand (2003) captures the common perception of the 
problem in the following statement from a favela resident: 
"The people who live in the communities, in the favelas, as they 
are called here, are regarded with very little respect. ... That is why 
1 think that there should be more respect on the part of the 
authorities... 1 think that the law was made for everyone. But 
people think that only those who have money have a right to the 
law. ln contrast, ifyou're poor, you don't have any right." 
While the problems discussed above specifically affect lower-income 
citizens, there are many other obstacles to access to justice in Brazil that affect 
everyone, inc1uding the poor. Court backlogs constitute an often insurmountable 
obstacle to access to justice. Not only is it a real challenge to get the case to court, 
there is no guarantee the case will make it out of court in timely delays68, if ever, 
sorne wonder, as cases can drag on for decades. 
As a result of the defunctness of the justice system, many conflicts and 
crimes are not reported, or dealt with through private channel s, if addressed at ail. 
In addition, many conflicts and grievances do not necessarily constitute crimes 
per se and are not likely to ever reach authorities, and even more so in a context of 
institutional mistrust. 
Micro-governance programs produc~ security by enabling cÎtizens to 
address grievances before they escalate into (more) violent conflicts. This reduces 
the likelihood that harm and/or violence will reoccur in the future and, thus, 
protects the long-term individual moral good of justice (Shearing and Johnston, 
2005; Froestad and Shearing, 2005). 
68 To give an idea, in sorne less developed rural/jungle states like Amazonas, only 25% of 
cases that entered state courts were actually judged in 2003 (SRJ-UNDP,2004) 
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The future-onented and non-retributive conception of justice can be traced 
back to classical philosophers of law such as Francis Bacon in the late ] 6th 
century who argued that "the past cannot be undone by another in jury" (c.f. 
Shklar, ] 988). Because they seek to identify and implement means to re-establish 
justice in the present and for the future rather than attempting to un-do a harm 
committed in the past with another harm (i.e., retribution, sanctioning), micro-
govemance programs of conflict resolution like the Zwelethemba model reduce 
the risks of creating more perceptions of injustice in the process of delivering 
justice and safeguardfuture peace between conflicting parties. 
The production of security as a result of the (micro )govemance process 
that enables the resolution of daily conflicts and problems in low-income 
communities is rightfully assumed, and scholars associated to the school of nodal 
govemance take it for granted. While their research focuses on findings from the 
Zwelethemba model of conflict resolution and mediation -an activity usually 
associated to the conceptual realm of justice- they talk about the govemance of 
security rather than the govemance of justice. 69 
ln Brazil, state agencies related to the justice system- tribunal s, the Public 
Ministry, the Public Defense Attomey's Office, the Ministry of Justice, police 
agencies, etc.- have been supporting community programs in the areas of justice 
to improve access to justice as an objective in itself, but also for their 
acknowledged security benefits. Community programs are expected to improve 
the overall quality of state justice and security services as conflicts mediated at the 
community level "free" police officers an courts from more trivial matters (that 
69 Similarly, political scientists refer to diplomacy as a tool of security, not justice. 
Diplomacy is ail about the art of contlict resolution without recourse to violence. Micro-
governance programs are as weil. Like diplomats work to get warring parties to hold 
hostilities and agree to a ceasefire and come to the negotiation table for dialogue, 
community mediators get families, friends, neighbors, and colleagues to the discussion 
table so they can identiry and solve their problems peacefuHy. 
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can lead to violence when left un-addressed) to focus on what they are best suited 
and trained for (Daniels, 2006; Jenneker and Cartwright, 2006 and 2005). 
Simply put, access to justice is expected to prevent violence: State and 
international development agencies, such as SRJ-MJ and UNDP-Brazil, thus 
explicitly support community justice as a means of violence prevention (Dutra 
Freire, 2006). It is with this integrated approach to justice and security that the 
pilot experiment in Sao Caetano was conceptualized. As the judge coordinator of 
the project eloquently stated on the day of the project's launching 70: 
"It is not by chance that the majority of interventions on the street by 
the police and the guards are to respond to contlicts involving 
domestic violence and quarrels between neighbors. But, as many of 
us are reluctant to take our problems to the police or to Justice, the 
contlict continues. Our security, as such, is affected - police officers 
could be responding to more severe crimes -; our health is affected -
for the lack of peace and tranquility, causing us stress, suffering, 
sadness-; our development is prejudiced - because we lack the time 
and conditions to look at the opportunities we have ahead, leaving us 
only with the difficulties. If these contlicts affect us as much, the 
need to find better solutions was justified. That is why justice, 
health, security, social development, and community were united, 
and created an innovative project, with international support: 
Restorative and Community Justice to resolve contlicts involving 
domestic violence and daily disputes in the neighborhood" 
Perceptions of injustice, wh en un-addressed, often lead to violence, and this 
is especially true in the context of poverty where the precariousness of everyday 
life creates a tense cJimate of insecurity where quarrels more easily escalate into 
violent contlict. Gilligan (J 996) argues that "ail violence is an effort to do justice, 
or undo injustice." While this may not be quite true -for sorne violence is 
7°Translation by the author. The statement from the judge coordinator can also be found 
in the formai project documentation distributed publicly on the day of the project's 
launching, which was realized as part of an international conference in which ] 
participated as a panelist: Restaurando justiça na familia e na vizinhança: uma parceria 
entrejustiça e comunidade, Tribunal of Justice of the State ofSao Paulo, Sao Caetano do 
Sul- Sao Paulo, June 22,2006 
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senseless- the point remains valid: Real and perceived injustice can and often 
does end with violence, and in extreme cases homicide. In a similar vein, 
Rousseau (c.f., Shklar, 1988) observed long ago that "we manifest a sense of 
injustice when we resort to primitive acts of revenge." When honor is at stake and 
there are no means to mediate the conflict, things often quickly escalate to a point 
of no-retum and the argument can become a question of life or death. 
Indeed, as Lima (2002) demonstrates based on a study of the motives for 
homicides in the greater Sao Paulo metropolitan area, the majority of homicides 
are rooted in sm ail conflicts within the community (e.g., disputes at home, in bars, 
and/or amongst neighbors). His research also shows that these social conflicts are 
especially prone to escalate to violence and homicide as the state is unable to 
establish its legitimacy as an efficient conflict mediator71 • 
The close relationship between access to justice, violence and (in)security 
was also corroborated empirically by findings from research in Colombia, where 
it was shown that in poor communities where citizens did not have access to 
community conflict mediation programs (in the absence of access to the formaI 
justice system), there were five and a half times more cases (per 1000 in the 
population) of citizens who employed ~iolent means to obtain justice than in 
communities where citizens had access to community programs of conflict 
mediation (Buscaglia, 2001). 
But this is not because the po or are generally more prone to violence. It is 
wrong to assume that citizens in low income communities are inherently more 
violent. The vast majority of residents in shanty-towns are not revenge-seeking 
denizens. The quick(er) escalation of disputes into violent conflicts in sIums and 
low-income communities are often due to disputes involving the large population 
71 See also Dutra-Freire (2006). 
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of male youths72, often armed and intoxicated. As Naim (2007) concludes, 
"Researchers can agree upon little [on what drives up crime rates] beyond the 
general notion that crime soars in places where there is a high percentage of 
young males, ample drugs, and easy access to guns." It has been demonstrated in 
studies in criminology73 that the presence of weapons is more likely to lead more 
rapidly to the escalation of violence and to the use of lethal force. Combine 
alcohol and drug (ab)use- a preferred activity for the young and idle in low-
income communities- with an overall sense of social injustice sharpened by a 
time-and-place specific perceived sense of injustice, and it becomes a potentially 
explosive cocktail for confrontation. Indeed, as Skhlar (1988) argues, "the 
spontaneous reaction to injustice is not a cali for legal procedures, but for 
revenge." This is ever more true when sobriety is no more and honor is at stake. 
ln the context of poverty, one's sense of honor is often one of the few things one 
may own. 
Injustice, whether real or perceived, creates insecurity, which has real 
consequences. Susan Eckstein and Timothy Wickham-Crowley (2003) make a 
powerful statement and are right to argue that "if people define social situations as 
un jus t, then such perceived injustices are real in their consequences." Injustice has 
concrete repercussions and is not simply the absence of justice74, as peace may 
not be simplistically defined as the absence of war. Both concepts involve states 
oftheir own and are experienced as such on a daily basis. 
It should be emphasized that the aim here is not to engage in philosophical 
debates about the meaning of (in)justice and its relationship to (in)security. 
Rather, the purpose of this discussion is to develop new ways to think about 
citizen agency on (in)security within a political science framework of analysis. 
72 According to Ituassu (2006), in Brazil, "between 1991 and 2000, the number of young 
people between 15 and 24 years old grew by 47.3%." 
73 See, for example, Cusson, (1999). 
74 For an interesting discussion on "The Faces oflnjustice," see Shklar (1988). 
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While the study of security has aJways been a central concern for 
mainstream political science, there has been no clear normative consensus on the 
meaning of security. As Hurrell (p.150) aptly put it, "the politics of security is not 
only driven by problems of trust and credible contracting but also by the deep 
disputes as to which values are to be incorporated into understandings of security 
and as to whose security is to be promoted (states? nations? regimes? 
individuals?)." 
For most of the 20th century, research has focused on security issues 
involving warring factions, states and international relations as opposed to people. 
More recently, in the J 990s, researchers and policy·makers began to develop 
schoJarly interest in the sources of insecurity that affect ordinary citizen s, not only 
states, as part of the new "hum an security paradigm." IR and policy studies that 
employ a human security perspective have thus become more interested in 
security issues affecting the welfare of vulnerable groups in failing states and 
countries with civil wars. Latin American studies and comparative scholarship 
have also produced interesting contributions to understanding the plight of 
citizens and communities in (otherwise politically) stable democracies where 
public security and judiciary institutions are failing. 
As will be demonstrated in Chapter 2, the actual and potential of citizen 
agency in the daily governance of security, however, remains largely unexplored 
in mainstream scholarship. Research in the fields of comparative politics and 
Latin American studies has focused on unlawful solutions to insecurity in sIums 
and, considering the methodological difficulties that the study of illicit, criminal 
behavior inevitably entails, researchers have usually taken for granted that private, 
unJawful forms of justice and security are the poor man's way to solve daily 
problems, and have instead focused their empirical efforts on documenting the 
private high-tech security solutions of the upper half. 
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While political scientists at least dating back to Tocqueville have studied 
civil society organization and different forms of citizen agency, these questions 
have been largely ignored in relation to the governance of security in peaceful, 
-democratic countries of Latin America. Strangely, at the same time as the shift 
from state-centered to 'multilateral' or 'polycentric' governance has integrated 
mainstream scholarship (McGinnis, 1999, c.f. Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 
2005)6, the positive consequences ofthis weIJ-documented trend for the regulation 
oftraditionally state-monopolized justice and security services are absent from the 
misrule of law literature. 
In the past three decades, comparative research and the Latin American 
studies literature has been primarily concerned with forms of citizen organization 
against authoritarian regimes3, and since democratization mostly with changing 
patterns of civil society mobilization against social injustices associated to 
neoliberal economic reforms4 . The ri ch body of literature on local governance in 
Brazil and other countries of the region has been largely focused on local 
budgeting processes75 • As will be demonstrated in Chapter 2, when the literature 
6 Many authors across the social sciences have observed a relative decline in the primacy 
of the state as both the main unit of analysis and the principal actor in domestic and 
international life. Criminologists have mainly focused on new power-sharing 
arrangements and the diffusion of authority in the organization of domestic security (see, 
for example, the scholarship on nodal governance). Political scientists have been more 
generally interested in the decline of state authority relatively to market forces, 
international organizations and transnational actors (e.g., (I)NGOs, epistemic 
communities, advocacy networks) in domestic and international political and economic 
affairs (see, for example, della Porta and Tarrow, 2005; Held and McGrew, 2002; 
O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams, 2000; McGinnis, 1999; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; 
Finnemore, 1996; St range 1996, Haas, 1992; Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). 
3 See, for example, the edited volumes by Eckstein (2001) and by Escobar and Alvarez 
(1992); Oxhorn (1995); CastelJs (1983). 
4 See, for example, the edited volume by Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley (2003) and by 
Eckstein (2001); Zugman (2005); Stolle-McAllister (2005); Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler 
(1998); Roberts (1998); Yashar (1998); Degregori (1998); Panfichi (1997); Hellman 
(1997); Waylen (1994). 
75 See, for example, A bers (1998, 1996); A vritzer (2000a and 2000b); Baiocchi (2003, 
2000); de Sousa Santos (1998); Inter-American Development Bank (2003); Koonings 
(2004); Souza (2001); Utzig (2000); Wampler, (2004); Wampler and A vritzer (2004). 
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does address the role of civil society in the governance security, it focuses mostly 
on unlawful and violent forms or citizen agency. 
Other recent studies of interest identify diverse and competing models of 
citizenship, raising the very relevant question of citizen agency and 
"consumerism". For example, after an in-depth comparative historical review of 
civil society organization in the region, Oxhorn (2004b, 2006) concludes that 
modem Latin American democracies are characterized by two "competing" 
models of citizenship: Citizenship as "consumption" versus "agency." As he 
keenly observes (2006), in Latin America, " ... a new model of citizenship has 
become overwhelmingly dominant: Citizenship as consumption. Neither simply 
co-opted nor agents in the construction oftheir own citizenship rights, citizens are 
best understood as consumers, spending their votes and often limited economic 
resources to access what normally would be considered minimal rights of 
democratic citizenship." 
Similarly, 1 would argue that the paradoxical pattern of citizen participation 
ln community programs observed in Brazil underscores a more fundamental 
regional problem where citizenship rights are constructed and exercised as a form 
of private consumption rather than collective agency. 1 would disagree with 
Oxhorn, however, that "citizenship as consumption" can be clearly conceptually 
dissociated from "citizenship as agency". 
Citizen participation in community programs ln the form of servIce 
consumption constitutes an important, albeit limited form of direct citizen agency 
on real and perceived sources of injustice and insecurity. Consumption ;s agency 
as recourse to community mediation and legal aid programs enables individuals to 
find solutions to private problems, and this is no sm ail achievement in a context 
where public security is failing and the judiciary is discredited. As Strozenberg 
(2006), the former coordinator of the community mediation component of the 
Viva Rio project argues: 
"Community law [through community mediation] is applied with 
many defects and enormous fragility, but it still provides meaningful 
requisites for the desirable sense of justice: The prevalence of local 
culture, accessibility, agility, low financial cost, and low 
bureaucracy 76." 
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Citizens that participate in community programs as consumers are exerting a 
form of agency- "citizenship as agency," therefore, cannot be completely 
dissociated from "citizenship as consumption." lt seems that only if citizens were 
allowed to collectively manage the community programs in which they participate 
that citizenship could be understood as "agency" from an oxhomian perspective. 
As this study will demonstrate for Brazil, "collective agency" on insecurity 
through community-based organizations unfortunately remains much more of an 
ideal than a realtty. ln Brazilian community govemance programs, citizen agency 
is ail about the consumption of services provided by outside-community experts, 
and while this is far from ideal, it is still far better than no agency at a1l, especially 
in the context of the "misrule oflaw." 
According to recent scholarship on democratization and citizenship in 
Latin America, lack of access to the formai institutions of the justice system, 
police violence and widespread popular support for authoritarian measures of 
social control, corruption, impunity, ghetto justice, death squads and vigilantism 
have pervaded and paved the way for the consolidation not of the democratic rule 
of law but of the "un"rule77 or "mis"rule78 of law. The concept refers to a 
democratic polit y characterized by the failure and/or discrediting of judiciary 
institutions and public security. As Hoiston explains (2006): 
"ln many regions of the world, not only in Brazil and Latin America, 
increasing everyday violations of civil citizenship in the form of 
urban violence and discredited judiciaries appear to accompany 
76 Translation by the author. 
77 According to Méndez, O'Donnell and Pinherio (1999) 
78 According to James Holston (2006) 
increasing political democracy. [ ... ] This coincidence of democratic 
expansion and erosion is the perverse paradox of Brazil's 
democratization. [ ... ] lnstead of the anticipated glories of 
democracy, Brazilians experience a democratic citizenship that 
seems simultaneously to erode as it exp~nds, a democracy at times 
capable and at other times tragically incapable of protecting the 
citizen's body and producing ajust society." 
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Popular culture and the mainstream literature depict daily life in Latin 
America's megapolises as a Hobbesian worId of self-survival and praetorian 
'politics, where citizens are left to fend for themselves and obtain justice and 
security by their own bloody means and arbitrary rules79• The world portrayed is 
one where the better-off recluse to gated communities with elaborate, state of the 
art security equipment and body guards, and where the tens of millions ~f 
Brazilians80 who live in shanty-towns have recourse to criminal groups, ghetto 
justice, vigilantism and Iynching. 
By focusing exclusively on unlawful forms of citizen-based security, the 
misrule of law literature fails, by error of omission, to identify (let alone explain) 
ail the components of its object of study. Moreover, research has been largely 
limited to problem-analysis. When the literature engages in actual problem-
solving, it tends to be limited to police and judiciary reform, which ironically, 
usually escapes the scope of social science expertise. Most scholars come to the 
very generic conclusion about the structural/societal need to "democratize the rule 
of law81 ," with little if any practical and immediate applications. 
As a result of this institutional reform bias and of the tendency to focus 
mainly on unlawful forms of citizen-based security, the more constructive role of 
79 A bias also Iloted by Anderson Sa (2005), the founder of a popular (Iaw-abiding) 
favela-based community organization in the documentary "Favela Rising" (2005). 
80 In Brazil, the sIum population is quite large. In 200], more than 50 million Brazilians 
were reported to reside in shanty-towns (United Nations Statistics Division, 2004), and in 
a big city like Rio de Janeiro, as much as 60% of the urban population is concentrated in 
sIums (Todaro, 1999). 
81 See, for example, Prillaman, (2000); O'Donnell (1999); and Holston and Caldeira 
(1998). 
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civil society actors in the govemance of security has been obscured. My research 
aims to address this deficit by re-constructing the other side of the story, focusing 
on lawful and peaceful cases of citizen-based security in underprivileged urban 
neighborhoods in Brazil. Rather than re-telling the captivating story of how 
people in Brazil, the epitome state of the "misrule of law," support authoritative 
measures of social control and rely on private justice and security to both fight 
and sustain criminal activities, this study focuses on lawful forms of citizen-based 
security. Of course, this is only a small step toward a more complete story of 
citizen responses to insecurity in Latin America, but hopefully an important step 
that will bring more attention to cases of lawful "justice from below" than on 
ghetto justice and "injustices from above" rooted in the failure of public security, 
lack of access to the formaI justice system, and poverty. 
More empirical attention should be focused on how ordinary citizens are 
solving problems of insecurity in the communities where security lacks the most, 
and hiring a local vigilante or justiceiro to right a wrong is not the usual way 
ordinary people go about everyday business. Citizens who live in urban sIums and 
poor neighborhoods are simply not the violence-crazed, revenge-seeking denizens 
the mainstream literature depicts. 
For a useful and empirically-backed theory of govemance in 
underprivileged communities where public security is failing, we must tum to 
criminology and the rich body of scholarship on "nodal govemance," most 
notably to studies on the Zwelethemba experiments in community govemance 
conducted by Clifford Shearing and other prominent criminologists in South 
Africa and elsewhere. 
Nodal Governance 
Nodal theory seeks to expJain and understand the nature of networked, power-
sharing arrangements, and the role of societal, state and private sector actors (?r 
"nodes") within these networks that enable the reguJation of specific issue-areas 
outside traditional state channels. Governance, Shearing, Burris and Drahos 
(2005) explain, "is substantially constituted in nodes -institutions with a set of 
technologies, mentalities and resources- that mobilize the knowledge and 
capacity of members to manage the course of events ... Nodes are normally but 
not essentially points on networks, but networks are a prime means through which 
nodes exert influence." 
Nodes have four principal constitutive components: They reqUlre 
technologies to exert "influence over the course of events, resources "to support 
the operation of the node and the exertion of influence"; an institutional structure 
"that enables the directed mobilization of resources, mentalities and technologies 
over time," and a normative structure (or "mentalities"). The authors emphasize 
that the node is "a real, not a virtual, entity, not simply a virtual point on a 
network where information can be said to coalesce [ ... ] To be a governing node 
as this theory defines it, a node must have sorne institutional form, even if 
temporary [ ... ] lt need not be a formally constituted or legally recognized entity, 
but it must have sufficient stability and structure to enable the mobilization of 
resources, mentalities and technologies over time". 
This study will further demonstrate with comparative data from Brazil and 
South Africa that while local security networks may not have their own 
autonomous technologies and resources as networks are virtual, they do have their 
own institutional and normative structure, which is determined according to the 
predominant "mentality" of the main Bureaucratic actor. Indeed, while they may 
share a common programmatic objective, ail nodes within a local security 
network are not equal. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, local security 
networks are essentially made up of mentalities about who can have agency on 
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justice: While the network does not exist independently of the nodes that 
constitute it, it does have a proper normative structure that does not necessarily 
reflect the "mentalities" of ail the constituting nodes, but rather the prevailing 
ideational position of the most powerful Bureaucratie actor. This finding points to 
the relevance and to the importance of norms for understanding and explaining 
the dynamics ofmicro-govemance initiatives. 
Local security networks follow principles of nodal govemance: They are 
characterized by a decentralized power structure where resources, responsibilities, 
and accountability are distributed within the network according to a knowledge-
based partnering relationship between strategie actors. The specifie capacities and 
the expertise of each node are mobilized through power-sharing institutional 
arrangements that favor the use of local knowledge to maximize efficiency in the 
administration and processing of specifie issues. Specifically, as Burris, Orahos 
and Shearing (2005) define it, "nodal govemance is an elaboration of 
contemporary network theory that explains how a variety of actors operating 
within social systems interact along networks to govern the systems they inhabit 
[ ... ] A node as we conceive ofit is a site [within a complex social system] where 
knowledge, capacity and resources are mobilized to manage a course of events." 
ln this vein, there IS an interesting body of research in criminology that 
employs a nodal framework of analysis to demonstrate how the capacities and 
knowledge resources of local communities can be mobilized and organized into 
"local security networks," in collaboration with outside-community public and 
private actors, to enable citizens to regulate security outside traditional state 
institutions within a lawful, institutionalized framework, through community-
based channels of dispute resolution and conflict mediation82 . Many scholars have 
82 See, for example, Dupont (2006, 2004); Wood and Dupont (2006); Wood and Marks 
(2006); Daniëls (2006); Cartwright and Jenneker (2006, 2005); Burris, Drahos and 
Shearing (2005); Froestad and Shearing (2005); Shearing and Johnston (2005); Shearing 
and Wood (2004); Wood (2004); Wood and Font (2003); Dupont, Grabosky and 
Shearing (2003); Johnston and Shearing (2002); Shearing (200Ia, 200Ib). 
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built on nodal theory to analyze the different actors and their interactions ln 
networked, power-sharing arrangements that enable the governance of a range of 
issues, including: the governance of security in weak and failing states8J ; the 
governance of security between citizens, the private sector and the police in 
advanced industrialized democracies such as Australia84; the governance of social 
justice in South Africa85 and Argentina86; and the governance of international 
norms on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") within 
the World Trade Organization87• 
ft is important to recognize that nodal theory is normative to the extent that 
it postulates the superiority of local knowledge and capacities for governance in 
complex social systems. The normative belief, however, is empirically-informed 
by a number of social experiments, notably the successful policing strategy that 
employed protesters themselves to police protests at the tumultuous time when the 
Apartheid regime opened up and allowed demonstrations for the first time88• 
Applying the same reasoning to the problem of (in)security in crime-Iaden 
underprivileged urban neighborhoods in developing countries like South Africa 
and Brazil, where state resources are limited and communities usually do not have 
access to or trust in the formai institutions of the justice system (including the 
police), nodal theory postulates that the most efficient way to solve daily disputes 
and problems that cause insecurity is to employ the problem-solving capacities of 
the citizens who live in these communities and face the problems on a daily basis. 
83 See Dupont, Grabosky and Shearing (2002). 
84 See Wood and Marks (2006); Wood and Dupont (2006); Dupont (2004); Wood (2004). 
85 See Jenneker and Cartwright (2006); Wood and Dupont (2006); Burris, Drahos and 
Shearing (2005); Shearing and Johnston (2005); Shearing and Froestad (2005); 
Cartwright and Jenneker (2005); Shearing and Wood (2004); Shearing (2001a and 
2001 b); Shearing and Bayley (2001). 
86 See Froestad and Shearing (2005); Shearing and Wood (2004); Wood and Font (2003); 
Shearing, Wood and Font (forthcoming). 
87 See Surris, Drahos and Shearing (2005). 
88 See, for example, Heymann's (1992) and The Goldstone Commission's (1993) account 
of events, which provides conclusive empirical evidence to corroborate the superiority of 
local knowledge and capacities over professional expertise in potentially explosive 
conflict situations. 
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Nodal theorists believe that mlcro-governance programs like the 
Zwelethemba model present an added-value to the formaI justice system and 
traditional law enforcement agencies to solve problems t~at cause real and 
perceived insecurity in urban sIums because they utilize local knowledge and 
capacities rather than profession al expertise for problem resolution. It is important 
to stress here that these community programs are not designed to replace but 
rather to complement the formaI justice system, and that more severe cases of 
crime and violence require recourse to police authorities. 
Nodal theory asserts that while they are not experts in social work, 
psychology, law, or diplomacy -traditional fields where conflict-resolution is a 
profession al skill- community residents are experts of everyday problems and of 
the reality in which these problems are embedded, and therefore have the relevant 
knowledge necessary to solve them. 
The shared culture of daily life, problems, and language between service 
providers (mediators) and consumers (disputants) in poor communities facilitate 
communication and the definition of relevant knowledge for conflict resolution. It 
is easier to communicate with community members who share daily problems and 
language than detached professionals, formaI judges and lawyers, and in the case 
of Brazil, police officers with a bad reputation. 
When conflicts and grievances are mediated through community-based 
mechanisms, it is not supposed to be social workers, psychologists, professional 
mediators, lawyers, judges and police officers --outside community experts-
but instead the local citizens who face the conflicts daily and are the c10sest to 
their reality who define what knowledge is relevant for their resolution. Problem-
resolution based on local knowledge and capacities through local actors 
constitutes the conceptual core of nodal theory, and the central prem ise on which 
Zwelethemba-inspired models of micro-governance have been developed in 
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crime-Iaden, low-income communities in South Africa, Uganda, Argentina, 
Brazil, Australia, and Canada. As the case of Brazil illustrates, however, these 
experiments have not yielded the same, expected, positive outcomes. 
To understand the context within which micro-governance initiatives were 
developed in Brazil, it is useful to begin with an assessment of the state of 
(in)security in the country. In the next chapter, 1 review empirical evidence 
indicating severe public security deficits. Contrarily to the mainstream literature, 
however, 1 argue that the poor do not usually have recourse to criminal means to 
compensate for the failures of public security and the justice system, and 
demonstrate it empirically with survey results for Brasilia. 
Chapter 2. The New Insecurocracy 
In the not so long ago political era of generals and military rulers of Latin 
America, the dark-humored cartoonist asked if anyone had ever heard of 
"insecurocracy89." Two decades or so of democratic development later, the 
concept is more relevant than ever as Latin Americans are confronted daily with 
violent crime, Kafkaesque police and judiciary bureaucracies, and a media culture 
that favors live footage of blood to accompany the countless scandaIs of 
corruption, injustice, and revenge. If perhaps a bit cynical, the idea of 
insecurocracy constitutes a most useful way to think about the meaning of 
democracy for ordinary citizens in Brazil today, where crime rates are soaring, 
law en forcement agencies are unable/unwilling to protect the population, and 
judiciary institutions and the police are discredited with corruption and 
inefficiency (Hoiston, 2006). 
The transition to democracy in Brazil did not bring about expected 
improvements in the accessibility and quality of formaI justice and security 
services and, many go on to argue, the current state "Iawless violence" indicates a 
"c1ear abdication of democratic authority" (Mendez, O'Donnell and Pinheiro, 
1999). This is especially true for Brazil9o, where the combination of high levels of 
crime and low levels of trust in state institutions responsible for dealing with the 
problem creates a vicious circle of violence, and where the impact of violence on 
basic civi 1 rights has been one of the principal threats to the quaI ity of democratic 
govemance. 
Scholars of the misrule of law argue that democratization in Latin America 
has, quite paradoxically, enabled an unprecedented level of political freedom 91 
and participation while "the civil component of citizenship remains impaired as 
89 See Quino, Mafalda. L'intégrale (p. 148) 
90 As 1 have argued elsewhere with Oxhom (2005) 
91 Oxhom (2004a). 
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citizens suffer systematic violations of civil rights and commonly encounter 
violence, corruption, and police abuse that go unpunished" (Holston, 200692). 
Public securitl3 institutions "fail" when state authorities are either unable to 
protect citizens or unwilling to enter in "dangerous," crime-Iaden areas like 
favelas: Even when law en forcement agencies are able and willing, the state 
security apparatus often remains part of the problem as the police engages in 
'social c1eansing' activities (CCHS, 200694). lndeed, sorne studies95 show that 
levels of police violence in Brazil have actually increased since the transition to 
democracy96. 
ln Brazil, the unwillingness/inability of the state to protect citizens residing 
in underprivileged areas is compounded, as Pinheiro (1999) keenly notes, by the 
fact that crimes perpetrated by state agents often go unpunished "to the same 
extent that it [the state] attempts to punish crimes committed by petty and 
common criminals." 
The failure of public security is symptomatic of what Holston and Caldeira 
(1998) define as a "disjunctive democracy" in Brazil, which, they believe, has 
created a daily c1imate where "many Brazilians feel less secure under the political 
democracy they achieved, their bodies more threatened by its everyday violence 
than by the repressions of military dictatorship" (Holston, 200697). The empirical 
evidence reviewed in this chapter also suggests that Brazilians have good reasons 
to be afraid of the police. 
92 See also Caldeira (2000); Pinheiro (1999); Hoiston and Caldeira (1998). 
93 Police agencies enforce the rule of law and constitute one of the principal pillars of the 
justice system: Most fundamentally, they are responsible for protecting citizens from 
crime and violence. 
94 Canadian Consortium on Human Security - Human Security and Cities, 2006. Human 
Security and Cilies (Power-point presentation, Human Security Policy Division -
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada). Available on-line at: 
https:/lhumansecurity-cities.orglpageI56.htm 
95 See, for example, Caldeira and Holston (1999, 1998) 
96 An argument also set forth by Chevigny (1995). 
97 See also Caldeira (2000), and Holston and Caldeira (1998). 
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Perhaps as both the result and as a cause of the failure of public security, 
shanty-towns in Latin America's modern metropolises are today among the 
world's "most dangerous places" (OF AIT, 2006) and levels of crime and violence 
in Brazil are among the world's highest98 • To give an idea, in 2003, there were 50 
980 homicide victims in Brazil, which indicates a high homicide rate of 28.8 per 
10000099 (compared to 1.9 per 100000 for Canada1oo). In 2004, the violent crime 
rate against property was 485 per 100 000, while the lethalJy violent crime rate 
reached the alarmingly high level of 3791 per 100 000 (SENASP, 2004). 
According to one study (Ituassu, 2006), murder rates in Brazil have increased by 
237% from 1985 to 2005, and today constitutes the principal cause of death for 
youths between 19 and 24. 
As a result of the generalized insecurity, a whooping 82%101 of the 
population in the city of Rio de Janeiro and 49%102 in Sào Paulo report feeling 
unsafe wh en night falls. Similarly, results from the opinion survey conducted in 
the satellite cities of Taguatinga and Ceilandia (presented below in Table 2) 
identify insecurity and crime as the principal source of daily con cern and the 
biggest problem in the two low-income, partly favelized communities. 
98 See Hojman, (2004); Karl (2003); Arriagada and Godoy (2000); Londono and Guerrero 
(1999); Ayres (1998); Fruhling and Sandoval (1997). 
99See the report on The Burden of Injuries in Brazil (2003) by Pinheiro Gawryszewski 
and Silveira (2006). 
100 Statistics Canada, 2005. Available on-line at: 
http://www.statcan.ca/DailylEnglishl050n]/d050n]a.htm 
101 (ILANUD, 1996, c.f. ILANUD, 2002) 
102 (lLANUD, 1997, c.r. ILANUD, 2002) 
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Table 2. Daily sources of insecurity in two low-income communities10J 
Survey question: What do you see as the (%) Frequency 
biggest problem in your community? (more 
than one choice possible) 
Delinquency, crime, and violence 
Insecurity and crime in your neighborhood 73 726 
Drug trafficking and use/ local gangs 55 545 
Disrespect and destruction of public property 38 381 
Noise coming from bars and clubs 35 353 
fights and arguments 34 343 
Alcoholism 35 349 
Misrule oflaw 
Police violence 27.5 275 
Lack of police presence 61 611 
Lack of access to formaI justice system 32.5 325 
Local developmental issues 1 quality of Iife 
in tbe community 
Jnappropriate housing/ insufficient private 30 301 
spaee 
Laek ofpublie green spaees 38 379 
Laek of sports eenters/entertainment faeilities 48.5 485 
Urban deeay 31 313 
Laek of adequate lighting 23 227 
Laek of publ ie transport 31 307 
Laek ofbasie sanitation (water, sewage) 22 217 
As discussed in the methodological chapter, for clarity purposes in 
determining the significance of socio-economic variables (e.g., race/ethnicity; 
c1ass; gender; age), sources of daily insecurity were (sub)grouped according to the 
three categories: 1) Delinquency, crime, and violence; 2) misrule of law; and 3) 
Local developmental issues / quality of life in the community. Basically, three 
new variables separate responses according to each of these three categories, 
based on the number of respondents who answered yes to one or more of the 
individual response options that represent the category of crime, delinquency, and 
violence, and so forth. Given the deep racial divides of Brazilian society, and the 
reality that darker Brazilians tend to be poorer and the principal victims of police 
103 Refer to Tables 5 .1, 5.2 , and 5.3 in Statistieal Appendix 
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violence, it is not surprising to find high levels of statistical significance between 
race/ethnicity and aIl three categories of daily insecurity l04, indicating that Afro-
Brazilians are likely to have have higher perceptions of insecurity in other 
underprivileged. and/or favelized communities. 
While poverty and its associated probJems (e.g., lack ofmoney to make ends 
meet, unemployment, lack of access to health, insufficient public spaces and 
sanitation, etc.) are obviously causes of concern for most local residents, crime 
and insecurity are the principal factors of human insecurity as experienced by 
citizens on a daily basis. The data c1early indicates, in Table 2, that insecurity 
related to "delinquency, crime, and violence" is the number one source of daily 
concern for residents in Taguatinga and Ceilandia, who are also very concerned 
(61 %) with the lack of police presence. Interestingly, 28% of survey respondents 
also believe that police violence is one of the biggest problems in the community. 
These paradoxical results may be explained by the fact that as crime and 
delinquency are the main sources of insecurity for the majority community 
residents (73%), people want law enforcement authorities to do something about 
it, which would explain why 61 % of respondents felt that the Jack of police 
presence was a big problem in their community. However, it is not because 
citizens wish that the police would do more about the crime problem that the 
police is trusted to uphold the law and do its job right, which would explain why 
as many as 28% of respondents also believe that police violence is a big problem 
in their community. 
104 Refer to Tables 5.1. J. J, 5.2.1.1 and 5.3.1.1 in Statistical Appendix 
Insecurity: Old Feelings, New (And Not So New) Bad Guys 
Many authors l05 have observed that, as a result of daily experiences and exposure 
to crime and violence, Brazilians today are increasingly willing to exchange 
hum an rights and democratic guarantees for security. In a fascinating 
ethnographic study of "Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in Sao Paulo," 
Caldeira (2000: 77) deftly captures this dilemma with a quote from a resident 
from a wealthy area (Morumbi) targeted daily by neighboring favelas for crime: 
"We used to think that the lack of freedom and censorship were 
bad. Today l think the military regime should come back. For 
example, take the case of kidnapping. Ifs absurd the lack of 
security that one feels. l'm nobody, l don't have many assets, but 
l'm afraid that suddenly sorne guy gets my son in order to ask for 
ransom offive million. l'm scared to death .... " 
As insecurity related to real and perceived crime in urban sIums spreads to 
wealthier neighboring communities, which are not only directly targeted for 
robbery and kidnapping but also often indirectly victimized by lost bullets from 
gunfire between rival gangs and the police, citizens from ail social walks demand 
"th nt something be done" to reduce crime- whatever the means, so long as it 
works, and this has meant largeling the poor generically (read arbitrarily) as a 
means of crime control. 
11 has been so frequently observed that it has become almost cliché to talk 
about the "criminalization of poverty" in Brazil. The problem, however, remains 
very real as on/off-dut Y and retired police officers are still commonly albeit 
illegally employed -formally and extra-officially- as private security guards 
and justiceiros. As Caldeira (2000: 206) describes, "justiceiros, literally, 'justice 
makers,' are groups of men who kill people they consider to be criminals, 
especially on the periphery. Many limes they are policemen, ex-policemen, or 
105 See, for example, Holston (2006); Oxhorn (2003); Caldeira (2000); Méndez, 
O'Donnell, and Pinheiro (1999); Caldeira and Holston (1998); Falcào (1998); and 
Pinheiro (1998). 
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others associated with policemen. Frequently, they operate behind the façade of a 
private security enterprise." 
Because many cases of police violence are fatal or not reported (due, 
amongst many factors, to fear of reprisais), it is difficult to quantify the extent of 
the problem 106. Nevertheless, 1442 cases of civilians killed and 2753 cases of 
civilians injured by the Military Police were reported in Brazil in 2000, of which 
315 deaths and 954 injuries resulted from violence committed by off-duty police 
agentsl07. 
The private security business is not only more lucrative than the cop's 
average monthly wage lO8, it is also a line of "dut y" which typically entails 
freedom to use violent measures of social control without the (potentially) 
restrictive controls of the law. In practice, this means, very plainly put, liberty to 
"get rid" of the crime and insecurity problem by getting rid of the perceived 
source of the problem -"suspicious poor people," guilty by reason of 
socioeconomic status defect. As Chevigny (1999: 56) argues, "This kind of police 
violence -shooting suspects of ordinary crimes (or people who merely run away 
from the police) in the streets- is a form of vigilantism; it is the police version of 
eliminating undesirables. [ .. ] The connection between vigilantism and police 
violence is emphasized by the fact that in every place where death squads are used 
against ordinary criminals, the police tum out to be involved. Furtherrnore, the 
police help the death squads. Thus, death squads and the police engage in 'social 
c1eansing' ." 
The strategy is reminiscent of the military regime's national security 
doctrine, which, in the official war against the "evils of communism" and the 
106 For an insightful discussion of the complex methodological issues involved with data 
on police violence in Brazil, see Caldeira, (2000) 
107 See Khan's (2003) working paper: Segurança publica e trabalho policial no Brasil 
(Working Paper Number CBS-51-04). 
108 For a discussion on the problem of the average monthly police wage, see Pinheiro 
(1998). 
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undeclared war on the Left and civil society more broadly, was responsible for 
thousands of civilian deaths and disappearances in Argentina, Chi le, Uruguay, and 
to a lesser extent Brazil,09. It should not be forgotten too quickly that for the most 
part of the twentieth century, the military repeatedly interven'ed in Brazilian 
politics and society to "restore order" and promote "progress." This meant 
dislocating and eliminating poor communities and squatter settlements (Goirand, 
2000), as weil as disappearing countless citizens suspected of "subversion"-that 
is, thousands of poor citizens. This was, and still is because in the city, to be poor 
means living in the "crime-infested" favela, and the favela resident is generically 
construed as a "criminal" to be targeted as part of crime control"o and to be 
treated as an infectious disease that must be contained before it spreads and 
contaminates other parts of society. As one disdainful member of the upper-half 
put it (c.f., Caldeira, 2000: 79-80) when asked about where the people who robbed 
came from: 
"]t can only be from the favela! But J won't say that it is the favela, 
because there are a lot of good people there too .... [But 1 know] by 
their smell they ought to be from there; because of the smell 1 think 
they are! ... " 
Caldeira provides convmcmg evidence that the poor, as inhabitants of 
marginal spaces lacking basic infrastructure (e.g. the favela), are generally 
considered "unclean," "polluting," and "contam inating," which is associated to 
crime and evil. As she convincingly argues (2000: 90-92): 
"Crime is also a matter of evil, and its explanations are also a matter 
of authority and cultural constructions intended to tame the forces of 
evil. ... These conceptions [are used] to attack human rights, to 
support abuses by the police, vigilant groups, and death squads, and 
to justify the death penalty. [ ... ] People 1 interviewed felt that the 
authorities and institutions were c1early failing in their task of 
controlling places and behaviors; that is, they were leaving open 
109 See, for example, Vanden and Prevost (2002), Oabène (1994); Rouquié (1987). 
110 See also Oxhom (2003); Goirand (2000); Caldeira (2000); Mendez (1999), Hoiston 
and Caldeira (] 998). 
spaces for evil to spread. The verb used to describe the increase in 
crime and the context in which it occurs were infiltrate, infest, and 
contaminate. Since evil is contagious, the danger of its spreading fast 
is immense. [ ... ] Although aIl human beings are vulnerable to evil, 
the poor are considered to be doser to nature and necessity and 
farther from reason and rational behavior than other people. ln 
addition, they are physicaHy doser to the spaces of crime. 
Consequently they are considered to be at greater risk for being 
infected with evi!." 
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In this twistcd scenario, vigilantes can benefit from popular support for their 
"social cleansing" activities, at times amongst those such practices victimize the 
most -favela residents-- because the po or are also the principal victims of the 
failure of public security and of the high costs of living in areas ruled by criminal 
gangs and drug lords. From the misguided policies of military dictators and their 
technocrats to the misguided politics ofvigilante-tumed cops and their associates, 
the poor came to be effectively criminalized in Brazil. 
In many ways, the "generalized human insecurity" characteristic of low-
income communities in modem Brazil remind of military-ruled Latin America 
and to what Quino described then as "insecurocracy," for the military in Latin 
America were infamously known to find insecurity a most opportune excuse for a 
coup as they called themselves in to "restore order" in The Name of The 
Nation ill . 
In today's poor urban communities ln Brazil, different actors resort to 
"whatever means available" to obtain justice and security as the System is failing 
them and state authorities are discredited with inefficiency and corruption. Drug 
traffickers take over "public security" and enforce compliance to their rules in a 
new game they -not democratically elected representatives of the people- get 
to define. The different police agencies and the special task forces assigned to 
deal with the problcm and enforce the Legitimate Law of the Brazilian State also 
III For an in-depth analysis of military rule and praetorian politics in Brazil, see 
Faucher's (1999) Le Brésil des Militaires. 
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follow their own set of rules 112 and ignore the rules of the Rules they seek to 
enforce. Law-abiding citizens face a difficult dilemma -whose rules to follow 
when?- and must make strategic choices alternating loyalties to survive and 
ensure their security. As one Military Police officer 1 interviewed explains: 
"In the war between the police and traffickers, the population [in 
favelas] stays covered because they know ifthey help the traffickers, 
the police will think they are helping the traffickers, and if they help 
the police, they will be killed by the traffickers." 
While in modern democratic Brazil, the military are no longer "depended 
upon" to restore order, in many ways the precarious situation of daily insecurity in 
urban siums across the country constitutes a microcosm of the c1assic politicized 
state, and the military are sometimes actually called in for interventions in big 
cities with major favela populations and big crime problems wh en insecurity 
interferes with everyday life a little too c10sely for comfort. Moreover, basic law 
enforcemen/1/3 in Brazil is ensured by the Military Police, who not only follow 
military tradition in name, uniform, command structure, customs, and training, 
but in the city of Rio de Janeiro further dispose of an ultra-specialized "battalion 
unit for special operations" (BOPE- Ba/alhào de Operacàoes Especiais) trained 
specifically in war operations by the lsraeli Defense Forces (lOF) and its secret 
112 See, for example, Soares', Batista's and Pimentel's documentary novel "Elita da 
Tropa" for a detailed account of combat tactics employed in favelas by Rio de laneiro's 
elite police task force. 
113 In Brazil, there are three principal police forces (with a number oftheir own parallel 
branches) responsible for daily law enforcement and case investigations: the Military 
Police, the Civil Police, and in sorne cities the Municipal Civil Guard. The Military 
Police are responsible for ail active law enforcement-that is, they patrol the streets and 
respond to citizen caBs and crime reports, and engage daily in a number of activities 
aimed to prevent the occurrence of crime. The Municipal Civil Guard exert the same 
functions and are often in direct competition with the Military Police. Municipal Guards, 
however, are not supposed to carry weapons, but in fact they do in many cases (as in Sao 
Caetano do Sul) either by ignoring, challenging, or circumventing the existing legislation. 
In ail states, the Civil Police-never the Military Police or Municipal Civil Guard- are 
attributed ail investigative responsibilities and powers. The Civil Police are responsible 
for the questioning and detention of suspects. ln actual fact, the "temporary" detention of 
suspects in Civil Police stations, is often prolonged into months as cases await trial, and 
even once convicted felons are often sent back to these "temporary" detention cells as the 
prison population by far exceeds prison capacities). 
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service (Mossad) for combat missions against traffickers In favelas (Soares, 
Batista and Pimentel, 2006114). 
BOPE agents wear special black uniforms and facemasks, of which the 
emblem is a skull with a knife planted through jt. As the self-explanatory lyrics of 
their training song indicates, agents are schooled to "neutralize" (read 
"eliminate") suspects in favelas as if they were war enemies rather than civilians 
with rights protected by the democratic constitution: 
Man in Black, what is your mission? 
To invade the favela and leave bodies on the ground. 
Do you know who 1 am? 1 am the damned dog of war. 
1 am trained to kill. 
Even if il costs me my life, the mission will be accomplished, wherever il 
shall be-
spreading violence, death and terror. 
1 am that combatant whose face is masked; 
The black and yellow strip that 1 boast on my shoulder 
Makes me uncommon: A messenger of death. 
1 can prove that 1 am a strong one, that is, if you live. 
1 am .... a hero of the nation. 
Joy, Joy, lfeel in my heart, 
for a new day has already dawned, 
already 1 will accomplish my mission. 
1 will infiltrate myself in a favela, 
with my gun in hand, 1 will combat the enemy, 
and provoke destruction. 
If you ask me where 1 come from 
and what is my mission: 
1 bring death and desperation, and total destruction. 
114 For example, urban warfare tactics of the lOF used 10 retrieve suspected terrorists in 
Palestian refugee camps, which share the similar maze-like geophysical landscape of 
favelas, employ special hydraulic guns to blow through the walls of local residences to 
enable commandos to attain their target directly in a straight line going through people's 
houses rather than streets as to avoid exposure to gunfire. This technique is also 
employed by BOPE agents. 
Cold blood in my veins, freeze my heart, 
we are not afraid of feelings, nor compassion, 
we love our fellows with whom we were taught 
and ha te common Military Police [pés-de-caoj. 
Commandos, commandos, what e/se are you? 
We are just damned dogs of war, 
. ·Idd if 115 we are Just Wl ogs 0 war . 
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Despite the existence of the Military Police's BOPE unit, in Rio de Janeiro, 
the fonnal military were also called in dozens of times in the pa st decade to take 
back control of favelas and surrounding areas when inter-gang warfare threatened 
. public security too defiantly and local law enforcement agencies failed to provide 
the bare-minimal appearance ofhaving sorne fonn of "monopoly" over violence. 
The problem is particularly complex in the city of Rio as siums are located 
on top of hills in the midst of posh residential neighborhoods and tourist areas. 
Problems within the favela easily become problems for everyone around. When 
gangs fight among themselves and with the police, bullets tly out and hit passing 
cars and surrounding buildings. When war turfs for drug distribution within the 
favela become full-blown, rival gang members have been known to block and 
blow off ail roads of access and entry points to what they consider "their" part of 
the favela. When the favela is situated in the middle of a busy downtown area, this 
has posed extraordinary logistical difficulties for daily transport as busy roads and 
access tunnels were blockaded and dynamited away by the favela lords. When 
things reach this point, the military are usually called in to "restore order." 
Recently, in the city of Sào Paulo during the Spring and Summer of 2006, 
the military were also called in when a criminal group (the PCC -Primeiro 
Comando da Capital- First Command of the Capital) waged war on local law 
en forcement agencies, penitentiaries, and against civil society generally as they 
115 Translation by author, cited from Soares, Batista and Pimente! (2006). 
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targeted public transport. Military units were deployed and dispatched across the 
city of eighteen million to patrol the streets and restore a sense of order. 
As 1 had the unfortunate chance to be in Sào Paulo at the time and witnessed 
the events unfold, it was striking how, given the Human Rights record of law 
enforcement agencies and the military in Brazil, one does not feel much safer 
knowing that there are tanks full of armed military personnel roaming the city and 
primed to use their arsenal. It is a most discomforting feeling indeed to be walking 
around in mid-aftemoon in a nice residential neighborhood going about everyday 
business and to come across a truck-full oftwenty-plus soldiers armed to the teeth 
with assault weapons pointed at you. 1t seems reasonable to suppose that this is 
how favela residents must feel on a daily basis, as they are confronted directly not 
only to the violence of gang warfare, but further have to fear the possibility that 
authorities might try to intervene, which might undoubtedly, considering the 
corruption factor and their ïeputation for trigger-happiness, make matters that 
much worse. 
As one resident from the favela of Rocinha in Rio de Janeiro dispassionately 
explained to me, "wh en the police come, and we always know when they come 
just before they get here because the drug traffickers have kids working for them 
as lookouts, we duck for cover wherever we cano When the police come, you have 
to be carefuJ, they just shoot at everything that moves." When 1 asked how was it 
possible that the police could target local residents so indiscriminately and get 
away with it -after ail, Brazil is still a democracy- he explained that this was, 
very simply, because "the police know we know they're c~ming, and so they 
know we run for cover and that the only ones left in the streets are those who want 
to be there, the traffickers and the gang members. They are the only ones who stay 
out on the streets to fight with the police." 
From the police perspective, according to a patrol officer from the Military 
Police, the dynamics of combat are not quite the same. According to him, "when 
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the police goes up to the community [favela], it is not so much that the police goes 
and shoots at everything that moves so much that the police goes and gets shot af 
by everything that moves, and needs to shoot back for protection and survival." 
But even this young, dedicated, and Human Rights conscious officer admitted that 
in these combat operations, which he considers to be part of "a special war," 
"shooting back indiscriminately at traffickers is the only way to get the mission 
accomplished and hopefully stay alive: You shoot them before they shoot you." 
While he did recognize the important collateral civilian casualties resulting from 
such operations, he reaffirmed this was "a special war," and argued that the police 
"did nof shoot randomly in the direction of unidentified targets but directly at 
traffickers," who hide amongst local residents in the community. He further 
insisted that "} had to understand, these people were bandits, the 'bad guys,' and 
that the police was just trying to do its job and to protect the population, ev en 
when the population would not collaborate." 
Given the context of uncertainty, researchers are usually keen on not getting 
into any trouble with the police -not gang members- during field trips to 
favelized communities as the threat of the latter is typically considered less 
significant. ln a similar vein, the Rocinha resident I interviewed felt it was 
necessary to "warn me against" the inherent risks of conducting research in the 
area: 
"Y ou have to be careful when you come here. The gangsters, they 
don't mean harrn to us, I mean us the people who live here. Depending 
on the boss- it changes when a rival takes over the business-
sometimes they help the local people and try to contribute to the 
development of the community. The traffickers, they fight amongst 
themselves and we try to stay out of their wayl16. The police, when 
116 In Brazil and most likely in shanty-towns across the region and in other developing 
areas, local drug lords tend to rely on traditional populist tactics to win the Joyalty of 
community residents. Thus, when their allegeance is put to the test, and community 
residents must choose between police forces, reputed for their acts of brute violence and 
corruption, and the "benevolent trafficker," sorne might and many actually do choose to 
demonstrate their loyalty to the latter.There are many other factors which may also 
account for the social construction of the trafficker's benevolent image within favela 
they come here, we are not so clear about their intentions. It is not very 
safe for you here- if 1 were you 1 would watch out, and if you see a 
police patrol get out of the way, anything can happen. It doesn't matter 
~ that you are not from here, like it doesn't matter that we have nothing 
to do with the war [traffickers vs. pol ice] .... it' s ail about being at the 
wrong place at the wrong time. Just like that [snap offingers] it can be 
ail over because you happened to be buying sorne meat at that store at 
that time and not another and something goes down and there is 
nowhere to duck for cover." 
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ln general, human rights lawyers and advocates aside, most Brazilians never 
set foot in a favela unless it is absolutely unavoidable, which is rarely, if ever the 
case unless one is procuring sorne kind of illegal good or service. Even the senior 
researcher responsible for the Zwelethemba pilot in the favela of Jardim Angela 
had never actually visited the project after it had been running for almost two 
years, much to the frustration of the team of graduate students (none of whom 
were from the favela) that were doing ail the footwork. But ifBrazilians avoid the 
dreaded favela, they also avoid encounters with the police as much ifnot more so. 
For the vast majority of law-abiding citizens, the usual response to an 
approaching police patrol is "uh oh," even after one has just been the victim of 
crime, and even when one is a judge. Brazilian common wisdom dictates that if 
you are a victim of robbery, the last people yOll want to calI are the police, for if 
they come they will probably ste al whatever you have left, and they might even 
make you pay them for their trouble, too. 
For example, as part of trammg workshops and interviews for the 
Zwelethemba pilots1l7, 1 was introduced to a Civil Police Chief who admitted, in 
front of five detectives and a police commissioner from South Africa, to using 
"whatever means necessary" to obtain confessions and information from suspects 
culture, notably, the fact that the drug business is lucrative and generates wealth, which 
may appeal to poverty-stricken youths with little or no education and grim career 
prospects. 
117 See Fieldwork Appendix 1 for a more detailed description of research activities with 
the police. 
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brought to his station "whenever necessary." The police chief in question had 
misunderstood my role and felt he could "talk openly amongst cops" since 1 was 
accompanying and translating for the Deputy Police Commissioner from South 
Africa as part of a Zwelethemba workshop. The police chief explained that "while 
Brazil had formally adopted a new Constitution in 1988 and since then officially 
respected Human Rights, they too here at the station 'officially respected Human 
Rights' as it could get you into a lot of trouble with the internaI affairs people if 
you didn '1. .. but amongst cops here we could be more open and talk freely ... You 
do what you have to do wh en you need to do it to get what you need." 
When J inquired about the station's reputation in the community and among 
other local law en forcement agencies, and mentioned the diplomatic bJur to an 
oflicer of the Municipal Civil Guard (GCM - Guarda Civil Municipal) she stated 
that she was "horrified but unfortunately, not surprised." Before she became a law 
enforcement agent and entered the GCM, she was actively involved with local 
women's groups for victims of domestic violence. As part of her activities, she 
had once accompanied a neighbor to that same police station to register a formaI 
complaint against her husband and request a restraining order after he had 
severely beaten her broken her bones and destroyed half their possessions with a 
baseball bat. The attending officer at the Civil Police station listened to the 
detailed story, and then advised against registering a formaI compliant as that 
"would undoubtedly make matters much worse for her." He suggested instead that 
"she get sorne kind of new age Reike treatment to clear the 'bad vibes' and hurry 
home to clean up and cook for her husband so that they could make peace." 
When J further discussed the case with the founder of a small NGO active in 
the favelas surrounding Silo Caetano, he informed me that Silo Caetano was 
infamous for its artificially-maintained low crime level. Civil police officers, who 
are responsible for registering and investigating crime occurrences, are instructed 
to discourage citizens from registering their complaints as to maintain low crime 
rates on paper, and thus bolster pro pert y prices. When citizens insist, cases are 
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referred instead to a neighboring civil police station in the vicinity (but outside the 
territory ofSào Caetano). The Commander of the Municipal Civil-Guard, who has 
an officer posted at the civil police station for liaison purposes, corroborates this 
is more often than not the case. 
In this context, one may expect that Brazilians tend to under-report crime 
victimization. A survey conducted by ILANUD revealed that 72% of the 
population in Rio l18 and 54.5% in Sao Paulo l19 did not report being victim of a 
crime to the police (and thus never followed the case through to court). This is 
particularly true for domestic violence (including physical, moral, psychological, 
patrimonial, and/or sexual violence l2o). A recent national survey (2006)12\ 
indicates that while violence against women in and outside the house is the 
principal source of con cern for 1 in 3 (33%) women in Brazil, and that as many as 
51 % of the women interviewed reported knowing at least one woman who has 
been or is being abused by her partner, only 40% of women have denounced their 
agressors. 
Considering that the majority of conflicts mediated through the community 
program case-studies in Brasilia and Sào Caetano do Sul are related to domestic 
violence122, data concerning the under-reporting of conflicts of this nature is of 
particular interest for this study. In domestic violence cases, offenders are usually 
reported and taken seriously by authorities only after severe incidence of violence 
or, in too many cases, death. ]t is not surprising that the national survey also found 
that 54% of women in Brazil believe that the services avaiJable for cases of 
118 (ILANUD,1996, c.f.ILANUD, 2002) 
119 (ILANUD, 2000, c.f. ILANUD, 2002) 
120 Categories established in confonnity with Law nO ] 1.340 -more commonly referred 
to as Law Maria da Penha-, which was adopted in 2006 to categorize crimes against 
women committed in the domestic and family realm. 
12/ The survey on Domestic Violence Against Women (Violência Doméstica contra a 
Mulher) was conducted by the Ibope/lnstituto Patricia Ga/vào. Data availabJe on-line at: 
http://www.patriciagalvao.org.br/apc-aa-patriciagalvao/home/ noticias.shtrol?x =6 71 
122 According to the commùnity agents interviewed in Taguatinga and Ceilandia, as weil 
as according to the judge coordinating the project in Nova Gert y (Sao Caetano do Sul), 
which at this time receives the bulk of hs cases through the tribunal of the judge. 
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violence against women do not work. Consistently, 3 out of 4 (75%) women 
believe that "the sanctions enforced for cases of violence against women are 
irrelevant and that the formaI justice system treats this drama lived by women as a 
matter of little importance." 
As data from the Latinobar6metro (2004) further indicates, less than half the 
population (49%) in Brazil believes that in their country, "justice arrives late, but 
it arrives". Similarly, an opinion survey from the Brazilian Bar Association 
(OAB, 2003) found that 62% of respondents did not have any trust in the 
judiciary power, providing further evidence of severe institutional mistrust 123• 
In the two partly favelized communities in Brasilia where the survey was 
conducted, 85% of respondents believed that access to justice and the justice 
system does no' work the same for aIl citizens, independently of income, gender, 
and race. Unsurprisingly given the racial fault-Hnes of Brazilian society, the chi-
square test deterrnined high levels of statistical significance between 
race/ethnicity and institutional (mis)trust in the formai justice system, indicating 
that Blacks and mixed Afro-descendants l24 are likely to distrust the justice system 
in other underprivileged and/or favelized communities125• 
Similarly, low levels of institutional trust in the police show that law 
enforcement authorities are also widcly discredited with corruption and 
inefficiency: 55% of Brazilians report not very much or no trust at ail in the 
police, compared to 20% in Canada (World Values Survey, ] 995-1997). Only 
21% of Brazilians believe the service provided by the police is "good,,126; 71% of 
123 For the extent of institutional mistrust in the judiciary in Brazil, see also Buscaglia 
(1995). 
124 Refer to Table 3.2.1.1 in StatisticaJ Appendix 
125 86% of respondents of Afro-descendance answered "no" to the question: "Do you 
think that every citizen has equal access to the justice system, independently of wealth, 
race and gender?" 
126 ILANUD (2000, c.f. lLANUD, 2002) 
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the population in Rio l27 and 52% in Sào Paul0128 believe the police is not able to 
control crime and is not doing a good job. The principal newspaper in Sào Paulo 
even published data showing that 23% of city residents were more afraid of the 
police then they were of bandits: and 33% feared the police and bandits 
equallyl29! 
According to survey results for Taguatinga and Ceilandia, almost ha If the 
population (40%) does not trust the police to "protect citizens, provide security, 
and help them when they had a problem." As for institutional (mis)trust in the 
formaI justice system, as could be expected, the relationship between 
race/ethnici ty l30 and mistrust in the police is statistically significant, indicating 
that Blacks and mixed Afro-descendants are likely to distrust the police in other 
underprivileged and/or favelized communities. Given the high concentration of 
youths (15-24) in underprivileged communities and favelas in Brazil (ltuassu, 
2006 131 ), the existence of a statistically significant relationship between age and 
mistrust in the police could also be expected, and was indeed found, indicating the 
likelihood that youths l32 (under 30) are likely to distrust the police in other low-
income communities. 
Citizens at the bottom of the social ladder who feel excluded from the 
formaI justice system and/or unjustly targeted by law enforcement agencies may 
believe they are entitled to take the law into their own hands. Indeed, if "Iegal 
justice exists to domesticate, tame, and control ail forms of vengeance in the 
interest of social peace and fairness" (Shklar, 1988) in theory, but in effect 
127 ILANUD (1996, c.f. ILANUD, 2002) 
128 ILANUD (1997, c.f. ILANUD, 2002) 
129 (Data folha, 1998, c.f. ILANUD, 2002). According to the ILANUD report, the 
proportion of citizens who feared the police as much as bandits c1imbed to 56% after a 
particularly badly mishandled police intervention in the favela of Naval in Sao Paulo. 
130 Refer to Table 3.1.2.1 in Statistical Appendix 
131 According to his study, the nUlllber of young people between 15 and 24 years old in 
Brazil grew by 47.3% between 1991 and 2000, and murder remains the number one cause 
of death for youths (15-24) today. 
131 Refer to Table 3.1.3 and 3.1.2.3 in Statistical Appendix 
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perpetuates existing socio-economic, gender and/or racial inequalities in practice, 
th en the fonnal justice system and traditional law enforcement may not al ways be 
considered viable options. What, then, are the alternatives to state-provided justice 
and security? If the state does not have an effective monopoly of violence and 
justice and is perceived to reinforce and create more insecurity and injustice, then 
how do citizens obtain justice and security? 
According to the misrule of law literature, the preferred solution for citizens 
across the c1ass spectrum is private justice and security. Based on data from 
interviews conducted in the chic neighborhood of Morumbi in Sào Paulo, 
Caldeira (2000: 77) establishes a correlation between crime vÎctimization and 
increased private security: "Each of those episodes [of burglary or robbery] 
provoked new security measures, new alarm systems and e1ectronic surveillance, 
many weekends without going out, reduced travel, and so on." ft is true that in 
Brazil, those who can afford to typically Învest in elaborate alarm systems, build 
waJls around their homes, purchase the services of private security guards or 
relocate to gated communities. For example, in Sao Paulo, an astounding 61% of 
civil society spending is directed toward private security (SENASP, 2007133). 
Even in neighborhoods where community policing units exist -which has been 
proven empirically to reduce real and perceived insecurity l34- citizens reported 
recourse to the numerous private security measures. 57% of respondents have 
high waHs/fences around their homes; 40% have special reinforced doors and 
windows; 28% own a watch dog; 28% employa private security guard; 38% have 
elaborate locks on their doors; 16% pay with neighbors for a local security guard 
to watch the block; 8% own house alann systems. 
But what about those who can't afford such private security measures and 
who live in places where the police are no match for the local drug lords? 
133 SENASP, 2007. Data available on-line a1: 
http://www.mj.gov.br/senasp/estatisticas/custos/estatcustosecon.htm 
134 See, for example, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990); lLANUD (2002); Barkan 
(1997). 
Favela Justice 
It is true that criminal organizations and drug traffickers are the lords of the 
favela, and impose their own parallel rule of law to the community. As one 
resident in Rocinha explains, there are three simple rules favela residents must 
abide to: 
"First, you didn't see or hear anything if the police asks. Second, you 
don't steal from no one in the favela, because sincethis could attract 
undesired wanted police attention. Third, you don't interfere with the 
traffickers' business in any way." 
As the experience of Dona Edeneulzal35 iIIustrates, nothing goes on in the 
neighborhood without traffickers knowing about it. When 1 asked her if she ever 
ran into trouble with traffickers doing her work in the area, located in a more 
favelized part ofCeilandia, she replied: 
"Not anymore but at first yeso So did Dona Creuza. We were 
amongst the very first to join the community justice project when it 
began. At little while after 1 started working as a community agent, 1 
had a visit at my home. It was the local dealer. He wanted to know 
what this 'community agent business' was about. After 1 told him, he 
said that was OK and that 1 could keep doing it, so long as it did not 
interfere with his activities. 136" 
Interestingly, "favela justice" can produce security at the same time as it 
instills fear and terror, in a similar way to how military dictatorships work. 
Indeed, authoritarian rule involves by definition authoritarian measures of social 
control, which are remarkably efficient at maintaining crime rates low. 
135 Throughout this study, names have been changed to proteet the anonymity of 
respondents. 
136 Translation by the author. 
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In the favela of Rocinha, the resident 1 interviewed proudly told me how the 
parallel security system ofthe traffickers made his neighborhood one of the safest 
places in Rio: 
"We have our share of problems with the traffickers, but there are 
sorne good sides too. No one steals from anyone here. Vou see over 
there the clothes hanging? You can just leave them there and no one 
will take them. Vou can even leave your purse here outside this door 
on these steps and no one will steal it, 1 guarantee it. Just the other 
day this woman who lives a couple of blocks from here, her c10thes 
that were drying off disappeared. She told someone about it, and 24 
hours later the cJothes re-appeared exactly at the same spot the y had 
been taken from." 
While the criminally-based parallel rule of law of the favela can have the 
paradoxical effect of reducing petty crime and in some cases, even domestic 
violence, overall, it contributes to a daily c1imate of t'Car, not security. Indeed, the 
"safety" of the neighborhood is not something favela residents usually boast about 
as the potential benefits of low petty crime rates are far outweighted by the heavy 
security costs of living in an area subjected to criminal rule. Caldeira (2000) 
explains that "as people turn to iIIegal and private ways of dealing with crime, 
crime and violence are removed from the sphere in which there may he a 
legitimate, comprehensive mediation of conflicts: that is, the judiciary system." 
Unlawful alternative justice and security practices cannot guarantee the liberal 
ideal of "due process" associated to the democratic rule oflawI37. 1n the realm of 
private vengeance, justice is "unjust" at the outset. The law of the talion, which 
dictates the terms of retribution, precludes fair punishment commensurate with the 
crime committed as respect for Human Rights is of no concern and "crimes" are 
defined arbitrarily (e.g., being poor, Black, or disrespectful; refusing to comply to 
the parallel system of rules; being with a partner coveted by a member of the 
criminal group, etc.). 
137 See also Oxhorn and Slakmon (200S) 
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Alternative justice and security practices that take the form of vigilantism, 
'ghetto justice', death squads, and Iynching are concrete manifestations of 
unlawfol citizen agency. They constitute parallel (micro)systems of justice and 
security that exist outside legal boundaries, and that deliver justice and security 
through channels that are neither monopolized by the formaI justice system nor 
rooted in societal consensus. 
The reality-based movie/documentary "City of God" (Cidade de Deus), 
named after the favela in which it was fi Imed in the city of Rio de Janeiro, 
provides countless and most vivid graphic illustrations of the paradoxical 
workings of the parallel, criminal-based rule of law. ln one scene, a drug lord 
hunts down and executes half the kids responsible for a series of recent robberies 
that hit local merchants in the favela. He then shoots one of the three surviving 
children in the hand, the other in the foot, and then forces the third survivor-
another six-year old- to chose which of his partners in crime to execute, and 
forces him to carry out the order to show his loyalty. In another scene, the same 
drug lord rapes a woman and th en burns down her boyfriend's home and kills his 
family simply because she refused to dance with him at a party. 
Such practices are destructive to the social fabric of communities and do not 
improve access to justice and security Instead, this parai leI rule of law delivers 
rogue justice for private, vengeful denizens and unwilling citizens- and the 
already disempowered are usually its principal victims. Illegal forms of local 
justice and security by definition involve criminal elements, which exacerbates 
insecurity and dislocates already weakened communities. ln the longer term, the 
legitimacy of formai penal justice institutions is further undermined as the state is 
unable to provide a satisfactory response to the insecurity unlawful private justice 
and security creates. Moreover, these practices can reinforce the sense of impunity 
because they are in effect above the law 138• As Chevigny (1999: 60) similarly 
138 Ibid. 
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argues for the case of police violence, "society cannot obtain 'security' through 
[police] lawlessness, precisely because it is lawless." 
1 do not question the existence of a parallel rule of law in urban siums, 
which is a very real and concrete manifestation of the misrule of law in Brazil. 
But citizens may abide more out of fear than free will. The vast majority of favela 
and low-income community residents are simply not criminals. As will be 
. demonstrated empirically in this chapter with survey results for Taguatinga and 
Ceilandia, if they have a problem or conflict which cannot be deaIt with by state 
authorities for whichever reason, they will normally either attempt to resolve the 
situation peacefully and lawfully, like most rational individuals, or do nothing 
about it until the problem "naturally disappears" or escalates to an extreme point 
where formaI state authorities are required. Indeed, survey results indicate, while 
they do not trust them, ordinary citizens still go to the police wh en their problem 
requires immediate intervention. 
ln communities where the state is failing to deliver Justice and to provide 
public security, sorne citizens may have recourse to unlawful private security 
measures and vigilante-style justice. Results for the survey in Brasilia, however, 
indicate otherwise: For the vast majority of citizens, alternative solutions to public 
security and formaI justice typically involve turning to other law-abiding citizens 
within the community- that is, mostly family members, fellow church-goers, and 
community pro gram workers where available- not drug traffickers. Survey 
results provide conclusive empirical evidence that the poor in Brazil are not the 
violence-crazed denizens social scientists, policy-makers, the media, and popular 
culture depict them to be. The data demonstrates that the vast majority of 
residents in low-income communities are law-abiding citizens, who can and have 
been exerting different forms of agency lawfully on the sources of insecurity 
affecting their daily lives. 
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Focusing on lawful rather than iIIegal fonns of citizen-based security in the 
context of failing public security presents significant advantages from a research 
perspective. Phenomena that occur within a lawful framework have the benefit of 
being more likely visible and documented, or at least possible to document. That 
is, citizens and state agencies who participate in community programs are likely to 
cooperate and share infonnation for research purposes; corrupt police agents and 
traffickers are not, and is it unlikely that law-abiding favela residents would be 
willing to say much about them as it would very likely yield direct retribution 
despite best efforts to ensure the confidentiality of infonnants. In the favela, word 
always gets around. Beyond any potential risks involved for the researcher 
conducting research in violent crime-lad en communities, there is no room for 
mistake when it cornes to the safety of research subjects. Those who act outside 
the law have something to hi de and do not usually appreciate researchers nor the 
local residents working with them asking around about private justice and 
corruption. 
To detennine how local residents in the communities of Taguatinga and 
Ceilandia usually solved problems and conflicts, they were asked to respond to 
the following question: "In general, if you have a problem/conflict, who would 
you ask to help you resolve the situation?" The respondents were given a multiple 
choice ofnine answers. Results are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 below. 
Valid 
Table 3. Usual means of problem-/conflict-resolution in two low income 
communities in Brazil 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
community justice 181 18.1 18.2 18.2 
agents 
the police 300 30.0 30.1 48.2 
a public defense 179 17.9 18.0 66.2 lawyer 
a private lawyer 114 11.4 11.4 77.6 
a small claims court 
judge 65 6.5 6.5 84.2 
take matters into 
your own hands 56 5.6 5.6 89.8 
people fram the 
38 3.8 3.8 93.6 community 
no action 12 1.2 1.2 94.8 
Other 52 5.2 5.2 100.0 
Total 997 99.7 100.0 
113 
Missing System 3 .3 
Total 
Valid 
100 100. 
0 0 
Table 4. Usual means of problem-/conflict-resolution in two low income 
communities in Brazil (aggregated results) 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
formai justice 
system 139 658 65.8 66.0 66.0 
community justice 181 18.1 18.2 84.2 
agents 
Private justice 140 146 14.6 14.6 98.8 
no action 12 1.2 1.21 100.0 
Total 997 99.7 100.0. 
Missing System 3 .3 
Total 100 100. 
0 0 
139 The aggregated variable "formai justice system" includes positive responses for the 
choice-answers: b) the police; c) a public defense attorney; d) a private lawyer; e) a Small 
Claims Court Judge. 
140 The aggregated variable "private justice" includes positive responses for the choice-
answers: f) take matters into your own hands; g) people from the community (i.e., 
community leaders, youths from the neighborhood, people from your church, etc.); i) 
other. 
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As survey results indicate, while most residents interviewed in Taguatinga 
and Ceilandia stated they did not trust the police nor the justice system l4 \ the 
majority (66%) also responded they still do resort to the police (30%), Public 
Defense Attorneys (18%), and Small Claims Court Judges (6.5%) for assistance 
when they need help solving a problem or a conflict. This is because the poor are, 
for the most part, law-abiding citizens, not violence-crazed revenge-seeking 
'denizens. This plain fact is further corroborated empirically by the existence of a 
statistical1y significant relationship between social c1ass l42 and usual means of 
conflict resolution l43 , which indicates that the poor are more likely to have 
recourse to the formai justice system (as opposed to private justice/retribution) to 
resolve conflicts in other underprivileged and favelized communities. 
The data also shows that 18% of ail survey respondents usually have 
recourse community agents to help them solve problems and conflicts, providing 
evidence corroborating the hypothesis that participation in local security networks 
enables individual citizens residing in underprivileged communities where public 
security is failing to solve daily conflicts and problems that cause insecurity (and 
simultaneously unburdens the formaI justice system of numerous cases). 
Similarly, respondents who had prior experience with the community program 
responded that, were the community justice project services not available, they 
would ask instead for assistance from the police (21 %), a Public Defense Attorney 
(51%), a Small Claims Court Judge (10%), or a private lawyer (10%). Less than 
5% of respondents stated they would "take matters into their own hands" (1 %) or 
141 As demonstrated with survey results on institutional mistrust discussed earlier. 
142 79% of respondents identified themselves to the "lower-half," which included the 
response-options: "Iower middle-class"; "working class"; and "poor." 
143 Refer to Tables 2.1.2 and 2.2.2.1 in Statistical Appendix. Chi-square tests further 
established the existence of a statistically significant relationship between age and usual 
means of conflict resolution, but not between race/ethnicity, gender, and usual means of 
conflict resolution. The high level of statistical significance of the social class variable, 
however, is sufficicnt to indicate the likelihood of finding similar results in other 
underprivileged and/or favelized urban communities. 
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cali on "people from the community" (3%) to help them solve a conflict were 
community justice services unavailable l44 . 
The data reviewed here indicates that, contrarily to the general assumption 
in the misrule of law literature, low-income citizens do not typically have recourse 
to criminal means to compensate for the failures of public security and of the 
justice system. Providing further evidence that the residents in the communities 
of Taguatinga and Ceilandia are mostly law-abiding citizens, only 6% of aIl 
respondents indicated they would "take matters into their own hands," which 
suggests potential recourse to unlawful and violent means of problem-resolution, 
but does not necessarily involve them either. lndeed, confronting a bully at 
school, an unfaithful spouse, a noisy neighbor, or an abusive employer ail 
constitute a forrn of "taking matters into one's hands" but do not necessarily 
involve violence or criminal behavior. While it is true that sorne students will 
choose to give the bully a dose of his/her own medicine, and that sorne cheated 
husbands end up stabbing their wives and their lovers, that sorne disgruntled 
residents go as far as to set fire to their neighbor's homes to keep the noise down, 
and that daily harassment sometimes leads employees to go on shooting rampages 
at the workplace, that is not how most people go about solving their problems. 
Rational individuals usually attempt dialogue before they have recourse to more 
forceful and violent means. 
Similarly, that 9%145 of respondents indicated they norrnally ask "people 
from the community" (3.8%) or "others" (5.2%) to help them solve a conflict does 
not mean that 9% of residents in Taguatinga and Ceilandia have recourse to 
justiceiros and vigilantes for problem-resolution. Most respondents specified that 
"people from church" and "family members" were the usual ones they went to for 
144 See Table 2.2 (p. 152). The chi-square test established the existence of a statistically 
significant relationship with the social class variable (See Tables 2.1.3.1, p.149, and 
2.2.2. 1, p.l 55), indicating the 1ikelihood of finding similar results in other 
underprivileged and/or favelized urban communities. 
145 Refer to Table 2.1 (p.147) 
assistance, not "youths from the neighborhood." One respondent even specified 
"Iawful means" in the space left open in the response-category 
"Other: ." Only one respondent specified she would have recourse to 
her "boyfriend" if she needed help solving a problem, which could be interpreted 
as a potentially forceful and violent means of conflict resolution. 
Misrule of Law but Misconstruing the Evidence 
While there is no doubt about the existence of the misrule of law in Brazil, 
researchers, policy-makers, the media, film-makers and novelists have also 
contributed to the criminalization of poverty at the ideationaJ level by assuming 
that poor people are more violent and typically resort to unlawful and violent 
means of problem-resolution when the state can't or won't help. That is, those 
same intellectuals who criticize the criminalization of poverty as a result of 
authoritarian social control are in fact themselves contributing to it by embracing 
this appallingly simplistic and elitist line ofreasoning. 
People who live in favelas are not ail into the drug business, the arms trade, 
gambling, racketeering, and prostitution. The majority are citizens who work at 
minimal wages and in the informai sect or. Residents of favelas are domestics, 
maintenance and construction workers, students, self-employed street vendors, 
salespeople and cashiers, low-Ievel police agents, etc. This point cannot be 
emphasized enough: Criminals constitute only a smaJ/ fraction of the favela 
population. As Naim (2007) plainly put it, "There is no correlation between 
poverty and crime. [ ... ] This idea is as common as it is wrong." There is no 
scientifically valid reason to assume citizens residing in poor areas are inherently 
more violent and would choose unlawful means to obtain justice and security, 
especially when presented with alternative options for lawful and peaceful 
conflict resolution. It is more rational to choose the lawful option as it promises 
more reliable outcomes and presents less risk. 
1I7 
My research takes the misrule of law discussion one step further and 
criticizes the critics, who are also guilty of criminalizing poverty at the ideational 
level by systematically assuming the poor are inherently more violent and usually 
have recourse to criminal means to compensate for failing public security. A most 
telling illustration of this bias -for why should it be assumed that the poor are 
not law-abiding citizens?- is splendidly captured in this power-point slide from 
the Canadian government's Human Security Outreach Pro gram 146: 
When public security fails, civilians are left to provide for their 
own security: 
"Elite security" ::::::> guards, gated communities, alarm systems 
"Sium security" ::::::> gangs, paramilitaries, vigilante groups 
Privatization ::::::> social segregation::::::> community violence 
Incredibly, the three alternative citizen-based solutions to insecurity in the 
case of "elites" are lawful, whereas the three solutions to insecurity in "siums" 
involve sorne type of criminal element! 
The following excerpts provide further empirical evidence that even the 
most prominent scholars of the misrule of law have been biased against the poor 
in assuming that their alternative security means are typically of the unlawful 
kind, and are therefore contributing themselves in sorne ways to the 
"criminalization of poverty" at the ideational level. 
While their contributions to the misrule of law scholarship are unequaled in 
terms of theoretical depth and quality, Hoiston and Caldeira (1998, 277-278) 
nonetheless show an un justifiable bias against the poor when they argue that: 
146CCHS, powerpoint presentation, slide 7, available on-line at: 
http://humansecurity-c i ties.org/page] 56. htm 
"Poor people perceive these organizations [death squads fonned 
by members of the police] as more efficient than a justice system 
in which death penalty does not exist and the judicial process takes 
forever. The same reasoning Icads them to resort to and admire 
vigilantes, called justiceiros. [ ... ] Poorer people are victims of 
arbitrariness, violence and injustices commined by Jaw institutions. 
As a result, they feel that they are left without alternatives inside 
the law." 
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In the same vein, in her briBiant study of crime and citizenship in Silo Paulo, 
Caldeira continues, disappointingly, to depict the poor as a group of revenge-
seeking denizens who do not hesitate to take justice into their own hands and 
break the law to compensate for the failure of public security. ln her own words: 
"Justiceiros may be the only type of security available to the poor. 
Feeling that the regular police does not proteet them, and unable to 
afford other private security services, many people, especially 
merchants on the periphery, turn to the justiceiros. Sometimes 
local mcrchants will pay to keep order in the neighborhood; 
sometimes groups formed by residents of a neighborhood take the 
task ofkeeping order in their own hands. FrequentJy justiceiros are 
involved with gangs and drug dealers" (2000: 206). 
Similarly, Oxhorn (2004), widely referenced for his theory of civil society 
and for his original work on the social construction of citizenship in Latin 
America, also shows uncharacteristic elitism wh en he argues that: 
"For those who lack the economic resources to hire anned guards 
or pay corrupt judges and police in order to anain justice, taking 
justice into one's own hands in the fonn of vigilantism or "popular 
justice" is a growing fhenomenon" (for which he provides two 
additional references J4 ). 
Novelists are no exception. In "Inferno"- in every other aspect a 
masterpiece of political fiction- Patricia Melo (2000: 185) portrays favela 
residents as willful and happy to abide to the drug lord's parallel rule oflaw, who 
147 See Carri6n (2003) and Neild (1999). 
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is himself portrayed as benevolent, just, and more efficient than state authorities 
to deal problems that arise in the community daily: 
"How much does Dona Oas Oore~ owe you? José Luis asked. Two 
month's rent, the man answered. OK. Here it is, said the trafficker, 
handing him a wad of bills. And, starting today, Oas Dores will 
only resume paying when she finds work. Tell the people at the 
agency. Understand? And you, Dona Das Dores, st art looking for 
work this very day. The community's problems were solved in this 
manner, without argument, and as a result thieves stopped stealing, 
husbands stopped beating their wives, exploiters stopped 
exploiting, and Zino, the butcher, stopped selling tainted meat. The 
ritual was repeated every Monday. Even before he arrived at the 
office a line of residents had already formed, waiting to make their 
complaints." 
Ali the examples above suggest that to compensate for the failures of public 
security, the poor tum to vigilante-style justice and criminal gangs. What are the 
options to state channels when public security is failing, Justice is for the rich, and 
you happen to be poor, and to have a problem that requires immediate attention? 
What are the options to taking matters into one's hands, to local thugs, and to 
justiceiros? What does the literature interested in the study of citizen-based 
security have to say about this? 
Unfortunately, not much. Scholars of social science and policy-makers who 
study problems related to the failures of public security and justice in Latin 
American democracies have constructed "half-narratives," and, by not telling the 
other, lawful side of the story, have perpetuated misrepresentations about how 
poor people deal with insecurity within the wider epistemic community of Latin 
American studies. There is an unjustifiable elitist bias in the literature, which 
takes for granted that the po or are inherently more violent and typically have 
recourse to vigilante-style justice and criminal means to compensate for the 
failures of public security and the justice system. As a resuIt, North American 
(and likely European) academics and students of Latin America who have not 
actually been to Latin America nor spent time in siums and low-income 
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communities are (mis)led to believe the poor are generally violent and criminally-
minded. This is only true for a very small faction of the population in low-income 
communities, not for the majority. As knowledge is cumulative, the mistruth 
carries on across collective imaginaries through space ànd time, and the poor end 
up criminalized not only by their own societies and authorities, but furthermore 
and quite ironically by the latter's local and foreign critics. 
The data reviewed in this chapter points to the relevance of community-
based programs of conflict resolution for research and intervention initiatives that 
aim to reduce insecurity in low-income communities where public security is 
failing and access to the formai institutions of the justice system is limited. But 
whether they had ever used or ev en knew of the existence of such projects in their 
communities, survey respondents did not usually consider recourse to local thugs 
when they have a problem that requires immediate attention, nor "taking a matter 
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into their hands." Citizens take their problem to justice or to the police even if 
they don't trust those responsible for applying and enforcing the Jaw. White there 
is no clear answer as to why citizens would entrust their problems to authorities 
they clearly distrust, it is reasonable to believe this is mainly for of lack of viable 
options. Yet mainstream literature almost exclusively features unlawful and 
violent forms of citizen-based responses to insecurity in communities where 
public security and justice are failing. Researchers and policy-makers interested in 
problems related to human security, crime, and violence in underprivileged 
communities should also foeus empirical efforts on lawful, citizen-based solutions 
to insecurity. ln the next chapter, 1 put the preaching to practice and examine 93 
concrete cases of eommunity govemance programs in Brazil and South Africa. 
Chapter 3. Local Security Networks In Brazil: The Lawfu) Side of 
the Story 
This chapter demonstrates the second research hypothesis, and examines sorne of 
the lawful means through which underprivileged citizens are organized to deal 
with insecurity in urban sIums and low-income communities. 1 identify and 
analyze the knowledge-base (i.e. technologies), resources, and institutional 
arrangements regulating 68 local security networks in Brazil, and then investigate 
their normative structures. Before analyzing the dynamics of state-society 
relations within these networks, however, it is important to examine the factors 
that motivate individuals to participate in the community project in the tirst place. 
This study takes for granted that if the formaI state justice system and local 
law enforcement agencies are discarded as a viable option, recourse to community 
program services constitutes a more desirable option th an private justice or no 
action at ail, as it is more likely to resolve the problem peacefully and quickly to 
"deliver" justice, which, as argued previously, has the addition al etTect of 
providing security. 
While the misrule of law literature and Canadian policy papers generally 
assume that in a context of public security failure and discredited judiciary 
institutions, the poor with naturally respond to injustice and insecurity with 
unlawful means and "free revenge," this study demonstrates instead that, wh en 
presented with the option, residents of low-income communities will take their 
problem to the community program, or the justice system even when distrusted -
not the local vigilante or trafficker- to deal with the perceived source of 
injustice/insecurity. Recourse to this option is more rational as community 
programs, unlike criminal organizations, compnse mechanisms and 
institutionalized procedures to ensure "due process," faimess, and accountability 
(discussed in subsequent chapters). Without these safeguards, it would not be 
possible to establish the legitimacy of the (micro)justice process and ofits agents, 
and it would be very difficult to ensure that agreements are peacefully enforced. 
]22 
Citizens may also have an incentive to participate as "consumers" in 
community programs to solve problems and disputes because they feel more 
comfortable and safe communicating with local residents, regardless of, yet 
especially in contexts of security deficits. Because they share daily problems and 
like most rational individuals aspire to peace and security, citizens residing in 
communities in which programs are implemented may also have an incentive to 
participate in the provision of pro gram services if presented with the option. 
Participation in the provision of services may be explained by self-interested 
motivations in work and sometimes financial rewards (as in the case of the 
Brasilia project and the Zwelethemba projects in South Africa), and/or for 
altruistic motives -that is, the "common good," of which the appeal can not be 
underestimated in communities plagued by crime and violence. 
In Sâo Caetano, community agents were asked to explain why they chose to 
get involved with the project and go through the mandatory training despite the 
absence of financial rewards and compensations for their mediation activities. 
This discussion was conducted as part of training activities, prior to the actual 
launching of the project in June 2006. The twenty-two local community agents 
were divided into four subgroups and asked to discuss among themselves why 
they chose to participate in the project as mediators, especially given the lack of 
funding to remunerate their work for the foreseeable future, and then to formulate 
a common answer reflecting the main points of their discussion. Each group 
debated the issue for approximately 30 minutes, and then provided the following 
answers: 
Group] responded: 
"We are here because we think that ail individual actions have 
repercussions in the community. Everything starts with "me". We need to 
make citizens realize this. We need to 'responsibilize' the citizens by 
working in groups and build a community." 
Group 2 responded: 
"Each individual will grow from participating in community justice. The 
experience will help to valorize themselves; to augment their self-esteem. It 
can also help with our own problems at home or at work (us, the agents)." 
Group 3 responded: 
"We need to work towards justice for ail. Even if as community agents we 
don't know everything about violence, robberies and lies, we can use ours 
values to guide the ones that are stuck in these problems. We need to give 
to others. By helping the people in the corn munit y, we can "find" 
ourselves. We can know ourselves better. We can do something for the 
community and make things better." 
Group 4 responded: 
"We can learn to harmonize ourselves to the community. We can relate to 
others because we have common problems. The conflicts that take place in 
our families are the same in 01her families." 
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Eleven months later, Dona Maria do Carmo, a community agent from Silo 
Caetano do Sul, responded the following when asked to explain why she still 
chose to participate in the project despite the lack of financial rewards or 
compensations: 
''l'm not sure how to explain ... It's a kind of work that brings me 
much joy. My objectives are the same than for those that brought me 
to participate in other volunteer jobs: Respect for Human Beings and 
for Basic Rights. 'Peace-Making and Peace-Building' - 1 learned 
better the meaning of those words with the South Africans [who 
provided the Zwelethemba training], they say everything that needs 
to be said about my objectives. [ ... ] To know that we are balancing 
moments to hear people without judging them, facilitating dialogue 
between them, many conflicts can be resolved before they take 
bigger proportions. Clarifying our way to work during each 
[mediation] circle, we hope to contribute so that each participant also 
awakens to a new way ofresolving his own conflicts.,,148 
In ail the responses, helping fellow community members out of a sense of 
community and shared responsibility came through as the main motivation to 
148 Cited from an interview granted to the project's research assistant (May 2006). 
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participate in the community project as "justice facilitators." Not surprisingly, the 
majority of community agents, despite their diverse racial, gender, professional, 
and economic profiles, were consistently also actively involved in community life 
(advocacy and help groups, church-related activities, local joumalism, etc.) prior 
to joining the program. Pending on how one construes the notion of "self-
interest," it can be argued that community agents participate in the project both 
out of egoistical or altruistic motives. The relevant point here is that to understand 
why these citizens participate in the community justice project, we cannot 
establish a rigid distinction between selfish interest and universalist moral values: 
lndividuals who participate because ofpersonal convictions that it is their dut y to 
help others and contribute to the "common good" of their community are both 
egoistical and altruistic, for it makes them selfishly "feel good" to seltlessly give 
their time and energies to what they consider to be a "good cause." 
ln a similar 1 ine of thought, Amartya Sen (1990) argues "against viewing 
behavior in tenns of the traditional dichotomy between egoism and universalized 
systems. [ ... ] Groups intennediate between oneself and ail, such as c1ass and 
community, provide the focus of many actions involving commitment. The 
rejection of egoism as description of motivation does not, therefore, imply the 
acceptance of sorne universalized morality as the basis of actual behavior." 
Mansbridge (1985) also questions the utility of opposing selfish versus altruistic 
motivations for participation, and further points to the relevance of institutional 
factors to account for civil society participation:" ... while dut y or love, the two 
forms of altruism or unselfish motivation, are valuable in themselves, they must 
also be sustained by institutions or an environment that provides enough self-
interested retum to both motivations to prevent actions based on them from being 
excessively costly." 
Moreover, in addition to the problem of attributing a selfish versus altruistic 
value to participation justified by "a desire to help others and further the common 
good" -a philosophical choice that is not mine to make- there is the problem of 
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plurality of interests. Indeed, there are undoubtedly a number of factors that come 
into consideration when one makes the individual decision to spend one's 
resources (time, energy, money, etc.) to participate in community initiatives and 
social causes, which can contain both altruistic and selfish motivations. For 
example, while the reasons put forward by Dona Maria do Carmo (cited above) to 
explain her volunteer participation in the Silo Caetano community project did not 
appear self-interested as such, she did have explicitly egoistical motivations for 
participating at first: 
"1 work with pregnant women and families and when 1 saw that it [the 
Zwelethemba and Restorative Justice training] would be a course on new 
strategies of conflict-resoJution for neighborhood disputes or that involved 
domestic violence, 1 thought that it could be useful for the work 1 already 
do. The training was excellent, and the workshops are still teaching us. 
And after knowing the Project, believing it in, it was difficult to get 
OUt."J49 
Despite the successful operation of the program In Silo Caetano without 
financial rewards and/or compensations for community agents for the costs 
personally incurred by project-related activities, financial considerations can be an 
important factor for participation nonetheless. Dona Dora -a community agent 
from the project in Taguatinga working with the project since its creation-
expresses much anger and disappointment with the lack of project funding for 
actual community agents, especially considering the high profile of the project 
and its sizeable institutional budget: 
"Great agents got out of the project because they did not have enough 
money for transport. Transport is very expensive. It is not possible to 
go to [the mandatory mediation and law] classes every week and to do 
mediations without money- it is ail very expensive and very 
demanding but there are no financial retums. There are too many 
classes, a lot of agents got out because people need to work. 1 am 
without hope that there will be new agents -people ask if there are 
financial compensations, and are told no, so they give up. A lot of 
people do the course and then they leave. They are an investment, but 
149 Cited from an interview granted to the project's research assistant (May 2006) .. 
they leave ... People like me who love the project, they stay but have to 
pay from their own pocket... 1 don't know if the project wil1last long 
as it is -it will not survive- 1 have hope one day it will be better.,,150 
While the reasons explaining why people participate in the consumption, 
provision, and administration of community programs services are certainly 
worthy of further investigation, especially when financial compensations are not 
available, deeper inquiry would likely require a dissertation in itself and is 
unfortunately weil beyond the scope of this study. For the purpose of this 
research, which is more interested in how and not why citizens participate in 
community-based justice and security initiatives, it suffices to know that in the 
cases examined in Brazil and South Africa, individuals participated in the 
community program as service consumers, providers, and administrators. 
Program Profiles 
Including the Sâo Caetano do Sul pilot project, there are currently 68 known 
community governance programs with a justice and security focus operating in 
Brazil. The 67 other programs were identified through the national survey on 
"Access to Justice through alternative systems of conflict administration" 
conducted by the Brazilian Ministry of Justice in 2004, to which 1 collaborated. 
Survey findings of interest for this study are summarized below in Table 5. 
150 Translation by the author. 
Table 5. Technologies, Resources, and Institutional Arrangements in 67 
Community-Based "systems of conflict administration" in Brazil 
127 
Program characteristic Frequency 
(%) 
Project was instigated and is mai nI y funded through a government 49 
agency 
Project was instigated and is mainly funded through a non-state entity 51 
(NGO or academic institution) 
Outside-community partner provides essential services and/or is co- 100 
responsible for project administration 
Project specifically targets low-income communities 30 
Project specifically targets minorities and/or "groups at risk" 24 
"Popular classes" are the principal service consumers 79 
Service consumers have "Iittle or no education at ail" 57 
Service providers are local residents from the communities where 15 
the (!roject o~erates 
Service providers are outside-community professionals with expertise 78 
in the areas oflaw, psychology and/or social work 
Service providers are required to have university training and/or 88 
experience in community development and/or social work 
Mediation training of service providers is provided by outside- 78 
community professionals with expertise in the areas oflaw, 
psychology and social work 
Alternative, community-based "systems of conflict administration" enable 
citizens to participate to varying degrees in the micro-governance of security at 
the local level through the window of conflict mediation. The programs are 
implemented . and administrated within the physical boundaries of the 
communities they attend, but, as this study shows, not necessarily through local 
channels and actors, pending on the nature of institutional arrangements linking 
the "community nodes" with its various "outside-community" partners. As the 
data presented here indicates, to operate, local security networks rely on different 
types of cooperative partnerships with state agencies and non-state actors su ch as 
international organizations, non-govemmental organizations (NGOs) and 
academic research groups (or "epistemic communities"). 
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If the theory of local knowledge is right, however, as nodal theorists believe 
based on empirical findings for the Zwelethemba experiments in South Africa, 
then there is something wrong with the data figured above. Indeed, in 15% of 
cases (10 projects) only are community service providers required to actually be 
residents in the communities in which the programs operate. Even if we add the 
Sâo Caetano do Sul Restorative and Community Justice Project, which was not 
included in the national survey, still only a small percentage (16%) of community-
based govemance programs in Brazil rely on people from the communities they 
attend to operate. The fact that 78% of community-based "systems of conflict 
mediation" in Brazil do not employ local residents but instead university-trained 
outside community professionals with expertise in the areas of law, psychology, 
and social work provides further evidence that community govemance projects in 
Brazil are plagued with a programmatic bias which creates monstrous 
bureaucracies that undermine citizen agency. 
Similarly, in 88% of cases, service providers rely on profession al expertise 
rather than local knowledge for mediation activities, which means that in the 
majority of community programs operating in Brazil, services are provided not 
only by outside community professionals, but based on outside-community 
knowledge and expertise. 
Building on comparative results for Brazil and the Zwelethemba 
experiments in South Africa (summarized below in Figure 3), l identify six 
distinct forms of citizen agency defined in terms of participation in community 
govemance programs: 1) Citizen-consumer; 2) Citizen-facilitator; 3) Active 
citizen-bystander; 4) Citizen-agent, 5) Citizen-administrator; and 6) Citizen-
manager. Schematizing comparative results in an ideal-typical model enables us 
to see how different models of micro-govemance enable different forms of 
individual and collective citizen agency on insecurity. 
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Figure 3. Citizen ageney in Brazil and South Mrica 
SELF-DIRECTION: 
COMMUNITY SOLUTIONS TO 
COLLECTIVE PROBLEMS 
Citizen-manager 
- 0 projects in Brazil and South Africa 
Citizen-administrator 
- Zwelethemba projects in South Africa 
Citizen-agent 
- Zwelethemba projects in South Africa 
- Sao Caetano do Sul project 
Active citizen-bystander 
- Zwelethemba projects in South Africa 
- Sao Caetano do Sul project 
Citizen-facilitator 
- Viva Rio project 
- Brasilia project 
Citizen-consumer 
- Ali projects in Brazil and South Africa 
CONSUMPTlON: 
INDIVJDUAL SOLUTIONS TO PRIVA TE 
PROBLEMS 
The institutional arrangements regulating the forwarding of cases between 
the different community nodes and the multiple outside-community nodes (which 
will be discussed in greater detail further in this chapter) enable us to determine 
how power is distributed amongst the different actors within the local security 
network and thus the different levels of agency the project empowers citizens as 
private individuals and as a community. 
ln the cases of Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro, power within the local security 
network is concentrated in the hands of outside-community actors, who provide 
and administrate most community pro gram activities themselves. The power 
structure underlying the institutional configurations for these two community 
programs do not empower citizens as a collectivity -as communities- to 
identify and implement solutions to collective problems of insecurity, but rather 
enable individuals to solve private problems that cause insecurity within the 
physical boundaries of their communities, provided with the assistance of 
professional outside-community experts. 
Conversely, the power-structure is more diffuse and decentralized in the 
local security networks in Sao Caetano do Sul and in the Zwelethemba projects in 
South Africa, as local community residents are alIowed to participate in the 
community program as more than consumers and facilitators bridging the 
community to the experts. However, because the project in Sao Caetano still lacks 
financing and infrastructure to have a community fund for peace-building, it 
enables only a "middle-range" level of citizen agency. It empowers local residents 
to work collectively as a community to address shared problems of insecurity 
through peace-making activities, but does not empower the community as such to 
deal with the generic causes of insecurity stemming from poverty and 
underdevelopment. 
Community Nodes 
Community participants in local security networks can be cJassified into five 
broad groups of citizens, although, as discussed in the methodological chapter, 
citizens may belong to more than one group or to different groups at different 
times. Citizens who participate in the community pro gram as local service 
consumers, concemed third-parties (e.g, active by-standers), servIce 
''facilitators,'' local service providers (e.g., "agents of Justice"), and service 
administrators constitute the five principal "community" nodes in the security 
networks examined in Brazil and South Africa. 
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First, citizen-consumers are evidently are on the "taking" end and are 
principally defined by their use of local community program services to solve a 
problem or mediate a conflict. Ali cases examined in Brazil and South Africa 
enable the residents of the communities where the projects operate to use program 
services free of charge. lt is imp0I1ant to emphasize that while citizen-consumers 
are fundamental to the local security network, these individuals do not constitute a 
node per se as they do not function as an organized group disposing of its own 
technologies, resources, institutional structure, and mentality. 
Second, active citizen-bystanders also have an important role to play in the 
community-based govemance of security. They are local residents who participate 
as "third parties" in mediation sessions, and help monitor compliance to the 
problem-solving strategy disputants agree upon ("Plans of Action" in 
Zwelethemba-speak). They are concemed relatives, friends, co-workers, 
neighbors or community residents who have been directly or indirectly affected 
by the conflict and are mobilized in the process of finding a sustainable and 
satisfactory solution to the problem, which they can help carry out. While ail the 
Zwelethemba projects in South Africa comprise mechanisms to ensure third-party 
involvement in mediation sessions (or "Peace Gatherings"), in Brazil, active 
citizen-bystanders were only found in the case of the Sâo Caetano do Sul 
Restorative and Community Justice project. Interviews with community agents in 
Brasilia and Sâo Caetano before and after the fusions suggest that the lack of 
third-party involvement in mediation sessions is not so much due to the fact that 
Brazilians are reluctant to get involved in the affairs of others, but rather because 
the projects lacked the technology to get third-parties to participate. 
Third, citizen-"facilitators" were found only in the cases of Brasilia and Rio 
de Janeiro. They are local residents who serve as a link between service 
consumers and the outside-community experts providing the services to the 
community. Citizen-facilitators either do not actively participate in the actual 
provision of mediation and legal orientation activities (as in the case of Viva Rio), 
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or do not rely on their own knowledge and capacities when they do (as in the case 
of Brasilia). 
In the case of the Viva Rio project, citizen-facilitators act as a bridge 
between community residents and professional experts by fulfilling the role of 
physicany bringing people from the community to the mediation center ran by 
volunteer law students and remunerated outside-community experts, who provide 
the mediation services themselves. 
In Brasilia, local community residents are allowed to provide mediation 
services, but are required to consult with a team of outside-community experts 
(social workers, psychologists, and legal aid consultants) for each case they 
attend, and therefore do not rely principally on their own knowledge to provide 
services to fellow community members. For this reason, 1 consider local residents 
involved in the provision of community pro gram services in Brasilia and Rio de 
Janeiro to be "service facilitators" and not actual "service providers" who can act 
as agents of justice based on their own knowledge and capacities. 
Only the Silo Caetano do Sul community program and the Zwelethemba 
projects in South Africa have institutional configurations that enable community 
members to exert agency on insecurity as service providers who operate based on 
local knowledge and capacities. Ironically, local residents engaged in mediation 
activities are called "community justice agents" in Brasilia and "rights agents" in 
Rio de Janeiro (while in both cases they are in fact " facilitators"), and are called 
"justice facilitators" in Silo Caetano do Sul (while they are actually "agents"). In 
the Zwelethemba projects in South Africa, individual members from the 
community who participate in the provision of mediation services do not have a 
title per se- they are members of a Peace Committee. 
Fourth, "citizen-agents" are the residents who act as the actual mediators 
between contlicting parties, relying on their own particular knowledge of shared 
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community problems. The receive basic training in mediation to act as peace-
makers and help bring disputes to a peaceful resolution, as weIl as to assist 
community members in forwarding their case to the appropriate state authorities 
wh en su ch action is warranted. The role of citizen-agents is to facilitate the 
gathering between conflicting parties and to help the disputants come to a 
peaceful and satisfactory solution. The community agents help frame the 
discussion to ensure that each party has equal opportunity to speak and be heard, 
and encourages dialogue between disputants with the objective of helping them 
find a solution that is acceptable to ail the parties. 
The involvement of community members as mediators, facilitators, and 
third-parties in mediation sessions has two important effects on power that ensure 
the faimess of the micro-governance process. It diffuses decision-making power 
for conflict resolution between a number of actors with different interests 
(disputants, mediators, and other participants afTected by the conflict), at the same 
time as it balances the power between the conflicting parties 
If the conflict is not resolved within the first mediation seSSIOn, another 
session is scheduled in the following days or week, and they meet again, as often 
as necessary (3-4 sessions within one month is the usual time-frame I51 ) until the 
conflict has been resolved and a1l parties are satisfied with the solution. 
]n community programs, due process is guaranteed with the timeliness and 
the "professionalism" of mediation services. Once cases are brought to the 
attention ofproject staff, the case is usually dealt with in the Immediate following 
days. Citizen-agents contact conflicting parties and meet with them separately. 
They then schedule and conduct a mediation session in neutral grounds, where 
disputants and related others ("third-parties") get together to discuss the problem. 
151 Guesstimation based on consultations with community agents in Brasilia and Sao 
Caetano do Sul, and project coordinators from IdeasWork. 
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Once an agreement has been reached, a written document is usually signed 
by the conflicting parties and participants. This serves a symbolic function to 
demonstrate one's willingness to abide to the decision. In sorne cases, the 
document can also have legal value in case of a breech of the agreement. The 
signed document (or Plan of Action), which c1early states the terms of the 
agreement and the means that will be employed to fulfill agreement requirements, 
is the primary mechanism ensuring the accountability of the process. 
Citizen-agents, citizen-consumers, and "third-parties" share the 
responsibility of monitoring adhesion to the agreement and its requirements. If 
one of the parties fails to abide to his/her end of the deal, the issue is brought to 
the attention of community agents or project staff, who either schedule another 
mediation session to attempt to resolve the problem, or directly forward the case 
to formai state authorities depending on the specifie terms of agreement and the 
nature of the case. 
Factors of user satisfaction would certainly warrant further investigation, but 
they are not a main concern for this study, which is more interested in explaining 
patterns of participation (or different forms of citizen agency) and understanding 
their institutional and normative contexts. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that of 
the survey respondents in Taguatinga and Ceilandial52 who had actually used the 
services offered by the community justice project (lI %), 92% responded being 
"satisfied" with the services received 153. 
152 Data based on frequency of positive responses (f= 108) for survey question #3: "Have 
you ever used the services offered by the Community Justice Project?" 
153 Data based on frequency of positive responses (f = 99), including the categories "very 
satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied", for survey question #5: "Ifyou used the services of 
the community justice program, were you satisfied with the outcome?" (Refer to Table 
4.1, p.98). Chi-square tests determined that there was no statistically significant 
reJationship between socio-economic characteristics of survey respondents and positive 
responses to this question. Thus the variables of race/ethnicity, c1ass, gender, and age can 
not be generalized as determining factors for user satisfaction outside the sample of 1000 
respondents (of which only 108 have used community program services.) 
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While there is no data cUITently available for Brazil to demonstrate 
empirically that solutions adopted by disputants in the mediation sessions were 
respected and efficient, the survey data reviewed here shows, in general, that 
residents of Taguatinga and Ceilandia who have used community justice services 
were satisfied with their experience. In Sào Caetano do Sul, of the sample of Il 
cases examined, 7 were successfully solved with a Plan of Action, of which 4 
were severe cases involving physical assault. The data presented earlier from the 
Zwelethemba experiments in South Africa (i.e., 98% of conflicts were resolved 
with a Plan of Action) and from Buscaglia's study in Colombia provide further 
cOIToboration for the hypothesis that community-based dispute resolution 
programs work to produce security through conflict mediation. 
Finally, citizen-administrators do not yet exist as such in Brazil and were 
only found in the community govemance experiments in South Africa. Citizen-
administrators are the community agents responsible for peace-building activities. 
They identify and prioritize the generic causes of insecurity in their community, 
decide how to address the issue and how much will be invested for the task from 
the peace-building fund, and then contract local residents to carry out the strategy. 
Citizen-administrators are accountable for the community fund, but are 
ultimately accountable to "citizen-managers" who themselves are accountable to 
donors who finance the community fund and the community pro gram more 
generally. There are cUITently no citizen-administrators in Brazil as even the very 
liberal Sfio Caetano project coordinator will not take responsibility for a 
community fund yet- the potential for corruption and nepotism is, he believes, 
sim ply too explosive. This concem is also shared by institutional partners at 
U1\JDP and the Ministry of Justice, which has undermined efforts by 
representatives of the IdeasWork organization to consolidate the peace-building 
dimension of the project. 
In an ideal world where theory could always be put to practice, there would 
also exist "citizen-managers" responsible for daily project management activities, 
su ch as: Attributing cases received to service providers; keeping track of accounts 
and filing records; issuing paymerits; coordinating human resources; project 
dissemination; and ensuring financial sustainability (e.g., applying for grants to 
guarantee continued funding). But even in South Africa, no Zwelethemba project 
was yet able to empower local citizens as the managers of their community 
programs, and outside-community academic partners continue to monopolize the 
program management. 
Outside-Community Nodes 
"Outside-community" bureaucratic partners provide indispensable financial and 
human resources for the preliminary and continuing mediation training of service 
providers, as weil as for the physical infrastructures, material (operational, 
didactic, dissemination), and administrative and support staff for the program. 
Most community program activities are entirely financed by outside-community 
partners, who also put in place and maintain incentive structures (usually in the 
form of small financial compensations and rewards for community agents for their 
activities) ~o ensure the projects' viability and continuity. 
The outside-community actors constituting the Bureaucracy in the local 
security networks examined in Brazil and South Africa can be grouped into three 
principal categories (or "nodes"): I)The expert-node; 2)the funding-node; and 
3)the case-forwarding node. 
Expert-nodes are constituted by outside-community university-trained 
professionals, who are permanently or temporarily employed by the community 
program but do not reside in the communities where the projects operate. In the 
three cases examined in Brazil, expert-nodes were constituted by certified 
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professionals with expertise in the areas of law, psychology, social work, and 
social science for the Zwelethemba training workshops in Sào Caetano do Sul and 
Brasilia. Expert-nodes provide the knowledge (e.g., peace-making and/or peace-
building skills) and technology (e.g., didactic material, data registration forms, 
and evaluation methodology) service facilitators and providers require to help 
local residents address and solve daily problems that cause insecurity. As 
discussed previously, in the cases of Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro (as in the vast 
majority of community programs in Brazil), expert-nodes provide mediation and 
legal orientation services to the local residents themselves. 
Funding-nodes provide the tinancial resources necessary for the community 
program to operate, including: Remuneration for outside-community service 
providers (in the case of Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro); remuneration for project 
coordinators and professional staff members (in ail cases); remuneration for local 
service facilitators (in Brasilia only); fees incurred as part of the mediation 
training (in ail cases); as weil as funding for daily operational costs (e.g., rent or 
purchase of a physical space for mediation activities and project administration; 
office material and supplies; project evaluations; didactic material; dissemination 
and advertising; etc); and funding for peace-building activities in the case of 
South Africa. 
The main funding nodes for the Brasilia Community Justice Project and the 
Sào Caetano do Sul are constituted by: The Federal District and Territories 
Tribunal of Justice in Brasilia and the Sào Paulo Tribunal of Justice, the United 
Nations Development Program for Brazil, the Special Secretariat of Human 
Rights, and the Secretariat of Judiciary Reform. 
The budget distribution for the Brasilia project illustrates weil the problem 
ofheavy and costly program bureaucracies. ln 2005, of the 814 495.28$ Brazilian 
reais (roughly 400 000.00$ USD) attributed to the project by the Federal District 
Tribunal of Justice, not one single Real went to local community agents (e.g., 
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"citizen-facilitators"). The bulk ofthe budget (785 385.28$ Reais) went to pay for 
salaries for the coordinating judge and seven civil servants, ail of which the 
project could do weil without as the Zwelethemba experiments in South Africa 
have demonstrated for the past 9 years. When citizen-facilitators in' Brasilia that 
year did get paid as promised for their mediation activities, it was with funding 
provided by the Ministry of Justice's Special Secretariat of Human Rights, which 
has a very limited budget and remains highly constrained by bureaucratic ties. ln 
practice, this meant that the money pledged never arrived on time, if it ever 
arrived, and community agents were not allowed to receive payments 
retroactively. As a result, they ended up doing most of the work voluntarily most 
of the time, which, in addition to dependence on an outside-community team of 
experts, is less than empowering and antithetical to the idea of community-based 
govemance. As Dona Dora, an agent from the community project in Taguatinga, 
bluntly put it: 
"We know there is a lot of money that cornes into the project from 
other partners, but we never see it. It goes for something else. There 
are a lot of us who think this way but no one has the courage to speak 
out. They produce super expensive dissemination material to send to 
other tribunals in other states but there is never any money for us. The 
[community justice] book, it is a lot of noise for nothing concrete, the 
community is not receiving anything really ... Everyone thought it was 
beautiful, but in reality it could be more useful for the communitr .. 
Everyone thinks it is wonderful but... there is something missing.,,15 
Similarly, the Viva Rio Project, before its untimely bankruptcy in January 
2007, disposed ofan immense global budget of 19632 172$155 reais (in 2004156) 
that served to finance mostly community mediation initiatives administrated 
essentially by outside-community staff and experts. The project operated in over 
twenty favelas across the city of Rio with funding provided by multiple local and 
154 Translation by the author. 
155 Approximately 9.5 million US dollars. 
156Yiva Rio annual budget (2004), available on-line at: 
http://www.vivario.org.br/relatorio/2004/en/pages/Slide28.htm 
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international partners from both the public157 and private sectors. ln 2004, while 
the largest part of the budget was allocated to community mediation activities (15 
941 045$ Reais I58), citizen-facilitators were not remunerated for their activities. 
The professional outside-community salaried staff of 1399 employeesl59 (!) was 
bound to takes its toll on the project, as its unfortunate closure due to financial 
problems confirms. 
The community project in Sao Caetano do Sul is principally funded by the 
Secretariat of Judiciary Reform, the United Nations Development Pro gram for 
Brazil, and the Sao Paulo Tribunal of Justice. The project, however, does not 
dispose of an annual budget at this time. The salary for the coordinating judge and 
the costs incurred for project material are incurred by the Tribunal of Justice and 
sometimes at the personal expense of the judge (for example, for printing t-shirts 
for justice facilitators with the name, logo, and contact information of the 
community project). lt should be emphasized here that contrarily to the judge in 
Brasilia (who was liberated from her judge duties to coordinate the community 
project), the judge coordinating the project in Sao Caetano is remunerated by his 
tribunal for the functions he fulfills on the bench, as a judge, not as a project 
manager. The time and resources this judge devotes to the community project are 
outside tribunal hours and entirely voluntary. The Sao Paulo Tribunal of Justice 
provides mainly institutional support for the project by forwarding cases to 
community agents, and by lending its name, one of its formaI representatives (the 
judge coordinator), as weil as office supplies to the community program. 
Contrarily to the community project in Brasilia, which operates from two tribunal-
owned buildings in Taguatinga and Ceilandia (the "community center" is literally 
within the Tribunal of Justice in the case of the latter), the community project in 
157 Almost half (47.6%157) of the 2204 budget for program activities was financed by 
national state agencies and international government aid agencies. 
158 Viva Rio Annual Report (2004), available on-line at: 
http://www.vivario.org.br/relatorio/2004/enlpages/Slide29.htm 
159 Viva Rio Annual Report (2004), available on-line at: 
http://www.vivario.org.br/relatorio/2004/enlpages/Slide27.htm 
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Sao Caetano do Sul does not own its own physical infrastructure and relies on 
collaboration from a local school for operational space for mediation activities. 
In Sao Caetano do Sul, local service providers are Ilot cun-ently remunerated 
for their mediation activities, but they could be receiving payments following the 
Peace Committee model in the Zwelethemba projects in South Africa once the 
project consolidates its funding structure and outside-community partners (the 
Bureaucracy) are able to agree on their respective mandates and responsibilities. 
The outside-community partners provided the initial funding to implement the 
project (e.g. costs incurred for training and dissemination activities), but are still 
debating the responsibility for the payment of community agents and the 
community fund. The problem for the payment of community agents for their 
mediation activities, as in the case of Brasilia, is due to a fear of being sued by 
community agents for unemployment insurance. To avoid such lawsuits, in 
Brasilia, the community agents are legally considered "volunteers", and they do 
not get "paid" for their work but rather "reimbursed" for the guesstimated costs 
incurred by the mediation process, su ch as fees for transportation, phone calls, 
food, etc. 
Case-forwarding nodes su ch as police agencies, tribunals, and local 
associations are central in local security networks. Their role is to reference (or 
forward) cases they receive from the community to the community program. The 
relationship between case-forwarding nodes and the community nodes is an 
excellent illustration of state-society collaboration (or civil society cooperation 
when cases are referenced from other local organizations) through decentralized 
networks for the regulation of a specific issue-area. 
ln local security networks, case-forwarding nodes are constituted by formaI 
authorities of the justice system (police officers, judges, defense attorneys, and 
prosecutors) and local associations who collaborate with service providers by 
forwarding cases to the project when the problem can be solved through 
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community channels and disputants agree to it. In the case of the Zwelethemba 
projects in South Africa, the South African Police Force (SAPS) was a key 
partner in the early phases of the project, although the collaborative relationship 
with Peace Committees was not operationalized right away to enable the projects 
to first establish legitimacy (without any association to the police) within the 
communities. Such collaborative arrangements were also formalized by the Viva 
Rio project with local police authorities in Rio de Janeiro, but it appears the 
partnership was seldom operationalized through actual case-referrals from police 
officers to the community project. In the case of Sào Caetano do Sul, partnership 
agreements were operationalized with the Sào Paulo Tribunal of Justice and the 
Municipal Civil Guard in Sfio Caetano, which reference the bulk of cases the 
community project currently handles. As the judge coordinator explains, 
empowering the community to work in collaboration with his Tribunal and local 
police agencies to solve community problems daily is at the very heart of the 
project: 
"If recourse to the (mediation) circ]es is the result of spontaneous 
action by those involved in the situation, nothing will be 
communicated to the police or the judge. However, jf the persons 
come to an agreement and wish for the judge to confirm it, the (local 
justice) facilitators will forward this request made by the participants 
of the circle and those involved in the conflict, along with its Plan 
(of Action), to the local tribunal on the following Monday, for 
immediate reception. A lawyer and a Crown Attorney will be present 
to assist and the Plan will be corroborated by the judge. That is the 
preoccupation of Justice: To help people reso)ve their problems. 
That is why if a case arrives at the police station or court, and if 
everyone agrees during the hearing, with the presence of a lawyer 
and a Crown Attorney, the case can be suspended and the parties will 
be forwarded to the justice facilitators so that, together and with their 
support, they find the best solution to the conflict. That agreement, 
given it is respectful and attending to the needs of all, will be 
corroborated by the judge and the case will be dismissed. I60" 
160 Translation by the author. Extract from the project informational booklet distributed 
on its inaugural day (June 22nd, 2006). 
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In Brasilia, the judge coordinating the community project actively opposes 
collaboration with her tribunal and security agencies through case-forwarding. 
The judge has resisted initiatives designed to promote collaboration with police 
agencies not only from institutional partners at the Ministry of Justice and UNDP, 
but from police agencies themselves, who have explicitly expressed a desire to 
cooperate with the community program. The judge admits to being herself afraid 
of the police, and further stated that "any association with police agencies would 
scare offlocal residents and dissuade them from using pro gram services 161 ." 
Conversely, sorne police officers are reluctant to work with the 
community. The deputy colonel from the Military Police in Silo Paulo responsible 
for the community policing initiative in collaboration with the Silo Caetano do Sul 
project is reluctant to lend his name and staff to the project as he worries 
community members and leaders wilI take advantage of the good relationship 
with police officers to further their own selfish interests, or, worse stilI, to coerce 
felIow community members into actions against their wilI with the threat of 
getting their "good friends from the police" involved ifthey refuse. Such cynicism 
appears misdirected, for community agents are for the most part afraid of the 
police and, ironically, fear for their good name and the project's in the event of 
colIaboration with the police. As a resuIt of the community projects' and the 
judiciary's reluctance to work with police agencies in joint initiatives, most 
micro-governance programs in Brazil do not have institutionaJized mechanisms to 
enable case-forwarding between the community and the police. 
The different institutionaJ configurations enabling case-forwarding from the 
community and the justice system (police agencies included) to the local security 
networks in Brasilia, Silo Caetano do Sul, and Rio de Janeiro are summarized and 
compared to the Zwelethemba model below in Table 6. 
161 Cited from personnal communications with the judge as part of routine project 
management activities prior to the (failed) fusion experiment. 
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Table 6. Dynamics of state-society collaboration in 4 local security networks 
Probleml Zwelethem ba Sio Caetano Brasilia Viva Rio 
dispute is Model Restorative & Community model 
forwarded Community Justice model 
from: Justice model 
community - Disputants know - Disputants know of - Disputants know of - Disputants know of 
to of the existence of the existence of the the existence of the the existence ofthe 
community the project project project project 
program - Communities have -The local association - The community - The community 
the resources to working in the area of program ' s team of program's team of 
solve the problem public health legal counse1ors, legal counselors has 
- Ali parties agree to references a case to social workers and the resources to help 
participate in a the project psychologists has the community agents 
"Gathering" -Communities have resources to help (service facilitators) 
the resources to solve community agents help local residents 
the problem (service facilitators) solve the problem 
-Ali parties agree to help local residents - Ali parties agree to 
participate in a solve the problem participate in a 
"Restorative circle" - Ali parties agree to "Mediation session" 
participate in a 
"Mediation session" 
police to -Police agents know - Police agents know - not an option -Police agents know 
community of the existence of ofthe existence of the of the existence of 
program the project project the project 
- Communities have -Communities have - The community 
the resources to the resources to solve program's team of 
solve the problem the problem legal counselors has 
- Ali parties agree to - Ali parties agree to the resources to help 
participate in a participate in a local residents solve 
"Gathering" "Restorative circle" the problem 
- Ail parties agree to 
participate in a 
"Mediation session" 
court to - not an option - Ali parties agree to - not an option - not an option 
community participate in a 
program "Restorative circle" 
community - Mediation process - Mediation process -Ilot an option -Mediation process 
program to failed; communities failed; communities failed; team of 
court do not have the do not have the experts does not have 
resources to solve resources to solve the the resources to solve 
the problem problem the problem 
community - Immediate law - Immediate law -Immediate law - Immediate law 
to policel enforcement or legal enforcement or legal enforcement or legal enforcement or legal 
court action is required action is required action is required action is required 
Comparing these four models is useful to identify the different partnerships 
regulating the network and to understand how power is distributed amongst the 
various nodes within the network. For example, of the four models, 
institutionalized mechanisms to enable col1aboration through case-forwarding 
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with other civil associations, police agencies, and the local tribunal were only 
found in the case of the Sao Caetano do Sul project. This finding is of particular 
interest when compared to the Brasilia project, which is also coordinated by a 
judge and funded by sorne of the same partners (UNDP and the Secretariat of 
Judiciary Reform) with the same programmatic objectives (e.g. human security 
through access to justice and community empowerment), but does not enable any 
kind of collaboration with either civil associations, police agencies, or the local 
tribunal of justice. 
Interestingly, the comparative analysis of the four models also reveals that 
while the original Zwelethemba model empowers citizens the greatest level of 
agency according to the ideal-type, only the Sfio Caetano do Sul project disposes 
of institutionalized mechanisms to enable cases to be forwarded from the local 
tribunal of justice to the community program, which constitutes a rare functional 
example of synergetic state-society collaboration through community govemance, 
and provides further evidence corroborating the added-value of local knowledge 
for conflict resolution. 
Comparative analysis also reveals important shortcomings In the 
institutional design of community govemance models: The Viva Rio project, 
intemationally acclaimed and widely referenced as a best practice in community 
govemance, appears limited at best and dysfunctional at worse in terms of 
community empowerment compared to the Sfio Caetano do Sul and Zwelethemba 
models. 
How to explain the variegated results observed in Brazil and South Africa 
and within Brazil? Why does community govemance work weil in South Africa 
but reduces citizen agency to consumption in the majority of cases in Brazil? Why 
do the projects in Sfio Caetano do Sul and Brasilia, both coordinated by judges 
and financed by mostly the same partners, enable community agency in Sfio 
Caetano but not in Brasilia? 
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To answer these questions, we must investigate deeper and ask a more 
tùndamental question: What deterrnines the power structures that determine the 
institutionaI configurations regulating local security networks in the first place? In 
other words, what are local security networks "made of'? 
Chapter 4. The People versus The Bureaucracy 
This chapter demonstrates that the variations observed between Brazil and South 
Africa and within Brazil can be largely explained by the opposing norms and 
ideas of Bureaucratic actors about who can have agency on justice (and how), for 
that is the "stuff' local security networks are essentially made of. "Mentalities" in 
the form of ideas about who can have agency on justice largely determine the 
other components not of the other nodes within the network but of the network 
itself: The normative structure of local security networks determines the 
institutional configurations regulating the network, the knowledge base according 
to which the network operates, as weil a the distribution of human and financial 
resources within the network. 
Interestingly, Shearing speaks of "mentalities" as a component of specific 
nodes within the network, and not as a constituting part of the network per se, 
which is made up by its various community and outside-community Bureaucratic 
nodes. This makes sense, as different nodes may have different "mentalities," 
pending on their identity and relative power position within the network. An 
anal ogy would be, again, the international system, constituted by a number of 
nodes (state and non-state actors), who as individual nodes each have their own 
mentalities, resources, technologies, and institutional structures, but who 
collaborate in organized decentralized governance arrangements (such as the 
various agencies of the United Nations), which comprise their own mentalities, 
resources, technologies, and institutional structures member-nodes adhere to and 
comply to various degrees. Local security networks, like the international system, 
are characterized by a form of anarchy as there is no over-arching governing body 
with the authority to make ail the nodes comply to the terms of agreement, and 
thus, the most powerful actors are able to impose their way and make their ideas 
prevail within the network. The evidence reviewed for this study indicates that in 
Brazil, conservative mentalities usually prevail over liberal ones. The 
bureaucratic actor (or node) responsible for the coordination and tinancial 
]47 
administration of the project has the power to impose its mentality to the entire 
network. Simply put, in decentralized governance arrangements involving 
multiple institutional partners and community actors, there is always one node 
where huinan and tinancial resources are concentrated that is able to exert greater 
influence over ail other nodes within the network. 
While ail nodes within the network share a common programmatic 
objective, loca] security networks are made up of individual actors with different 
views about the regulation of justice and at times diametrically opposed interests. 
The bureaucracy of local security networks is not an abstract entity: lt is made up 
of individuals, who have their own agendas and their own ideas and biases about 
who can have agency on justice and (how), and this in turn determines the extent 
of citizen and community agency on insecurity. The mentality (conservative vs 
libera]) of projects coordinators was determined according to their position 
towards change and challenges to the state's traditional monopoly of justice based 
on the level of credentialization required for participation and the extent of citizen 
agencyeach oftheir programs enables, as weil as on public statements, published 
material, interview results, and professional communications with individual 
project coordinators. The four cases examined indicate that the more conservative 
the project coordinator, the lesser the extent of citizen and community agency on 
insecurity and the more powerful the bureaucracy. Conversely, the more liberal 
the project coordinator, the lighter the project bureaucracy and the greater the . 
extent of citizen and community agency within the network. This is because there 
exists a constitutive re]ationship between ideas about who can have agency on 
justice (and how), the relative power of the bureaucracy, and citizen agency 
through micro-governance. Building on the ideal-type of citizen agency presented 
earlier, it is possible to situate these dynamics within their ideational context, as 
schematized below in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Relationship between ideational position, relative power of the 
bureaucracy, and extent of citizen agency 
SElF-DIRECTION 
Manager 
Administrator 
Credentialism 
State monopoly 
of justice CONSERVA TIVE 
Vivo Rio 
78% of projects 
in Brozil 
Brasilia 
Ideas Matter 
Agent 
Facilitator 
Consumer 
CONSUMPTION 
Sâo Caetano 
LIBERAL 
No projects 
Zwelethemba 
Local 
knowledge 
Outside-state 
regulation of 
social conf/icfs 
As discussed briefly In the methodological chapter, at the one end of the 
ideational spectrum, there are liberals, who challenge the state' s exclusive 
monopoly of justice and believe social conflicts can be efficiently arbitrated 
outside the formaI state justice system is communities where public security is 
failing. As Clifford Shearing explains, recognizing the legitimacy of the state's 
monopoly of violence does not imply that "only states should do 'justice''': 
"It is important that violence be authorized. The Hobbesian position 
(and Weberian) was that states should [be responsible for] the 
authorization of violence, i.e. one could use it only with state approval. 
They then need to be able to back this up, which means that they must 
be able to enforce this. This still is a sensible position in many places. 
The idea behind it is that the use of violence must be legitimized and 
that states constitute a source, perhaps at the moment the only 
legitimate source of such legitimacy. But this doesn't mean that only 
states should do "justice" .162 
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The Zwelethemba micro-governance model in place in 25 locations across 
South Africa illustrates weil how local residents in poor communities with severe 
public security deficits can be mobilized and organized into an efficient, 
governing node in local security networks, provided with technology (e.g. 
mediation techniques and organizational skills) and resources (human and 
financial) from the main institutional partner (in this case an academic institution). 
The projects in South Africa are operated at low cost and involve a very light 
outside-community bureaucracy in comparison to the cases examined in Brazil. 
Once a group of local residents has received minimal training and become 
organized and able to operate as Peace Committees (i.e., mediators), the outside-
corn munit y project management does not interfere with daily routine project 
activities. Moreover, as discussed in the methodological chapter, Peace 
Committee members are not only remunerated for their mediation activities but 
further entrusted with the responsibility of a community fund which they choose 
how to invest in the community (in an directed effort to address the generic, root 
causes of the contlicts mediated on a daily basis). While the degree of cooperation 
between individual projects and local police agencies may be subject to important 
variations, it is noteworthy that no project in South Africa has case-forwarding 
mechanisms in place to enable collaboration with formaI authorities from the local 
tribunal of justice. 
162 Cited from personal electronic communications with Prof essor Shearing (April 23, 
2007). 
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More moderate liberals, like the judge coordinator in Sao Caetano do Sul, on 
the other hand, also believe community actors have the capacities to arbitrate 
social conflicts outside the formaI state justice system, but may be situated further 
left on the ideational pole (toward state monopoly of justice) as they favor micro-
govemance models that work in close collaboration with state authorities from the 
justice system through case-forwarding mechanisms, and do not entrust 
community members to participate in the administration of project funds. The 
liberal judge in Sao Caetano believes that community agents, once provided with 
minimal training (more or less 80 hours), have the knowledge and capacities to 
help local residents identify and solve problems and conflicts that cause daily 
insecurity. The judge sends cases from his tribunal to the project when granted 
consent from disputants, and institutional mechanisms were developed to enable 
the judge to further attribute a legally binding value to agreements reached 
through community mediation services (if requested by parties to the conflict). 
This judge further favors active collaboration with local security agencies -most 
importantly the Municipal Civil Guard- who have been trained to forward cases 
that do not fall within their expertise or mandate to the community program. 
Corn munit y agents are also free to accept or, when warranted, forward (to the 
appropriate state agencies) cases of criminal nature. 
When moderately liberal norms define the ideational position of the main 
institutional node (in this case the judiciary power), citizens are empowered to act 
on the sources of insecurity affecting their lives and communities not only as 
consumers but as actual agents, who rely on their own knowledge and everyday 
experiences of local life and problems within the community to enable fellow 
community members to develop their own solutions to common problems. This is 
because, the judge argues, community actors have the means to "deliver Justice": 
"The Plan [of Action reached through community-based mediation], 
if it is respectful of ail and if ail openly feel respected by it, 
symbolizes the Justice ofthat group. Justice has to do with that: With 
respect and dignity, with peace and security, with responsibility and 
commitment for our own choices and decisions. 163" 
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It is important to emphasize that another important characteristic that 
enables us to identify variations within the liberal mentality is the greater extent to 
which "ultra Iiberals" are willing to be imputable to other institutional (funding) 
partners and take responsibi1ity for the financial dimensions of project activities 
within the community. For example, while Peace Committees are remunerated for 
their daily peace-making activities and responsible for the integrity of a 
community fund, the project in Sfio Caetano do Sul still lacks institutional 
mechanisms for the financing of both peace-making and peace-building activities. 
There are currently previsions to establish a funding structure to remunerate 
community agents for their work and finance peace-building activities, but the 
iniative was not yet able to overcome debates amongst institutional partners. The 
project's principal local outside-community partners -the Sao Paulo Tribunal of 
Justice, the Ministry of Justice, and UNDP- cannot agree on where this fund 
would be physically hosted, who should finance it, who should be responsibJe for 
the issuance of payments for peace-making and peace-building activities, or who 
would be ultimately responsible for its integrity. In view of the data examined in 
Chapter 2, the potential for corruption constitutes a very real problem. 
Inner-bureaucratic squabbling over the division of responsibilities for the 
tinancing of peace-making activities and of a community fund is c.omplicated by 
the fact that key actors within the Ministry of Justice, unlike UNDP personnel and 
the Sfio Paulo Tribunal of Justice in Sfio Caetano do Sul, are appointed for limited 
terms and are regularly changed with new administrations and political alliances, 
which means, especially given the elusiveness of formaI partnership agreements 
in Brazil, that institutional support (and eventually funding) for projects has to be 
re-conquered not only with every new political administration but more 
frequently, with new appointees. To tùrther complicate matters, the capacity to 
'63Translation by the author. Excerpt from the informational booklet for the project 
distributed on the day of its inauguration (June 22, 2006). 
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(re)consolidate a tinancial and institutional support-base for a given community 
project largely depends on one's ability to (uncover and) overcome longstanding 
political rivalries within and between government agencies and individual 
appointees. 164 Bureaucracies are indeed plentiful of political obstacles that 
ultimately undermine the development and efficiency of micro-governance 
initiatives. As will be discussed next, more bureaucracy generally translates 
concretely into less citizen agency. 
At the opposite end of the ideational pole, there are conservatives, who, 
conversely, are in favor of the status-quo and seek to preserve a form of state 
monopoly over justice. Traditionally, conservatism is defined as "a political 
philosophy which aspires to the preservation of what is thought to be the best in 
established society, and opposes radical change" (Mclean and McMillan, 2002: 
p.114). Individuals on this end of the ideational spectrum believe that only state-
certified operators of the justice system (e.g. members of the bar, psychologists, 
social workers, police officers) have the credentials and capacities to arbitrate 
social conflicts. Conservatives strongly oppose the transfer of decision-making 
power for the regulation of justice to communities and what they consider to be 
"ignorant" and "irresponsible" citizens. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
conservative norms pervading the security culture in Brazil have translated 
concretely in lack of government and police support for community governance 
164 Given the consistent support and the ingenuousness of the partners at UNDP and the 
Sao Paulo Tribunal of Justice, however, it seems reasonable to expect that with time, 
inner-bureaucratic debates will not constitute an insurmountable obstacle for the creation 
of a peace-building fund that would enable greater citizen and community agency in 
Nova Gerty. The reason for this optimism is justified by the success of the 25 
Zwelethemba projects currently operating in South Africa, which ail had to overcome 
initiallogistical complications of this nature. It may be that the Zwelethemba community 
projects were more easily able to overcome the bureaucratie obstacles currently 
encountered in Sào Caetano because they are administrated by project coordinators 
(through the IdeasWork organization) situated on the extreme other pole of the ideational 
spectrum. The dedieated researchers are not deterred by the potential corruption factor 
and are ultimately responsible for the payments for the mediation activities of Peace 
Committees and for the community fund themselves, as accountable academics and 
professional staff members attached to establîshed research institutions. 
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programs, to the notable exception of the Municipal Civil Guard in Sao Caetano 
do Su1165. 
Traditional conservatives, like most senior officiaIs at the Ministry of 
Justice's National Secretariat of Public Security (SENASP) and a significant part 
of the judiciary community in Brasilia, are skeptical of the very concept of 
community governance. While rare are those conservatives who will go as far as 
to explicitly argue against community governance -for that would be most 
politically-incorrect- most do argue that community programs should be 
administrated and operated by professionals from the justice system, not 
community residents. In Brazil, the judiciary power is very reluctant to let go of 
even a parcel of its monopoly on justice. While it is true that "the state has a 
legitimate con cern to safeguard due process and basic rights," as Zehr argues, it 
also has "a tendency to expand its power and authority"- that is, the state is a 
"greedy institution" (Coser, 1974 c.f., Zehr, 2005), and this is particularly true of 
the judiciary power in Brazil. 
The judiciary power, which constitutes a central element of the bureaucracy 
of most community prograrns in Brazil, must be understood not simply as a set of 
authoritative institutions, but also in terms of its normative structure, which is 
constituted by the ideas of its actors --{)f its "bureaucrats" in the broad sense, 
including judges- on who can have agency on justice and the appropriate means 
toward this end. In Brasilia, for example, a conservative judge, who at the time 
165 The participation of the Municipal Civil Guard (GCM) in the local security network in 
Sao Caetano do Sul may be due to the fact that by detinition, the GCM is a community-
focused policing institution created after the transition to democracy to develop closer 
ties with citizens. lndeed, in theory (but not in practice however), Municipal Guards are 
not armed with guns as to promote a fiiendlier image and encourage local residents -
generally mistrustful of the police- to collaborate with law enforcement authorities. 
Interestingly, the GCM network in Sao Caetano do Sul also has a social worker on its 
full-time staff, to whom cases involving youth deliquency are brought when involving 
tirst offenses and/or minor crimes. Instead of sending youths to jail and court, the case in 
handled internally within GCM auspices: The social worker convokes the youth's 
responsible adults (meeting with them on more th en one occasion if necessary) to solve 
the problem and ensure it does not reoccur. 
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was a candidate for the tribunal's presidency, stated that "the poor just don't have 
what it takes [to regulate justice outside courts], they are ail iIIiterates, how can 
we expect them to be rational?,,166. A senior security advisor from the Ministry of 
Justice's National Secretariat of Public Security made a similar comment publicly 
at a recent conference event in Brasilia, c1aiming that social chaos would 
inevitably ensue if more responsibilities were attributed to citizens (as opposed to 
law enforcement experts) in the governance oflocal security issues. 
In the course of the two years of field research investigating the Ministry of 
Justice from within, it was observed that senior officiaIs at SENASP undermined 
initiatives designed to empower underprivileged citizens and communities as 
means of security on numerous occasions. For example, as part of a desperate 
strategy to reduce crime and violence in Rio de Janeiro for the 2007 Pan-
American games, SENASP invested millions of Reais to set up a number of 
"community mediation centers" administrated by police agents (as opposed to 
local citizens), who provide mediation services themselves to community 
residents in sIums strategically located on routes where athletes had to come 
through in various sporting events. The basic idea was to attempt to reduce crime 
and violence through the window of conflict mediation in the most crime-Iaden 
and violent areas that could not be avoided during the prestigious sporting event. 
Interestingly, the main concern appeared to be not so much about crime and 
security in those communities, but rather about avoiding media scandaIs that 
could result from potential hostage situations, kidnappings, and attacks, which 
would tarnish Brazil's international reputation. 
If in favelas (and in Brazil more generally) citizens trusted the police and 
had recourse to police services when they were victims of actual crimes, the 
strategy might have yielded interesting results. But as the data reviewed in 
Chapter 2 c1early indicates, citizens in Rio de Janeiro are particularly mistrustful 
166 Cited from personnal communications with thejudge coordinator as part of routine 
project management activities prior to the (failed) fusion experiment in Bràsilia. 
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of the police and have an unusually high rate of under-reporting crime 
victimization. If citizens don't report being victim to serious crimes because they 
fear or distrust the police, they are ever more unIikely to resort to police agents for 
problem resolution of daily conflicts. When we were invited to discuss these plans 
(months before they were concretized and implemented in locations across Rio), 
the chief of staff of SRJ, the UNDP representative, and myself voiced concern 
about the appropriateness and relevance of the initiative. Since they were asking 
for our help in elaborating and implementing the initiative, we proposed instead, 
in collaboration with Prof essor Shearing, a project which would respect the idea 
of community-based conflict mediation centers in coooperation with the local 
Military Police, but the model we suggested would have employed local residents, 
not police agents, as the principal service providers. The SENASP officiaIs 
initially agreed to the alternative proposition, but decided not to follow-up and 
eventually went ahead with their original, counterintuitive plans. 
The case-study in Brasilia, similarly, iIIustrates weIl how state agencies, 
seeking to safeguard their interest in the state's monopoly of justice, create 
monstrous outside-community bureaucracies for the community projects they 
support, thus creating a vertical, assistentialistic dynamic of dependence between 
civil society actors (i.e. project participants in Taguatinga and Ceilandia) and state 
authorities (i.e. The Federal District and Territories Tribunal of Justice) rather 
than enable citizen agency and community self-direction. Such heavily 
bureaucratized micro-governance projects reflect the prevalence of moderately 
conservative norms within the local security network. 
Moderately conservative actors, like the judge coordinating the Community 
Justice project in Brasilia and the Viva Rio coordination team, are more open to 
change than traditionalist conservatives and may be positioned further down the 
ideational pole (towards outside-state regulation of social conflicts). They argue 
against the state's exclusive monopoly of justice, but believe that the state and 
professionals from the justice system must still play a central role community-
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based govemance initiatives by assisting and/or monitoring community actors 
c10sely in ail oftheir program activities. 
The moderately conservative position could be construed as a form of 
"patemalism," defined commonly as "the exercise of power or authority over 
another person to prevent self-Înflicted harm or to promote that person's welfare, 
usually usurping individual responsibility and freedom of choice." (Mclean and 
McMillan, 2002: p.399) Specifically, state patemalism refers to "the use of law 
or other state activity to prevent adult citizens, as weil as children, from harming 
themselves, or to promote their welfare." A number ofproblems may result from 
such a top-down approach to social welfare because patemalism fundamentally 
undermines the autonomy of individual and collective actors, and as it is often 
concluded, can be seen as "inimical to liberty [ ... ] because some of the forms of 
intervention risk imposing the legislator's views of what is harmful or welfare-
promoting." 
ln this vein, the Viva Rio project offers "community mediation" services 
to local residents in a number of favelas, but these mediation sessions always 
involve the participation of an array of salaried outside-community experts "made 
up of lawyers, law students, collaborators of various distinct specializations 
social workers, architects, psychologists, etc.,- and "citizenship agents (residents 
of the region where the project operates)" (Strozenberg, 2006: 89-90). As in the 
case of Brasilia, the Viva Rio project was, until its unfortunate bankrupcy in 
January 2007, a highly credentialized micro-govemance model developed to "mix 
academic knowledge leamed in universities with local rules as lived by 
residents l67" (Ibid.). From an institutional and policy perspective, had the costJy 
program been successful in reinforcing local capacities to mediate local conflicts, 
the costs incurred by the credentialized bureaucratie stucture could have been 
justified. The Viva Rio project, however, directed most budget allocations to the 
outside-community "specialists," which not only resulted in non-existent financial 
167 Translation by the author. 
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attributions to actual local community agents, but further severly limited their 
participation and their role in daily pro gram activities within their communities. 
In Brazil, conservative norms and ideas about the state's exclusive 
monopoly of justice are predominant and have translated into institutional 
configurations where local residents are, for the most part, only allowed a limited 
form of participation in micro-govemance processes. The case-studies of Viva 
Rio and Brasilia ironically illustrate that while they are the most costly to operate, 
and benefit and empower mainly outside-community staff rather than actual local 
residents, programs with a conservative approach are more easily capable of 
consolidating a financial basis because they present less risk from a funding 
perspective. State agencies and NGOs, because they are strongly institutionalized 
nodes, are, after ail, more accountable than loosely defined groups of "community 
agents." Moreover, moderate conservatives carry an eloquent politically-correct 
discourse to obscure their implicit disbeliefin the capacities of the poor to address 
the sources of injustice and insecurity affecting their daily lives, which is 
appealing to other institutional partners, who have their own bureaucracies to 
justify these budget allocations to micro-govemance programs to. From a 
moderately conservative perspective, the poor are not considered to be "ignorant" 
so much as "insufficiently tooled to act on their own"; underprivileged citizens 
are not considered irresponsible to solve their own problems, but rather "more 
efficient when provided with the expert help of trained professionals. 168" The 
double-discourse of moderate conservatives in weil captured in the following 
statement from the judge coordinating the Brasilia project169: 
"The necessary elements for this reinvention of Law are the 
recognition of the plurality of judicial orders and rhetoric dialogue, 
in opposition to the State monopoly of Justice and its scientifization. 
[ ... ] The State as a newest social movement is a process of creation 
168 Cited from professional communications with the judge coordinator as part of routine 
project management activities prior to the (failed) fusion experiment in Brasilia, as weil 
as from discussions with outside-community expelts of the Viva Rio projects in the 
favelas of Leme and Babylônia. 
169 See Falserelli-Foley, (2006: pp. 95, 107). Translation by the author. 
of a non-State public space. In this new political consteIlation, the 
fragmented State converts itself into a field of disputes for different 
projects and interests. [ ... ] The role of coordinating these different 
organizations that act in the realm of these disputes may thus fall on 
the State." 
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Moderate conservatives view the state as a "newest social movemene 70" 
who must be omniscient and ever-present to serve social movements and 
emerging forms of civil society organization. The question of "how much and 
what kind of state support" is elusive and subject to interpretation, but the impl icit 
argument is that civil society cannot be "emancipated" through community justice 
without continued assistance (read supervision) from the state. Ironically, 
moderate conservatives denounce "the state's exclusive monopoly of justice" and 
define themselves in opposition to traditional conservatives, whom they condemn 
for their "paternalism," but in reality, both are perpetuating the status-quo of the 
state's exclusive monopoly of justice, only to different extents. For example, 
while the judge coordinating the community project in Brasilia criticizes 
conservative judges opposed to commllnity justice for their "narrow-mindedness 
and snobbism," she manifested strong opposition when, as part of the 
Zwelethemba-fusion, it was sllggested to cut down on the costly te am of tribunal 
experts and rather use the resources for the community agents and community 
development, as, according to her, "the agents would be incapable of doing 
mediation by themselves without the assistance of the experts, the experts are 
central to the project 171." Community agents, however, since having received the 
Zwelethemba training, believe otherwise. As Dona Dora, the community agent 
from Taguatinga, put it: 
"There is always someone on our back ... The judicial technicians 
accompany every mediation ... We were trained to think we need 
assistance to work with the community, and in the beginning we truly 
170 "Novissimo movimento social;" See Falsrelli-Foley (2006: 107-108), and Sousa 
Santos (pp. 59-69 c.f. Falsrelli-Foley, 2006: ) . 
171 Cited from personnal communications with the judge coordinator as part of routine 
project management activities prior to the (failed) fusion experiment in Brasilia. 
believed we needed the team of experts because that is what we were 
told, but we don't believe that anymore ... But we have to do as she [the 
judge] saysl72." 
The Predatory World ofBureaucracies 
Conservative nonnative structures embedded ln big (outside-community) 
bureaucracies are bad for local security networks as community initiatives are 
"decommunitized" at the onset. When conservative norms pervade the 
bureaucratic culture within the local security network, local residents are 
discarded as legitimate agents of justice in their own lives, and, consequently, 
underprivileged communities are provided only limited opportunities to achieve 
greater levels of security by their own means. 
Local security networks that are regulated based on credentialized 
knowledge and professional capacities only enable individual citizens to solve 
daily conflicts as consumers and facilitators of services provided by experts from 
outside their community, as illustrated by the case-studies in Brasilia and Rio de 
Janeiro. That is, credentialized micro-governance programs do empower 
individual citizens as a means of security, but not communities as a collectivity. 
Local security networks regulated based on local knowledge and capacities, on 
the other hand, enable citizens to address and solve daily problems as both 
individual citizens and as a collectivity actively involved in the consumption, 
provision, and administration of community program services, as illustrated by 
the Zwelethemba experiments in South Africa and in Sao Caetano do Sul. ln other 
words, micro-governance programs that operate based on local capacities 
empower both individual citizens and the community as a means of security, 
whereas programs that depend on an outside-community Bureaucracy only 
empower individuals as a means of security. 
172 Translation by the author. 
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While bureaucracies are conceived to be a means through which an 
organization (whatever its nature) rules, bureaucracies also have interests of their 
own and, as this study demonstrates empirically for Brazil, may become 
predatory173. Weber himselfbelieved that in real life, bureaucracies were prone to 
corruption, nepotism, contradiction, rivalry, chaos, impunity, over-specialization, 
rigidity, and inertia and thus the bureaucracies were often far less efficient in 
practice than his ideal model theorized. 
The age-old problems identified by Weber commonly affect, to vary mg 
degrees, the bureaucracies of outside-community partners in local security 
networks across Brazil. Simply put, the problem in Brazil is that outside-
community partners are over-involved in the projects they support and, ironically, 
end up de-communityzing community programs by monopolizing the 
administration and the provision of most program services. 
In many ways, the predatory tendencies of the judiciary power observed in 
Brazi1 follow "Parkinson's Law I74," which stipulates that "work expands so as to 
fill the time available for its completion." Following this principle, state 
authorities (and an NGO in the case of Viva Rio) create huge outside-community 
bureaucracies for the community programs they support, and then lend their own 
staff to fill the credentialized positions and exigencies they create. Bureaucracies 
are somewhat of self-fulfilling prophecies l75 : They generate administrative needs 
and expansive infrastructures they th en must respond to and fill ihemselves. 
Indeed, as Niskamen (1971) argues, bureaucrats seek to maximize their budget 
and thus tend to systematically overproduce bureau goods and services. 
173 Bates (2005) and Evans (1995) have made similar arguments. 
174 See C. N. Parkinson's (1958) Parkinson's Law: The Pursuit ofProgress 
175 The predatory nature of the Bureaucracy and the absurdity of its self-tùlfilling 
tendencies were also the subject of c1assic works of fiction such as Franz Katka's The 
Trial, Milan Kundera's La Plaisanterie, and George Orwell's 1984 and Animal Farm. 
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As the budget analysis of the case-studies of Brasilia and Viva Rio 
i1Iustrated almost to satirical degree in Chapter 3, "bureaucrats" from the Federal 
District and Territories Tribunal of Justice (in Brasilia) and the Viva Rio NGO 
seek to maximize their share of the budget in the community programs they 
support and have indeed systematically overproduced bureau goods and services 
by embedding varying forms of "credentialism" into the local security network, 
or, more plainly put, by refusing to allow community residents to operate the 
community program without the continued and close monitoring of professional, 
full-time salaried staff from the Tribunal and the NGO. The evidence reviewed in 
this study suggests that in Brazil, the community in "community" governance 
projects has been filling a consumptive role at best, and at worse a decorative role 
that serves its purpose for nice show-case projects that attract funding and make 
the people responsible for them look good. Viva Rio actually states it very plainly 
in a power-point slide l76 in the 2004 Annual Report, bluntly entitled "The non-
profit sector generates jobs and income" -that is, jobs and income for 1399 
outside-community specialists, not local residents. 
Credentialism reflects the prevalence of conservative norms and constitutes 
the ideational backbone of the normative structure regulating the majority oflocal 
security networks in Brazil. Normative structures are self-reinforcing, and, in 
sorne ways, follow the expansionary and self-fulfilling principles set out by 
Parkinson's law. As Sweet (1999: 157, c.r Hurrell: 147) argues, "norms ... 
develop in path-dependent, self-rein forcing ways, one mechanism of which is the 
ubiquity, and naturalness of normative reasoning itself. Normative systems are 
inherently expansionary to the extent to which they enable people to reason from 
one situation to another, by way of analogy." In the same vein, Hurrell also (2001: 
143) wryly notes that norms are easily manipulated as "powerful actors can 
always find a norm to support their consequentially-based choice." 
176Yiva Rio Annual Report (2004): 
http://www.vivario.org.br/relatorio/2004/enlpages/Slide27.htm 
162 
The case-study in Brasilia iIIustrates weil the self-reinforcing dynamics of 
normative structures. ln the course of dally interactions177, 1 c10sely observed the 
community agents from Taguatinga and Ceilandia prior to the Zwelethemba 
training, during the training, and after the workshops had been completed. At first 
the community agents were skeptical oftheir capacity to act on their own in teams 
oftwo, without the close supervision of the professional tribunal staff, as for years 
they were schooled to believe they lacked the capacities to act independently of 
the experts. Moreover, community agents' feelings of inadequacy are reinforced 
by their mandatory attendance to weekly 4 hour courses in law administered by 
legal scholars as part of their "ongoing training." 
The Zwelethemba training workshops, in stark opposition to everything they 
had been taught, presented community agents with hard empirical evidence that 
people from the most underprivileged communities in South Atrica had not only 
been acting without the assistance of experts for years, but that they never had to 
undergo more than 40 hours of training. Moreover, Brazilians learned, community 
agents in South Africa were not only paid for their mediation activities, but were 
further attributed responsibility to administrate a community fund to address the 
social and economic roots of the problems they helped mediate on a daily basis. 
Community agents from Taguatinga and Ceilandia stated that this was 
"revolutionary," and slowly but surely became convinced oftheir "own expertise 
and capacities" as they integrated the fundamental Zwelethemba principle of the 
added-value of local knowledge through daily workshops. Indeed, as Hurrell 
(2001: 148) argues, "actors may be culturally unaware of the range of potential 
options open to them or may be cuIturally inhibited from adopting particular 
paths178." ln opposition to what they had been taught by the judge coordinator, the 
project's professional staff, and the weekly visiting prof essors, the South African 
Zwelethemba experiments demonstrated that one need not have a university 
degree to be an expert of everyday problems and have agency on daily sources of 
177 (as detailed in Fieldwork Appendix 1) 
178 An argument also set forth by Katzenstein (] 996). 
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insecurity. The community agents expressed much enthusiasm in stating their 
desire to try out their new "tools" of conflict mediation in Taguatinga and 
Ceilandia. Unfortunately, they were never provided with the opportunity. 
This is because, simply put, local security networks are prone to hostile 
bureaucratie takeovers, a process that could best be described as the authoritative 
and normative appropriation of agency and resources by the outside-community 
bureaucracy to the detriment of community actors. 
While local residents in Taguatinga and Ceilandia are actually allowed to 
participate (albeit to a limited extent) in the provision of pro gram services, the 
local tribunal prefers lo spend hundreds of thousands of Reais on salaries for 
experts (social workers, psychologists, lawyers and judges) to monitor (or 
"assist") community agents in each of their activities than providing them with 
real decision-making power and agency. In this case, the hostile Bureaucratie 
takeover occurred at the onset as various forms of credentialism were embedded 
in the original project design. Unfortunately for the community agents, a second 
hostile takeover occurred to safeguard the interests of the Tribunal once the 
transfer of Zwelethemba technology had been completed and the funding came 
through, as the judge responsible for the project unilaterally decided to eut off the 
partners and re-appropriated the monopoly of the decision-making process against 
the stipulations of the international partnership agreement that had been signed 
between the Federal District and Territories Tribunal of Justice, the Secretariat of 
Judiciary Reform (which is supposed to represent the executive power's new 
system of checks and balances on the judiciary power), UNDP, and the 
IdeasWork organization. 
One of the important lessons learned from the Brasilia case-study is that 
judges embody the supreme and all-powerful authority of the judiciary power. 
Indeed, no one was able to intervene to force the judge to respect the power-
sharing agreement and to "implement" the selected Zwelethemba tools and 
164 
procedures that would empower community agents with greater agency to act on 
the sources ofinsecurity in their own communities. 
The Zwelethemba fusion-mode) never became operational in Brasilia' and 
the community agents were instructed to continue to act as they always had, with 
the perpetuai and close monitoring of the tribunal's team of éxperts. The 
community agents were further instructed to continue to refuse to handle cases of 
potentially criminal nature, as the judge coordinator believes that "given the 
resistance from the conservatives within her Tribunal, criminal conflicts should 
remain the 'property' of the judiciary power. 179" This is highly problematic from 
a community perspective, for citizens who come forth with a problem to a 
community justice agent do not classifY the problem in terms of pre-established 
legal categories. A problem Îs a probJem- citizens rarely stop to think about 
wh ether the problem is of civil, family, labor, or criminal nature and thus whether 
or not it will be eligibJe for assistance from the community justice program. As a 
result, many cases are turned down, for fear of challenging the judiciary power's 
monopoly on justice despite the judiciary's support, albeit limited, of community 
justice. 
The judge's refusaI to deJegate more agency to community agents cost the 
taxpayers and UNDP thousands of wasted Reais for the technology transfer and 
other implementation costs, which were not actually incurred since the fusion did 
not go through, but for which the project nonetheless received funding. The 
official excuse presented by the judge for refusing to follow and implement the 
stipulations of the international partnership agreement was that "the use of 
Zwelethemba technology would involve sorne intellectual property issues that 
may not be overcome in Brazil and in particular with her Tribunal." 
179 Cited from personnal communications with the judge coordinator as part of routine 
project management activities prior to the (failed) fusion experiment in Brasilia. 
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Considering the first Zwelethemba pilot project in Jardim Angela involved 
an international partnership agreement with both local and international actors and 
similar intellectual property rights issues, one need not be an expert of Brazilian 
law to suspect fouI play. Indeed, the President of the Tribunal's School of Judges 
confirmed that neither of the claims were true, and that neither would uphold in 
the court of law. But none of the local and international partners, not ev en the 
community agents of the community project, were able to make the judge respect 
the formaI and informaI terms of agreement 1 80, and the Zwelethemba model was 
never implemented although much local and international funding was invested in 
the initiative and thus went to waste, instead of benefiting the targeted community 
public. 
One year after the failed experiment in Brasilia, 1 met with two community 
agents from Ceilandia (Dona Neide) and Taguatinga (Dona Dora), who had made 
"the long trip downtown to the pilot plan" from their distant satellite cities to see 
me as they had been informed that 1 would be present at an event there. The 
community agents had come to ask me "what had happened with the 
Zwelethemba model, and why were we (the UNDP representative and myselt) no 
longer part of their project? Why were they not allowed to work with the "tools" 
we had provided them with, and could 1 please do something to help so that they 
could?". They stated they had discussed the issue with many other agents, who 
were equally frustrated at the outcome, and no one could understand what had 
happened. They further explained that they had protested repeatedly to the project 
management but without result, so they were getting organized to leave the 
Community Justice project to form their own Zwelethemba community program, 
independently of the Tribunal, so they could be allowed to work more 
independently "now that they had been convinced oftheir own capacities." 
180 While this poses a fascinating legal puzzle, it is unfortunately weil beyond the sc ope 
ofthis study. 
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In the course of a "secret" interview with Dona Dora a few months later -
community agents are now required to ask permission to the judge coordinator to 
give interviews, which must be supervised by the judge herself- Dona Dora 
again expressed her anger and disappointment with the unsuccessful outcome of 
the Zwelethemba experiment, and frustration with the general lack of autonomy 
of agents, especially given the new stringent rules imposed on them since the 
Tribunal's hostile Bureaucratie takeover in early 2006: 
"It is ridiculous that we now have to ask permission from the 
coordination to give interviews. We don't have autonomy to do 
anything. We always have to ask permission for everything, as if we 
were employees, but 1 am not paid! My friend left the project for this 
reason -1 am from the community, not an employee of the Tribunal! 
If you miss one class [weekly training in law], they ask why and want 
to know where you were. If you give opinions they don't like they 
make faces. When the UNDP person came to do interviews with al! the 
agents, the judge insisted on being there, no one had courage to speak, 
of course we are afraid. 1 never speak anymore, 1 am afraid. They need 
to meet with the agents one-on-one. You don't give your truthful 
opinion in front of her [the judge] because she will get mad. We are 
simple people from the community. Imagine us in front of the judge! 
She is a 'monopoIizer' [monopolizadora] , and everyone is afraid of 
her. The judge makes us feel insecure. We respect her but we are not 
close. If they listened more to the agents, we could give them our 
opinion because we know the project and the community, but our 
opinion is not worth anything to them. So they do things to "improve" 
the project but in the end it does not improve anything because they 
don't know the community. [ ... ] One day there will be a complete 
turn-around! 1 dream, 1 know one day 1 will be able to do more for my 
community. With Zwelethemba we couId heIp the community, but it 
does not work because we are not allowed to use it- the Tribunal has 
no interest in social justice and peace-building, but we do! Ifwe could 
work like that with the community, the project would be much more 
popular, but no, we are limited to peace-making.,,181 
181 Translation by the author. 
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One may speculate that this judge, who personifies the supreme authority of 
the Judiciary Power, could not let the Zwelethemba fusion initiative follow 
through as it threatened to take power away from her Tribunal, its profession al 
salaried staff, and herself, and to transfer it directly into the "insufticiently tooled" 
hands of local residents, and indirectly to other local and international partners 182. 
Given the evidence examined, and the fact that after breaking the 
international partnership agreement, the judge coordinator was personally 
awarded the very prestigious Premio Innovare for the Community Justice project 
(a national prize awarded, most ironically, by the Secretariat of Judiciary Reform 
and the Getulio Vargas Foundation in Rio de Janeiro to the best innovative 
judiciary project), one may doubt that in Brazil community interests will ever 
prevail over the bureaucracy's in community programs. Much to Dona Dora and 
her fellow community agents' frustration, the prize money (50 000$ Reais, 
roughly 22 000$ US dollars) was, again, "invested in the project, not in the 
agents." 
The case-study of the failed Zwelethemba intervention in Brasilia illustrates 
weil how and how much ideas about who can have agency on justice matter for 
182 In the course of our interview, Dona Dora stated that when she had asked, privately, 
the project secretary why they were not allowed to apply the knowledge they had 
received from the South African experts and work with the Zwelethemba model, the 
secretary responded that: "The judge did not want other people mixing in her project, that 
it was her business and hers only. She wants to join the four [mediation] models [from 
previous trainings] to have her own model exclusive to her project." According to Dona 
Dora, this is because the judge is "arrogant and self·important, and it has gotten worse 
with ail the publicity the project benefitted from with the international partnership 
agreement l for the Zwelethemba fusion project]." It would be too cynical to conclude, 
like the project secretary and the community agent, that the judge refused to implement 
the international partnership agreement because of personal greed for power and career-
ambitions, although "working with the community" may certainly be expected to tùrther 
career advancement under Lula's left-oriented government. 
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community govemance programs. White moderate conservatives explicitly 
denounce the state's exclusive monopoly of justice, their convictions are 
grounded in the implicit assumption that poor people don 't have the capacities to 
deal with the security and justice issues affecting their own lives. As this study 
demonstrates, this ideational inclination translates concretely into a programmatic 
bias in the form of credentialism, resulting in costly institutional configurations 
that undermine both citizen and community agency in local security networks. 
This programmatic bias, which can be found in the institutional 
configurations reguJating the vast majority of local security networks in Brazil, 
results from the predominance of conservative norms and ideas about who should 
have agency on justice within the network. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, most 
community programs enable only a limited form of citizen agency, and more 
often than not, do not engage the participation of local community members in 
community govemance beyond the individual consumption of program services 
that remain monopolized by outside-community experts. 
lt should be noted that the problem of community governance "from above" 
is not only related to the monopolistic tendencies of judiciary institutions, as the 
experience with the local academic partners in Sao Paulo and the faiJed 
Zwelethemba experiment in Jardim Angela suggest. ln that case, the main local 
partners were liberal in theory but conservative in practice to the extent that they 
safeguarded the prevalence of their own bureaucratie interests to the detriment of 
those of the community. Once the Zwelethemba technology transfer had been 
completed through a series of international training workshops, and the funding 
was pledged, the local research center behaved like the tribunal of justice in 
Brasilia, monopolizing the multi-stakeholder project and cutting off the other 
partners. 
11 is, unfortunately, not c1ear at this time if the Zwelethemba project in 
Jardim Angela is still operational or to what extent. If it is, it is done 
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independently of international academic partners, and likely unlawfully 
considering intellectual property issues. In 2004, when the pilot had been 
operating for almost two years unknowingly to the IdeasWork organization, the 
project was not working weil as there was no demand l83 . The general lack of 
demand could be related to the fact that the technology transfer was not entirely 
completed -specifically, the technology on community mobilization and 
dissemination- due to the lack of transparency of local academic partners and 
the subsequent information void between international partners. The lack of 
demand for community program services could also be attributable to the fact that 
the project lacked institutional linkages to the formai system of justice, which in 
Brazil appears important to establish legitimacy. In the course of a recent 
interview (March 2007) with the junior researcher at the time responsible for 
project management (as the senior researcher in charge refused to step foot in the 
favela), we debated the possibility that the lack of demand for mediation services 
could also be the result of our fai1ing to think of obtaining permission from the 
local traffickers to operate on "their turf." Had we attempted to and succeeded in 
obtaining their "approval," word would have gotten around and residents would 
not have had to fear reprisais for their recourse to the community project. The 
relevant point here is that the problem would have been more likely to be solved 
had there not been a complete information void between the academic partners, as 
the Brazilians could have leamed from their South African, Canadian, and 
Argentine colleagues how similar problems were overcome in other Zwelethemba 
pilot experiments. 
As a result of the prevalence of the bureaucracy' s interests over the 
community's in this case, the residents of the Jardim Angela favela were deprived 
of a concrete opportunity to become effective, organized agents capable of 
183 Local partners were so kean to get locals to participate (and generate data) that they 
encouraged community agents to practice their mediation skil1s on conflicts within their 
own extended families, and actually had research assistants map out the genealogical 
trees of the community agents so that it could help them identify potential family 
conflicts more easily. 
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helping themselves and their fellow community members to address daily and 
root causes of insecurity in their community, which, according to the chief of the 
Military Police of Sao Paulo, used to be considered the most dangerous sIum not 
only of Brazil but of Latin America. At the same time that the residents of Jardim 
Angela were disempowered by the (local academic) bureaucracy, the bureaucracy 
directly benefited from its paper involvement with the Zwelethemba model and 
the community in Jardim Angela as it added significant prestige and weight to the 
research institution's reputation for intervention projects, lending greater 
credibility to their effectiveness and thus increasing the likelihood to attract more 
funding l84 . 
The lesson to be learned from the failed Zwelethemba experiment in Jardim 
Angela is that the bureaucracy, even when constituted of supposedly liberal 
academics, can and has worked to undermine citizen agency in very tangible 
ways. 
When conservative norms prevail and the bureaucracy WlnS, as in the 
unfortunate cases of Brasilia, Viva Rio, and Jardim Angela, the people lose. And 
they lose big. To begin, millions of Reais are infused by government agencies, 
international donors, and the private sector in their names and in the name oftheir 
"underprivileged communities" that actually go right into the Bureaucracy (as 
opposed to the community) and into the hands not of local residents but of 
outside-community staff members. Second, and more importantly, when the 
bureaucracy wins, communities are disempowered as legitimate agents to act on 
the sources of insecurity affecting their own existence, adding insult to the injury 
of having funding funneled in their names and for their communities to mostly 
outside-community benefactors. 
184 For example, in a grant application for the Pan-American Health Organization, the 
local academic research center shamelessly features the (fake and dysfunctional) 
Zwelethemba project as one ofits star show-case projects of demonstrated success in the 
area of violence prevention. 
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It is important to note a recurring pattern. Consistently, community 
governance programs in Brazil have been undermined by the monopolistic 
tendencies of outside-community partners- of "the bureaucracy"- whether in 
the form of a tribunal, a research center, or an NGO. In Jardim Angela the 
community project was undermined by the monopolistic tendencies of the 
academic bureaucracy; in Brasilia by the tribunal's bureaucracy; and in Rio de 
Janeiro by the NGO's bureaucracy. As the case-studies discussed in this chapter 
illustrate, conservative norms embedded in big bureaucracies constitute an 
important obstacle to citizen agency and community governance in BraziJ. The 
evidence reviewed indicates that the Sao Caetano do Sul Restorative and 
Community Justice project represents one of the few documented cases185 in 
Brazil of a local security network that works to primarily promote the 
community's interests. 
Having investigated both the institutional and ideational foundations of local 
security networks in Brazil and having compared results with South Africa, one 
may concJude that to tell the "Iawful si de of the story" of citizen-based security in 
Brazil is to tell the tale of the people's struggles with the bureaucracies that 
support them for agency on justice. Ideas about who can have agency on justice 
and how matter for local security networks as they ultimately determine the extent 
of citizen agency within the network. Outside-community partners in Brazil have 
persistently monopolized community programs and undermined both citizen and 
community agency on the sources of insecurity affecting daily life in the 
communities they seek to "help" (not empower) them. 
ln the next chapter, 1 concJude with sorne thoughts on the role of the state in 
local security networks, and discuss the implications of research findings for 
policy studies in the area ofhuman security. 
185 See, for example, the published piece by the project cordinator in Sao Caetano do Sul: 
"Comunidade e justiça em parcena para a promoçao de respeito e civilidade nas relaç6es 
familiares e de vizinhança: um experimento de justiça restaurativa e comunitaria. Bairro 
Nova Gert)', Sao Caetano do Sul/SP" (Rezende Melo, 2006). 
Conclusion 
'This study of citizen-based security in Brazil has demonstrated that how the story 
is told matters, and that the nature of citizen participation and ideas about who 
should have agency on justice matter equally for research that seeks to explain 
and understand citizen-based security in a context offailing public security. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, it is both theoretically and empirically wrong 
to take for granted that the poor are naturally more prone to violence and will 
have recourse to unlawful means of contlict-resolution, especially when presented 
with the alternative option of community justice. It is also an untenable position 
from a normative perspective, for to believe the poor to be innately more violent 
is to assume an elitist and prejudiced worldview. 
But micro-governance programs are no panacea either. The evidence 
reviewed for local security networks in Brazil indicates that the people in poor 
communities have been persistently and consistently undermined by the 
bureaucracies of outside-community actors who seek to "help" -as opposed to 
empower- them. As a resuJt, millions are invested and donated annually by local 
and international partners in their names and for their communities, but not much 
if any of the funding actually ever reaches local residents nor their communities. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that the bulk of funding goes to finance the activities and 
the bureaucratic infrastructure of outside-community benefactors, who 
monopolize the management and provision of community pro gram services, much 
to the detriment of alleged local "benefactors." In the majority of cases examined 
for Brazil, community governance programs enabled citizens to exert only a 
limited, consumptive form of agency on the sources of insecurity that affect daily 
life in their community. 
In the cases of Viva Rio and the Brasilia Community Justice 'Project, where 
citizens were able to participate to a limited extent in the provision of community 
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pro gram services, the project management remained highly monopolized by the 
bureaucracy, and community agents did not rely on their own knowledge and 
capacities whey they participated actively in mediation activities. Both projects, 
however, still do "help" local citizens to access justice and address local sources 
of insecurity with the assistance of outside-community experts. The problem with 
such micro-governance programs is that they are very costly to implement and to 
operate, yet they do not directly benefit local actors so much as outside-
community actors, and do not work to empower citizens and communities as 
much agency on insecurity as much as the y could and should. 
As the untimely and unfortunate bankruptcy of Viva Rio and the failed pilot 
experiment in Brasilia suggest, in decentralized governance arrangements, 
important power struggles may arise between community actors and the 
bureaucracies that seek to help them. The majority of micro-governance programs 
in BraziJ indicate that bureaucracies work in numerous and very concrete ways to 
undermine both citizen and community agency in areas where security is most 
needed. 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that bureaucracies in local security networks are 
essentially made up of individuals with opposing ideas about who can have 
agency on justice and how. This largely explains the diversified results of "state 
support" from local justice tribunals for community projects, as illustrated by the 
case-studies in Brasilia and Silo Caetano do Sul, both coordinated by judges. As 
the case of Brasilia indicates, conservatives, for ail their well-meaning actions and 
convictions, work against community interests. 1ndeed, this study shows, the road 
to hell is paved with good intentions. 
The evidence examined in this research points to the relevance of norms and 
ideas for understanding power-sharing arrangements in local security networks, 
and especially of the paradoxical role orthe state within these arrangements. "Too 
much" or "too little" state involvement in local security networks appears to be a 
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central factor to explain their relative success in empowering local residents and 
communities as a means of security. 
The case-study in Brasi"lia illustrates weil how much "state support" can 
work against community interests in local security networks. As a result of the 
predominance of conservative norms about who can have agency on justice and 
how, the community program in Brasilia remains monopolized by the judiciary 
power and citizens may only exert a limited, mostly consumptive form of agency 
on the sources of insecurity that affect their daily existence and life in their 
communities. Clearly, the case of ~he Brasilia Community Justice Project 
constitutes a case of a local security network too closely tied to the judiciary 
(state) node, resulting in the preval en ce of the bureaucracy's interests over the 
community's. 
Conversely, in the case of Jardim Angela, the local security network, while 
modeled on the original Zwelethemba projects as they operate in South Africa, 
failed to establish formai linkages with local police (and judiciary) agencies to 
enable case-forwarding to the community project, and failed to stimulate any 
community demand for community program services. 
The case of Sào Caetano do Sul, like the original Zwelethemba pilot 
experiments, suggest that it takes a certain time for the community project to 
become known and established within the community. At the present, the bulk of 
cases handled by community agents are received directly from the tribunal of the 
judge coordinating the project. The longer the community project is in operation 
and the more cases it handles, the more it becomes known within the community 
and the greater the legitimacy of the project, and thus the greater the community 
demand for program services. The Zwelethemba experiments in South Africa 
consistently indicate that "word to mouth" is the key for dissemination and 
publicity of program services within the community, and eventually to other 
neighboring and more distant areas. 
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As both the cases of Jardim Angela and Sao Caetano do Sul indicate, the 
institutionalization (not necessarily legal formalization) of a collaborative 
synergetic relationship that enables the forwarding of cases between state 
agencies (e.g. state "nodes") and the community pro gram largely influences local 
demand for program services and is crucial to establish the project's legitimacy 
within the community. 
lt is true that given the high levels of institutional mistrust in the police and 
the demonstrated failures of public security, citizens might be suspicious of 
projects affiliated to local police agencies. lt is important to remember, however, 
that building trust in the police, developing better community-police relations, and 
getting the police to be more efficient at crime control in underprivileged 
communities while respecting Human Rights are developmental objectives per se 
in many community govemance programs in Brazil 186, including Jardim Angela, 
Viva Rio, Sao Caetano do Sul, and the Brasilia fusion pro.iect (which was never 
operationalized). Given the demonstrated success of the Zwelethemba 
experiments in South Africa and Sao Caetano do Sul, local security networks 
appear to be a good place to start concretizing these human security objectives. 
That is, it is the role of outside-community partners (in particular other state 
agencies) to overcome their own wariness of local police agencies and to establish 
institutional mechanisms to enable case-forwarding between the police and the 
community program, as a first step and demonstration of good will, that 'can and 
hopefully will show the graduaI way to greater and more harmonious police-
community collaboration in the targeted areas where the failures ofpublic security 
are most severe. 
Moreover, survey results for the two underprivileged communities studied in 
Brasilia indicate that while the majority of residents do not trust the police, they 
still do have recourse to police agents wh en they have to. Establishing case-
186 See, for example, Outra Freire (2006). 
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forwarding mechanisms to enable sorne cases to be dealt with within the 
community program as opposed to within a law en forcement agency not only 
liberates the police of cases they are not so weil trained to handle (such as 
domestic violence), but further benefits local residents by p·roviding them with a 
con crete, lawful and effective alternative to police inaction, as the unfortunate 
story of the lady sent home with her broken bones to get a Reike treatment, clean 
her home, and make food for her abusive husband iIIustrates. l do not know how 
the story of this woman ended, although one may reasonably expect the worse. As 
the Deputy Chief of Police of the Western Cape (South Africa) bluntly put it, the 
police often take the case of domestic violence seriously only when it is turned 
into a murder investigation. By forwarding such cases to the community program 
instead of turning them down, police agents not only provide a service to 
community residents, they contribute to building their reputation within the 
community. At the same time, police agents who are trained to send cases to the 
community program are also more likely to take cases that are forwarded to them 
from the program seriously at the outset, as it is clear that if the case was 
referenced to the police station from the community program, it is likely to 
warrant immediate police intervention. 
Ideally, as the case of Sao Caetano do Sul demonstrates, to become fully 
synergetic (micro)models of state-society collaboration that effectively enable 
community members to regulate the bulk of social conflicts outside the formaI 
state justice system, local security networks in Brazil should also establish 
institutionallinkages with tribunals. This, however, must be effectuated with great 
caution as to not enable a hostile bureaucratic takeover of the community project. 
The judiciary power in Brazil is a greedy institution indeed, the hard lesson 
learned in Brasilia tcaches. 
While the judiciary power's bureaucracy is pushing hard to retain as much 
of its monopoly over justice, residents of low-income communities appear to be 
closer to the other end of the ideational spectrum. Survey results tor Sao Caetano 
177 
do Sul indicate that local residents believe social conflicts can be regulated 
outside the state justice system (within a lawful framework of action). The 
majority (58%)187 ofrespondents in Nova Gert y do not believe social conflicts, no 
matter their criminal gravit y, must necessarily be resolved through the 'state 
system. White the data is inconclusive to the extent that is based on survey results 
from a sample of only 13 respondents, this finding does indicate that community 
members in Nova Gert y, and thus Iikely in other similar low income communities 
in Brazil, have a tendency for Iiberalism. The minority of respondents l88 who 
believe sorne social conflicts and problems can not be resolved outside the formaI 
state justice system nevertheless unanimously stated that this was only to the 
extent of what they considered to be very grave crimes, su ch as murder, armed 
assault and robbery (including banks), kidnapping, sequestration, and drug 
trafficking. 
These findings suggest that the judiciary power ln Brazil is, as Hoiston 
(2006) eloquently put it, threatened to become an irrelevant institution as it is 
effectively becoming discredited with inefficiency and corruption. Establishing 
institutional linkages that enable case-forwarding between local tribunals of 
justice and community programs of conflict mediation may thus constitute one of 
the few, con crete ways to deveJop a collaborative partnership with local 
communities that will work to improve the judiciary's image and strengthen its 
credibility. 
There is further reason to believe that when local security networks are able 
to establish these synergetic linkages to a local tribunal of justice, the result can be 
expected to contribute not only to building institutional trust in the judiciary, but 
also, interestingly, in the police. Survey results for Sao Caetano suggest that 
181 Based on the frequency of respondents (7/12) who answered "no" to the question: "Do 
you believe that sorne problems/contlicts should never be resolved through community 
programs services and a/ways by the formai system ofjusticeT'. 
188 Based on the frequency of respondents (5/12) who answered "yes" to the question: 
"Do you believe that sorne problems/contlicts should never be resolved through 
community programs services and a/ways by the formaI system of justice?". 
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despite mistrust in the Justice of the justice system, local residents expect it to 
work through the community pro gram as a safeguard against potential abuses 
from the police (and community agents). At the same time as they affirmed their 
liberal beliefs against the state's exclusive monopoly of justice, the overwhelming 
majority of survey respondents (92%) also stated that state support for the 
community justice project was "very important" (10/13) or "partI y important" 
(2/13). When asked to justify why, respondents explained that "state support" -
almost unanimously construed as the local tribunal of justice, as opposed to the 
police- was necessary for the community project to protect its citizen-consumers 
and serve as a control mechanism against potential abuses from the police and 
community agents. 
These paradoxical results corroborate research findings on the importance of 
the judiciary node in local security networks in Brazil and on the necessity of 
finding the "right amount" of state involvement in micro-govemance programs. 
The role of the govemment in community justice was also a central question in 
the report from the Law Commission of Canada on participatory justice (2003), 
which concluded that: 
"Giving government a role in the development of these programs 
[could] lead to a dependence on govemment-driven structures and 
resources that will ultimately undermine the ability of communities 
to make good decisions for themselves and their members. But 
without sorne role for govemment in legitimating and promoting 
participatory processes, these initiatives may simply cease to grow 
and flourish. The answer seems to lie in the creation of a partnership 
between state and communities that would combine the vitality and 
local knowledge of community-based InItiatIves with the 
accountability and resources offered by govemment." 
While the failed pilot experiment in Brasilia illustrates how much "too 
much" state involvement can undermine community-based initiatives and result in 
hostile Bureaucratie takeovers, the Sao Caetano Zwelethemba-inspired 
community project illustrates weil how and why "just enough" state involvement 
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is key to effective micro-govemance and citizen-based security in Brazil. Given 
the success of the Silo Caetano project, which is not only coordinated by a judge 
but further receives the bulk of cases to mediate from the judge's court, it would 
be erroneously simplistic to conclude community govemance should not work in 
collaboration with judiciary institutions. To the opposite, according to the 
evidence reviewed in this study, institutional affiliation to the formaI justice 
system appears to be an important factor to establish the legitimacy of community 
agents as such in their communities. 
The question, again, is ail about balance and defining limits for the state's 
and other institutional partners' participation in micro-govemance initiatives to 
ensure the community project is not govemed from the top-down, or «from 
above," which severly hinders the autonomy of community actors. As this study 
demonstrates, the nature of citizen participation in local security networks has 
significant effects for human security. The comparative cases examined in Brazil 
and South Africa indicate that community programs that only enable local 
residents to consume services provided by protèssional outside-community 
experts are not sufficient to empower communities as a means of security, and 
thus fail to meet important human security objectives. The more balanced and 
synergetic the relationship between the community program and its state nodes, 
the more power and labor are distributed efficiently within the local security 
network, according to each node's relative capacities and expertise, and thus, 
following principles of nodal govemance, the more citizens and communities are 
empowered as a means of security. Concretely, this means that in "synergetic" 
micro-govemance model, power and labor are concentrated within the community 
node, as opposed to outside the community within an institutional node. Daily 
decisions are made everyday by local community members, not professionals 
from partner institutions: Community actors operate the community program, and 
are attributed the bulk of funding for their daily program activities. As community 
programs by definition usually aim to empower community members with the 
means to address problems and grievances, the more decision-making power and 
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financial resources are concentrated within the community node, the more the 
micro-govemance program may be considered "efficient." 
lndeed, my research shows, the "pluralization of sium security" does not 
necessarily, as sorne misguided policy-makers and scholars of human security 
beJieve l89, "weaken allegiance to the state" nor is it inherently detrimentaJ for 
society. First, the majority of residents who resort to community-based means of 
justice and security do not appear to have that much "allegiance to the state" to 
begin with, as indicated by low levels of institutional trust in the justice system 
and the police. At best, citizens' Joyalty to the state's courts and police agencies is 
divided and subject to shift according to context-specificity. Second, my research 
shows that the "pluralization of sIum security" in Brazil actually often takes the 
form of govemment-sponsored "community" mediation programs. State 
authorities would unlikely support the regulation of social conflicts outside the 
forma] state system if they thought it would "weaken a11egiance to the state," 
especially in Brazil, where the judiciary power is very reluctant to Jet go of even a 
parceJ of its monopoly on justice. 
Moreover, considering that in many of the case-studies reviewed for BraziJ, 
community projects were reJated to the formaI justice system through 
sophisticated outside-community Bureaucracies and mechanisms of case-
forwarding and follow-up, it could also be argued that citizens who participate in 
community programs are in fact showing their "allegiance to the state" as many 
use the program for legal aid purposes hoping they will get the needed help to 
take their case to appropriate state authorities. 
Contrarily to previsions in the policy framework of analysis presented in 
Chapter 2, where the privatization ("pluralization") of security was expected to 
189 See, for example, documentation produced by the Canadian Human Security 
Consortium, in particular: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
(DFAIT), 2006b. Human securiry and cilies: Opporlunities and challenges (Foreign 
Affairs Canada Human Security Research and Outreach Program). 
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cause social segregation and ultimately community violence, this study 
demonstrated that the pluralization of security in low income areas can and has 
been working to prevent community violence and strengthen social cohesion. 
ln their discussion of the state's role in community governance programs, 
policy-makers in the related area of "participative justice" have been more 
conscientious than their colleagues in human security about the positive outcomes 
of "pluralized sium security," but have also failed to take important factors into 
consideration. The Law Commission of Canada's (2003) recommendations 
regarding the role of the state in community-based, "participatory justice" 
initiatives did not consider potential problems resulting from the lack of a 
coherent and consistent policy vision, as the case of state-sponsored "community" 
mediation programs in Brazil indicates. Strong inner- and inter-agency rival ries 
within government departments at the city, state and federal levels, compounded 
by the common practice of nepotism (which further translates into raving 
incompetence lurking at ail government levels), mean that in Brazil "the state" is 
far from being a unitary actor, and even farther from having ,a single coherent 
policy vision with regards to "participatory," community-based initiatives in the 
area of justice and security. As this study shows, in the absence of a strong and 
consistent policy vision for a specifie issue-area, state support for initiatives in the 
unregulated area yield diversified results. Policy recommendations for 
participative justice, therefore, should take this important factor into account. 
Finally, this study presented evidence that the intellectual production on 
outside-state justice and security regulation in Latin America has obscured the 
more constructive role of civil society actors by systematically and erroneously 
taking for granted that the poor are inherently more violent and typically resort to 
cri minai means to compensate for the failures of public security, at the same time 
as it fails to take into account the lawful and organized means through which 
citizens and communities deal with real and perceived sources of insecurity on a 
daily basis. As a result of the criminalization of poverty at the ideational level, the 
182 
poor are disempowered as legitimate actors by the very intellectuals who, in their 
own way, may seek to "help" their cause by exposing and documenting the 
failures of Latin American democracies to deliver the ever-elusive promise of 
justice and security. 
More significantly perhaps for policy studies, placing the main analytical 
focus on unlawful forms of "sium security" has led to the development of 
frustratingly generic conclusions and recommendations for citizen security. While 
scholars of Latin American studies cali for the "democratization of the rule of 
law," police, and judiciary reform l 9<l, policy-makers argue that Canada should 
promote "urban democratic development" and "community projects that build 
inter-group trust 191., in low-income areas where public security is failing. As this 
study shows, citizen- and community-based solutions to insecurity in Brazil 
constitute a promising solution to failing public security indeed. To he enicient 
and truly community-based, however, initiatives -whether heuristic or 
practical- that seek to explain, understand, and/or promote human security and 
citizenship rights through local action must take into account two important 
factors which are generally neglected: The nature of citizen participation in 
allegedly "community-based" projects, and the ideational premises according to 
which the institutional arrangements that regulate the project were configured. 
This study transcended disciplinary fields and epistemological boundaries to 
provide a more complete and accu rate account of citizen-based security in Brazil. 
While telling (and empirically demonstrating) the lawful side of the story does, al 
the ideational level, empower the poor as legitimate actors capable of addressing 
the sources of insecurity affecting their own lives and communities, !ittle can be 
190 See, for example, Oxhom (2003); Mendez, O'Donnell, and Pinheiro (1999); and 
Holston and Caldeira (1998). 
191 Slide 14, Canadian Consortium on Human Security Human Security and Cities, 
2006. Human Security and Cilies (Power-point presentation, Human Security Policy 
Division - Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada). Available on-
line at: https:/lhumansecurity-cities.orglpage156.htm 
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done to safeguard their interests from patemalistic bureaucracies determined to 
"help" them. 
Long ago Weber wisely concJuded that while individuals were the ultimate 
agents of social change, individuals were guided by values, and thus change was 
constrained by values. IR theorists similarly point to the relevance and the 
importance of norms and values in explaining cooperation 192. The evidence 
reviewed in this study indicates that "cooperation" between Bureaucratie actors 
and community actors to empower citizens and their communities agency through 
local security networks raises fundamental identity issues about the community 
projects and the very notion of "commun ity." As Hurrell (200 t: 149) keenly 
notes, "one aspect has to do with the degree to which successful cooperation may 
depend on sorne prior sense of community. [ ... ] cooperation is possible once the 
parties have come to believe that they form part of a shared project or community 
in which there is a corn mon interest that can be fUl1hered by cooperative 
behavior." In most local security networks Brazil, outside-community actors and 
actual community actors have a direct conflict of interest when the question of 
agency IS at stake. The power structure of local security networks, like ail 
anarchical systems, however miniature, follow the zero-sum dynamics of Real 
Politik, that is, power to the community means less power to the bureaucracy. 
While they may share a common "community" project, the relevance -and 
th us ultimately the survival- of the (outside-community) bureaucracy is 
threatened when community interests prevail. Indeed, "changes in the normative 
structure are closely bound up with power and the distribution of power193." 
Moving away from credentialism and conservative values toward local knowledge 
and more Iiberal values involves the transfer of decision-making power and 
resources directly from institutional actors to communities. This means work and 
money would be taken from the web of bureaucracies and go to the communities 
192 See, for example, the influential research of Finnemore (1996), and of Keck and 
Sikkink (1998). 
193 Hurrell (2001: 146) 
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and community members where community programs operate. The locus of 
power and of the decision-making process would move out of the state realm of 
regulation to civil society. As mentalities usually change only slowly over time (if 
ever), these shifts are unlikely to occur within existing projects, and, given the 
prevalence of conservative norms in 78% of cases in Brazil, are also unlikely to 
occur in the foreseeable future. 1t is reasonable to expect that new initiatives will 
model existing projects (however defunct) such as the Brasilia and Viva Rio 
micro-govemance models,' which have been praised as "best practices" in 
community govemance. 
While in princip le, ail nodes in the local security network share a common 
basic programmatic agenda (e.g. community empowerment, human security, 
access to justice, etc.),' in sorne cases, as seen in Brazil, community and 
institutional actors can have c1ashing interests and become locked in a quiet war 
over agency. If community actors are to be empowered to govem their own ]ocal 
security networks, normative agendas and ideational platforms will have to be 
changed. Changes in the normative structure must first happen outside the 
community, within the web of bureaucracies. 1t is hoped that this study will 
constitute a sm ail but significant step to help move the debate in the right 
direction. 
On a different level, the academic debate would also benefit from an 
analytical shift toward lawful forms of citizen-based security. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, scholars of the misrule of law have unwillingly contributed to the 
criminalization of the poor at the ideational level by erroneously and 
systematically taking for granted the poor are inherently more violent and 
typically resort to unlawful means of problem resolution to compensate for the 
failures of public security. Their account of the story of citizen-based security in 
Brazil and Latin America is incomplete, and dishonest to the extent of omission of 
the other, lawful side of the story. This study hopes to have filled part of the gap 
in the literature, and to have aptly documented the predatory tendencies of 
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bureaucracies so that lessons could be leamed and costly mistakes avoided. There 
is, after ail, on)y so much public and private funding available for micro-
govemance initiatives; it may not be so wise to il1vest it in "community projects" 
that employ and empower mainly outside-community actors. 
Fieldwork Appendix 1 
Gaining access to the local security networks examined in this study and the 
Bureaucracies that supported them was most effectively accomplished through 
academic networking. To obtain direct access to the communities where there 
were micro-govemance projects without actually becoming a resident myself, J 
worked through local "outside-community" partners who were already engaged in 
collaborative initiatives within these communities. My fieldwork in Brazil began 
i~ May 2004 with a two month research internship at the Center for the Study of 
Violence (NEV Nuc1eo de Estudos da Violencia) at the University of Sao Paulo, 
where 1 was instructed to assist in the implementation of a "Zwelethemba" 
community pilot project for which my research supervisor in Canada was co-
responsibJe. 
The two-month fieldwork at the Center for the Study of Violence in Sao 
Paulo was conceived, initially, to enable my participation in the implementation 
of the first Zwelethemba pilot project in BraziL 1 quickly discovered, however, 
that there was not much to "implemellt" as the pilot had been operating for almost 
two years, without the knowledge of the academic partners in Canada and South 
Africa. 
The field research, concretely, thus consisted in accompanying a team of 
two NEV researchers every week during eight weeks to the shanty-town where 
the project was running -Jardim Angela- to meet with community agents and 
residents to try to figure out why the project was not working, and to come up 
with creative solutions to stimulate demand. 
At the end of the two month research period, J was able to establish a 
relationship of mutual trust with both the community agents and my two NEV 
colleagues, which provided invaluable insights for this study, as illustrated in 
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Chapter 4 in the discussion on the problematic role of outside-community 
partners, which can result in hostile Bureaucratic takeovers of community 
initiatives. 
Specifically, 1 spent approximately 50 hours (distributed over 8 days 
over 2 months in May-June 2004) in the favela of Jardim Angela in Sao Paulo, 
where 1 interacted with 4 local community agents, their friends and families, as 
weil as with other relevant community actors, as part of weekly visits to the 
community justice project with the local academic partners. 
ln August 2004, 1 was invited to carry my research within the 
institutional fnimework of the Secretariat of Judiciary Reform at the Ministry of 
Justice in Brasilia, where 1 conducted my own research investigating "the 
Bureaucracy" from within between August 2004 and July 2006. It should be 
emphasized, however, that my research objectives were declared formally at the 
outset, and that this investigation was carried out openly to the full knowledge of 
my colleagues and with their explicit consent. 
Working with the Secretariat of Judiciary Reform provided me with an 
excellent opportunity to study Bureaucratia "from within," and enabled me to 
uncover normative agendas and find out what the people responsible for 
community governance programs in state tribunal s, police agencies, and at the 
Ministry of Justice really thought about community governance, as weil as to 
experience firsthand "hostile Bureaucratic takeovers." 
Over the two years 1 spent as an associate of the Ministry of Justice, 1 
provided assistance for "alternative justice" and "citizen-based security" 
initiatives. It should be emphasized here lhat 1 was "remunerated" for my work 
strictly in terms of research opportunities. My work at the Ministry of Justice not 
only entailed access 10 aIl ils data and key actors, it further enabled me access 10 
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substantial financial and human resources to collect new data for my own research 
purposes (e.g. pi lot projects). 
Beyond my participation in the design "and implementation of the two 
pilot projects, my involvement with these initiatives enabled daily interactions 
with local and international partners (project coordinators and professional project 
staff, community agents, community residents, and institutional partners at the 
Ministry of Justice, the UNDP, local tribunals and police agencies) through 
routine project management activities. Other pro gram activities included: 
Organizing and following-up on meetings and discussions between the multiple 
stakeholders (e.g. SRJ, UNDP-Brazil, the National Secretariat of Public Security 
(SENASP), local tribunals and police agencies (Military Police, Civil Police, 
Municipal Civil Guard) in Brasilia and Silo Paul); Articulating and facilitating the 
formalization of legally-binding international partnership agreements between the 
stake-holders; Drafting grant proposaIs and preparing budget previsions for the 
two pilots; coordinating local and international dissemination strategies and 
events; And active participation in the design and realization of training 
workshops for community agents, judiciary staff members, police officers and 
senior security officiaIs, govemment staff, and representatives of international 
organ izations. 
My activities at the Ministry of Justice further presented an excellent 
occasion to experience firsthand the daily challenges in Lula's new Secretariat of 
Judiciary Reform, which in August 2004 had barely a few months of existence. 
Since 1 was in the country to study problems associated to the failure ofthe justice 
system and public security, this was a golden opportunity to see how one goes 
about the daunting task of "reforming Justice" concretely on a day-to-day basis. 
lndeed, one may wonder, how does the work produced behind a comfortable desk 
in Brasilia tum into improved access to justice and security for the poor in the 
country's countless sIums? 
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The more familiar 1 became familiar with the staff at the Ministry of Justice 
and the more 1 participated in meetings with other state agencies and UNDP 
officiaIs (who provide funding for SRJ and SENASP activities), the more it 
became obvious that those responsible for improving access to justice and security 
for the poor had rarely if ever actually stepped foot in a poor community nor ever 
taken the time to consult with residents of the se communities. With the pilot 
experiment in Brasilia, it also became apparent that the mentalities of institutional 
actors could create invisible but very real obstacles for community govemance 
projects. 
More specifically, in total, as part of research activities in Brasilia, 1 
spent approximately 100 hours with the 40 community justice agents from the 
satellite-cities of Taguatinga and Ceilandia. These interactions were distributed 
unevenly over 3 months from June to August 2005, and then intensively for 8 
hours per day during 2 weeks in October 2005 as part of Zwelethemba training 
workshops in which 1 participated. ln between these periods, 1 interacted regularly 
with the community agents to discuss the community project and my own 
research objectives, the opinion survey, their experiences, their expectations, and 
motivations as community agents. 1 also observed the agents in the course oftheir 
ongoing weekly training sessions (4hrs every Friday) in legal theory during the 
summer of 2005. Moreover, 1 interviewed one community agent during 3 hours in 
March 2007. Manual notes taken in the course of daily interacions with 
community agents and the coordination team in Brasilia were translated and 
typed into an electronic document on a regular basis. During the 3hr meeting with 
the community agent from Taguatinga, 1 was permitted to take detailed notes, 
which were translated and transferred to an electronic document immediately 
following the interview. 
As part of research activities for the second pilot project in in Sào Caetano, 1 
spent approximately 60 hours (distributed over 2 months in May-June 2006) with 
the 20 local community justice agents in the community justice project in Nova 
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Gert y, with who 1 interacted daily as part of training workshops and project 
implementation activities and discussions (about their expectations and 
motivations). For this project, most note-taking, as weil as the translation and 
conversion of notes into an electronic document were made by the research 
assistant, who further compiled daily observations and interview results in a 
summary report. 
1 also spent approximately 10 hours in the favelas of Leme and Rocinha 
(July 2006) where 1 was able to meet with 2 local community agents through the 
Viva Rio NGO (in Leme), and to interview 2 community residents in Rocinha as 
part of a visit to the community. Note-taking was difficuIt in research irips to 
favelas in Rio and Jardim Angela in Sào Paulo; interviews were often informai 
and only sumary notes could be taken in the course of verbal communications, 
which were subsequently completed, translated and transferred to an electronic 
document. 
ln June and July 2006, 1 had the opportunity to interact c10sely with police 
officers from the Military Police, the Civil Police, and especially the Municipal 
Civil Guard at ail levels of the command structure on a daily basis during two 
consecutive weeks as part of training and dissemination activities 1 carried out 
jointly with the Deputy Chief Commissioner of the Western Cape, who 
represented the pol ice component of the Zwelethemba projects in South Africa. ] 
further conducted a number of informaI interviews as part of routine project 
management activities with a Commander of the Municipal Civil Guard, as weil 
as with a patrol officer and a Deputy Colonel from the Military Police in Sào 
Paulo and Brasilia. Two police officers from Brasilia and Sào Caetano were re-
contacted via electronic means to develop on the views that had been expressed 
publicly in the course of a conference event a few months earlier. 
Fieldwork Appendix 2 
Extracts from the formai document which served as the basis for the signing of an 
international, legally-binding collaborative agreement between the Federal 
District and Territories Tribunal of Justice, the Secretariat of Judiciary Reform, 
UNDP-Brazil, and ldeasWork for the pilot ex periment in Brasilia (October 
2005). 
Strategy - The fusion (Phase 1) 
The fusion of the Zwelethemba model of dispute resolution and community 
development to the community justice project in Brasilia will help overcome the 
problems of 1 )Iack of community development; 2)lack of investments in the 
communities; 3)lack of a clearly defined and functional model of conflict 
resolution; 4)widening the scope of action (including criminal matters); and 
5)self-sustainability[summarize them here] noted above by restructuring tThe 
CUITent Brasilia community justice project will be restructured to include the 
Zwelethemba mode!'s values and procedures m k· 194 peacema mg 
194 Specifically, there are 19 steps in the Peacemaking process (ldeasWork, 2005): 
and 
1) Members of the Peace Committee meet separately with the people involved in order to 
find out what happened or what the problem seems to be; 
2) Members encourage them to come together in a Peace Gathering, and discuss with 
them who e/se could be invited who might help to find a peaceful and practical solution; 
3) Peace Committee members (at least Iwo, and no more than six) meet with ail these 
people together in a Peace Gathering; 
4) One member of the Peace Committee facilitates the Gathering (Facilitator), and 
another fills out the reportformfor the Gathering (Reporter); 
5) The Facilitator opens the Peace Gathering by explaining why the people are gathered 
together; 
6) The Facilitator reads out The Code ofGood Practice; 
7) Each of the people directly involved in the dispute is then invited to say what 
happened, while the others wait outside. The Reporter notes what each person says; 
8) The Disputants are then ail invited back into the Gathering; 
9) The Reporter reads out their statements in the presence of everyone; 
10) The disputants may then briefly add to or modifY what they said. The purpose is not 
to find out what actually happened but to find out how the participants see what 
happened; 
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peacebuilding. The Zwelethemba model will with the principal differencebe 
modified so that that community agents will remain linked to the judiciary judicial 
power system through credentialing and provided the provision of with 
elementary judicial training. This will contribute to reinforce the legitimacy of 
community agents and allow justice to occur within the community but not 
completely outside the greater judicial apparatus. [Say why this difference is 
importantJneeded.]. Moreover, the community justice project will establish a 
community fund (controlled by UN DP), and provide community agents with 
basic business knowledge to administer and ensure the financial sustainability of 
the community fund. 
The community justice project currently operating (since 2000) in two 
underprivileged communities of Brasilia has successfully managed to 1 )mobilize 
local resources for conflict resolution; 2)develop networks between state agencies 
and civil society; 3)transfer knowledge and raise rights-awareness for community 
agents and the communities in which they operate through the School of Justice 
and Citizenship (providing free judiciary training by legal experts) and the rights-
oriented material they publish and freely distribute; 4)develop physical 
infrastructures (community centers) that work as operational bases and 5)provide 
both community agents and their communities with a multidisciplinary te am of 
experts (project administration, legal orientation, psychological and social 
Il) Ali the people at the Gathering are then given the opportunity to say how the y jèel 
about what happened and, if they were afJected, what it meant for their lives; 
12) The Facilitator makes sure that everyone has the opportunity to speakfreely; 
13) The Facilitator then encourages the people at the Gathering to identifY the root 
causes of the dispute; 
14) The Facilitator makes then makes sure that the people present come up a Plan of 
Action to create a better tomorrow; 
15) The People at the Gathering then decide upon a Plan of Action; 
16) This Plan is written down by the Reporter. The Plan must make clear what 
everybody's role will be in making it work; 
17) Everyone then signs the Plan of Action; 
18) The Galhering then appoints 2 persons to monitor the Plan of Action; 
19) The Gathering is c/osed in a way that will show that people who participated 
appreciate and respect what has taken place at the Gathering (e.g., a prayer or a song). 
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assistance, and a theater production specialist to raise awareness and promote the 
project within the communities). The community justice project, however, still 
lacks I)a strong community development element (agents act as individuals, not 
as a team); 2)investments in the communities; 3)a c1early defined and functional 
model of conflict resolution; 4)a wider scope of action (including criminal 
matters); and 5)self-sustainability given that the modest funding pledged by the 
Secretariat ofHuman Rights remains locked in the bureaucracy. This needs to be 
integrated into the discussion of the Brazilian model above. Otherwise, it is not 
only harder harder for the reader to follow, but it isn't c1ear why you are jumping 
to the SA mode!. These obstacles can be overcome through the development of 
the Zwelethemba model within the context of the community justice project 
currently operating in Brasilia, adapting the two models accordingly. Moreover, 
theThis fusion of the projects models will increase the impact and scope of action 
of the Brasilia community justice project at very ]ow cost, at the same time that 
the resultant hybrid model can be studied to detennine its usefulness in other 
Latin American contexts. The fusion wi1l also entail new partnerships, including 
in the private sector, which will provide new sources and opportunities for 
funding to further ensure the project's longer term self-sustainability. 
During the pre-project period (September to December 2005) the funding 
that is not yet secured by lead partners will be sought from private sector and 
philanthropic organizations. The first step to enable the fusion of the models will 
be to train local community agents and project administrators in the values and 
procedures of the Zwelethemba model. 
This will reqUlre an international mISSIOn consisting of one experienced 
trainer from South Africa and one collaborator/evaluator from Canada to Brasilia 
for a period oftwo weeks (October 2005). The training funding for training will 
be provided by the Secretariat of Judiciary Refonn of the Brazilian Ministry of 
Justice and the Federal District Tribunal of Justice. The second step will be to 
reorganize the structure of the community justice project into peace committees in 
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accordance with the principles and values of the Zwelethemba model (October 
2005). This can be done with the help of the onethe experienced trainer from 
South Africa. The third step will be to secure a partnership with a local research 
center specializing in business administration to train project coordinators and 
community agents in applying for funding in private sector and managing funding 
(August 2006). The partnership will be established through the Secretariat of 
Judiciary Judicial Reform. The fourth step will be to organize an institutional visit 
to the Zwelethemba community projects for Brazilian lead partners and the 
international coordinator to exchange experiences with South African 
communities and project coordinators. The funding for this visit will be provided 
by the Secretariat of Judiciary Reform ofthe Brazilian Ministry of Justice, UNDP, 
and the private sector. The fifth step will be to hold a meeting and to organize a 
workshop and an international conference for international and local partners in 
Brasilia after the first two surveys have been carried out (June 2005). The funding 
for these events will be provided by the Secretariat of Judiciary Reform and 
UNDP. 
The fusion project will be ready for operationalization by January 2006. 
From January 2006 to January 2007, small payments will be made to community 
agents and a community fund for every conf]ict they facilitate. The payments 
made to community agents are will be based on the estimated value of personal 
costs incurred to compensate agents for the costs for every case attended (i.e. 
transportation, communication, etc.). The community fund will be used to solve 
and preempt other conflicts, as weil as to support community initiatives through 
micro-enterprise schemes. By January 2007, the project will still be coordinated 
by the Federal District Tribunal of Justice, but should be financially self-
sustainable through funding provided by the private sector. 
The community peace center (Phase 2) 
ln the second phase of the project, once the fusion has been completed and 
effectively operationalized effectively, partnerships will be sought with local 
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police organizations. The operation is based on the assumption that each partner 
has something unique and valuable to offer within a network of flexibly inter-
acting 'nodes', and that this cooperation will provides the community with a 
strikingly more effective service than if they operated separately. The police 
officers carry out regular police work - that is, law enforcement, emergency 
response and detective services. The Peace committees facilitate the resolution of 
disputes, conflicts and problems that do not require police action: Community 
members may take their problems directly to the Peace committee for facilitation. 
Altematively, the police officers participating in the Community Peace Centre 
initiative may offer complainants the option of taking the matter to the Peace 
committee rather than opening a docket or following sorne other bureaucratie 
route. The Peace committee may also refer matters to the police where 
appropriate. The police will notes referrals to the Peace committee in their daily 
log, while Peace committees will complete a detailed report-form for ail 
facilitations they carry out. 
Methodological Appendix 1 
Opinion survey conducted with 1000 respondents in Taguatinga and Ceilandia 
(Brasilia) 
Community Justice, Institutional (Mis)Trust, and Main Causes 
for Daily Concerns 
The infonnation collected in this survey is strictly for academic and research purposes, 
not for any fonn of commercial use or gain. The participation in the survey is completely 
voluntary, and participation in the survey can be halted at any point. The survey is 
anonymous to protect identity and privacy. 
1. Did you know that a community justice project was operating in your 
neighborhood? (if the answer is "no", skip to question #8) 
a) yes b) no 
2. Do you know what community justice agents do and bow tbe program works? 
a)yes b)no 
3. Have you ever used tbe services of the community justice program? (if the answer 
is "yes", skip to question #5) 
a) yes b) no 
4. If you know the project exists, wby haven't you used the services of community 
agents before? 
a) never had a need for it 
b) don't trust community agents 
c) prefer to solve problems through other channels 
d) don't know 
e) other reason: _________________________ _ 
5. Ifyou used tbe services orthe community justice program, were you satisfied with 
the outcome? 
a) very satisfied 
b) somewhat satisfied 
c) somewhat unsatisfied 
d) not satisfied at ail 
6) Ifyou answered "somewhat unsatisfied" or "not satisfied at ail", why? 
a) my problem remained unresolved 
b) agents were not competent and knowledgeable 
c) Other reason: ___ . ______________________ _ 
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7. If you did not have the possibility to have community justice agents help you 
resolve your problem/contlict, who would you go to? 
a) the police 
b) a public defense attorney 
c) a private lawyer 
d) a SmaIl Claims Court Judge 
e) take matters into your own hands 
t) people from the community, specify: (i.e., community leaders, 
youths from the neighborhood, people from your church, etc.) 
g) no action 
h) other: _________________ _ 
8. In general, if you have a problem/conflict, who would you ask to help you resolve 
the situation? 
a) community justice agents 
b) the police 
c) a public defense attorney 
d) a private lawyer 
e) a Smalt Claims Court Judge 
t) take matters into your own hands 
g) people from the community, specify: (i.e., community leaders, 
youths from the neighborhood, people from your church, etc.) 
h) no action 
i) other: ___________________________ _ 
9. Do you trust police officers to protect citizens, provide security, and help you 
when you have a problem? 
a) very much b) somewhat c) not much d) not at aH 
10. Do you think police officers are: 
a) very honest 
b) somewhat honest 
c) somewhat corrupt 
d) very corrupt 
e) don't know 
Il. Are you afraid of police officers? 
a) completely afraid b) fairly afraid c) a Iittle afraid d) not at ail afraid 
12. Do you think that every citizen has equal access to tbe justice system, 
independently ofwealth, race and gender? 
a) yes b) no 
13. Do you think the justice system is: 
a) very transparent 
b) somewhat transparent 
c) somewhat corrupt 
d) very corrupt 
e) don't know 
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14. What are you most worried about? (more than one choice possible) 
a) not having enough money to make ends meet and provide for elementary needs (ie 
food, shelter) 
b) insecurity and crime in your neighborhood 
c) providing good education for yourself and/or your children 
d) rèmain unemployed 
e) your children falling into a "wrong path" (ie drug use, crime) 
f) good health and access to medical services (i.e. access to a doctor ifneeded) 
g) other: ______________________ _ 
15. What do you see as the biggest problem in your community? (more than one 
choice possible. List according to priorities) 
a) insecurity and crime __ _ 
b) drug trafficking and use/ local gangs __ _ 
c) inappropriate housing/ insufficient private space __ _ 
d) lack ofpublic green spaces __ _ 
e) lack of sports centers/entertainment facilities __ _ 
t) urban decay __ _ 
g) police violence __ _ 
h) lack ofpolice presence __ _ 
i) lack of access to the formaI justice system __ _ 
j) lack ofadequate lighting __ _ 
k) lack ofpublic transpolt __ _ 
1) disrespect and destruction ofpublic property __ _ 
m) Lack of basic sanitation (water, sewage) __ _ 
n) Noise coming from bars and clubs __ _ 
0) fights and arguments __ _ 
p) alcoholism __ _ 
q) other: _________________________ . 
166. Which social c1ass do you consider yourself to be part of? 
a) the wealthy 
b) the upper-middle-class 
c) the middle-class 
d) the lower middle-c1ass 
e) the working class 
f) the poor 
177. What is your racelethnicity? 
a) White 
b) Black 
c) Mixed descent ("Pardo") 
d) lndigenous 
e) AsianiOriental 
t) other: ______ . __________________ _ 
188. What is your gender? 
a) male b)female 
1919. What is your age group? 
a)14-19 b)20-29c)30-39d)40-4ge)50-59f)Over 60 
20. What is your level of education? 
a) Never studied 
b) Primary school 
c) High school 
d)Bachelor's degree 
e) Graduate degree 
210. How many people do you live with? 
a) alone b) 1 c) 2-3 d) 4-5 
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e) 6-7 d) 8 or more 
22. What do you see as the biggest problem in your household? (more than one choice 
possible) 
a) the alcoholism of a family member 
b) verbal violence 
c) physical aggression 
d) lack of income to cover expenses 
e) unemployment 
t) Other: ______________ _ 
Methodological Appendix 2 
Supplemental questions added to the opinIOn survey conducted with 13 
respondents in Nova Gerty (Sao Caetano do Sul) 
1. Do you think that formai state support and recognition of the community justice 
program is important? 
a) very important 
b) somewhat important 
c) somewhat unimportant 
d) not important at all 
e) don 't know 
2. Please elaborate on your answer to question 18: Why do you tbink so? 
3. Do you tbink sorne problems/conflicts should never be dealt with tbrough 
comrnunity justice services and a/ways through the appropriate state channels? 
a) yes b) no 
4. Ifyou answered yes to question 22, please elaborate on your answer: Which types 
of problems and conflicts sbould a/ways be dealt with througb tbe appropriate state 
channels and wby? 
Statistical Appendix 1 
Selected survey results 
FreQuency Percent 
1 Cumulative 
Valid Percent Percent 
Valid other 78 7.8 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 922 92.2 
Total 100 100. 
0 0 
1. Socio-economic profile of respondents 
1.1. Survey Question # 16. Which social class do you consider yourselfto be part of? 
(aggregated results) 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid upper 209 20.9 21.1 21.1 half195 
lower 782 78.2 78.9 100.0 half196 
Total 991 99.1 100.0 
Missing System 9 .9 
Total 1000 100.0 
1.2 Survey Question # 17. What is your race/ethnicity? (aggregated results) 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid white 331 33.1 33.6 33.6 
afro-descendents 197 581 58.1 59.0 92.7 
indigenous 10 1.0 1.0 93.7 
Asian descendents 40 4.0 4.1 97.8 
other 22 2.2 2.2 100.0 
Total 984 98.4 100.0 
Missing System 16 1.6 
Total 1000 100.0 
195 Includes combined survey categories of "the wealthy;" "the upper-middle-class;" 
and "the middle-class." 
196 Includes combined survey categories of "the lower-middle-c1ass;" "the working class;" and 
"the poor." 
197 lncludes combined survey categories of "Black" and "Mixed descent ('Pardo')." 
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1.3 Survey Question # 18. What is your gender? 
! Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 1 Percent 
Valid male 352 35.2 36.7 36.7 
female 607 60.7 63.3 100.0 
Total 959 95.9 100.0 
Missing System 41 4.1 
Total 1000 100.0 
1.4 Survey question #19. What is your age group? 
! Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent ! Percent 
Valid 14-19 214 21.4 21.7 21.7 
20-29 268 26.8 27.1 48.8 
30-39 240 24.0 24.3 73.1 
40-49 146 14.6 14.8 87.9 
50-59 83 8.3 8.4 96.3 
over60 37 3.7 3.7 100.0 
Total 988 98.8 100.0 
Missing System 12 1.2 
Total 1000 100.0 
2. Usual means of conflict resolution 
2.1 Survey question #8. In general, ifyou have a problem/conflict, who would vou ask to 
help vou resolve the situation? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid community justice agents 181 18.1 18.2 18.2 
the police 300 30.0 30.1 48.2 
a public defense lawyer 179 17.9 18.0 66.2 
a private lawyer 114 11.4 11.4 77.6 
a small claims court judge 
65 6.5 6.5 84.2 
take matters into your own 
56 5.6 5.6 89.8 hands 
people trom the community 
38 3.8 3.8 93.6 
no action 12 1.2 1.2 94.8 
Other 52 5.2 5.2 100.0 
Total 997 99.7 100.0 
Missing System 31 .3 
Total 10001 100.0 
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2.1.1 Aggregaled rendis for Survey question #8. ln general, ifyou have a problem/conflict, 
who would you ask to help you resolve the situation? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid formai justice system 658 65.8 66.0 66.0 
community justice agents 181 18.1 18.2 84.2 
private justice 146 14.6 14.6 98.8 
no action 12 1.2 1.2 100.0 
Total 997 99.7 100.0 
Missing System 3 .3 
Total 1000 100.0 
2.1.2 CrosstabuJation results ((or self-attributed socio-economic stalus) 
Which social class do 
you consider yourself to 
be..Qart of? 
upper ha If lower ha If 
ln general, if you have a formai justice system Count 144 507 
problem/conflict, who would % within Which social 
you ask to help you resolve class do you consider 69.6% 64.9% the situation? yourself to be part of? 
community justice agents Count 18 162 
% within Which social 
class do you consider 8.7% 20.7% 
yourself to be part of? 
private justice Count 44 101 
% within Which social 
class do you consider 21.3% 12.9% 
yourself to be part of? 
no action Cou nt 1 11 
% within Which social 
class do you consider 
.5% 1.4% 
yourself to be part of? 
Total Count 207 781 
% within Which social 
class do you consider 100.0% 100.0% 
yourself to be part of? 
2.1.3.1 Chi-Square Test 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 22.450(a) 3 .000 
N of Valid Cases 
988
1 
a 1 cells (12.5%) have expected cou nt less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.51. 
Total 
651 
65.9% 
180 
18.2% 
145 
14.7% 
12 
1.2% 
988 
100.0% 
2.2 Survey question #7. Uyou did not have the oossibilitv 10 bave community justice 
agents help you resolve your problemlconflict, who would you go to? 
1 Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid the police 60 6.0 21.4 21.4 
a public defense lawyer 144 14.4 51.4 72.9 
a private lawyer 28 2.8 10.0 82.9 
a small claims court 
judge 29 2.9 10.4 93.2 
take matters into your 
3 .3 1.1 94.3 own hands 
people from the 
8 .8 2.9 97.1 community 
no action 2 .2 .7 97.9 
other 6 6; 2.1 100.0 
Total 280 28:01 100.0 
Missing System 720 72.0
1 
Total 1000 100.0 
2.2.1Crosstabulation results ((Or self.attributed socio-economic status) 
Which social c1ass do 1 
you consider yourself ta . 
be part of? . 
upper ha If lower ha If • 
if you did not the police Count 4 56 
have the % within Which social 
possibility to c1ass do you consider 10.0% 23.3% have yourself to be part of? 
community 
justice agents a public defense lawyer Cou nt 16 128 
help you re % within Which social 
class do you consider 40.0% 53.3% 
yourself ta be part of? 
a private lawyer Count 10 18 
% within Which social 
class do you consider 
yourself to be part of? 
25.0% 7.5% 
a small c1aims court Count 7 22 
judge % within Which social 
class do you consider 17.5% 9.2% 
yourself ta be part of? 
take matters into your Count 0 3 
own hands % within Which social 
class do you consider 
.0% 1.3% 
yourself ta be part of? 
people tram the Count 2 6 
204 
Total 
60 
21.4% 
144 
51.4% 
28 
10.0% 
29 
10.4% 
3 
1.1% 
8 
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community % within Which social 
class do you consider 
yourself to be part of? 
5.0% 2.5% 
no action Count 1 1 
% wilhin Which social 
class do you consider 
yourself to be part of? 
2.5% .4% 
other Cou nt 0 6 
% within Which social 
class do you consider 
yourself to be part of? 
.0% 2.5% 
Total Count 40 240 
% within Which social 
class do you consider 100.0% 
yourself to be part of? 
2.2.1.1 Chi-Square Test 
1 Asymp. Sig. 
Value df f2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 21.162(a) 7 .004 
N of Valid Cases 
280 
a 8 cens (50.0%) have expected cou nt less than 5. The minimum expected count is .29. 
3. Institutional (Mis)Trust 
3.1 Survey question #9. Do you trust police officers to protect citizens, provide security, 
and help you when you have a problem? 
Cumulative 
F ~ rcent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid very much 140 14.0 14.1 14.1 
somewhat 457 45.7 45.9 60.0 
not much 310 31.0 31.2 912 
not at ail 88 8.8 8.8 100.0 
Total 995 99.5 100.0 
Missing System 5 .5 
Total 1000 100.0 
2.9% 
2 
.7% 
6 
2.1% 
280 
100.0% 
206 
3.1.1 Aggregated results 
1 Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent 
Valid trust 597 59.7 60.0 60.0 
mistrust 398 39.8 40.0 100.0 
Total 995 99.5 100.0 
Missing System 5 .5 
Total 1000 100.0 
3.1.2 Crosstabulation results (for race/ethnicitv' 
• 
What is your race/ethnicitv? 
afro- Asian 1 
white descendents indigenous descendents other 1 Total 
Doyou trust Count 220 324 7 26 9 586 
trust % within What 
police is your 66.9% 56.1% 70.0% 65.0% 40.9% 59.9% 
officers raee/ethnicity? 
to proteet mistrust Count 109 254 3 14 13 393 
citizens, % within What provide 
security, is your 
and help race/ethnicity? 
you 33.1% 43.9% 30.0% 35.0% 59.1% 40.1% 
when 
you have 
a 
problem? 
Total Count 329 578 10 40 22 979 
% within What 
is your 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
race!ethnicity? 
3.1.2.1 Chi-Square Test 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 14.365(a) 4 .006 
N of Valid Cases 
979 
a 1 ceUs (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.01. 
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3.1.3 Crosstabulation results (for age) 
what is vour age group? 
14-19 20-29 30-39 40.49 1 50-59 over60 Total 
Do you trust trust Count 104 143 163 104 50 30 594 
police officers % within 
to protect what is 48.8% 53.6% 68.5% 71.2% 60.2% 83.3% 60.4% citizens, yourage 
provide group? 
security, and mistrust Count 109 124 75 42 33 6 389 help you when 
% within you have a 
problem? what is 51.2% 46.4% 31.5% 28.8% 39.8% 16.7% 39.6% yourage 
group? 
Total Cou nt 213 267 238 146 83 36 983 
% within 
what is 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% your age 
1 group? 
3.1.3.1 Chi-Square Test 
1 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 38.752(a) 1 5 .000 
N of Valid Cases 
983 
a 0 celfs (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.25. 
3.2 Surrey question #12. Do you tbink tbat every citizen bas equal access to tbe justice 
system, independently of wealtb, race and gender? 
1 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 1 Percent 
Valid yes 148 14.8 15.0 15.0 
no 836 83.6 85.0 100.0 
Total 984 98.4 100.0 
Missing System 16 1.6 
Total 1000 100.0 
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3.2.1 Cross tabulation results (for race/etbnicity) 
What is your race/ethnicity? 
afro- Asian 
white descendents indigenous descendents other Total 
do Vou yes Count 51 80 5 7 4 147 
think that % within What 
every is your 15.6% 14.0% 50.0% 17.9% 18.2% 15.2% 
citizen race/ethnicity? 
has equal no Cou nt 275 492 5 32 18 822 
accessto 
% within What the 
justice is your 84.4% 86.0% 50.0% 82.1% 81.8% 84.8% 
system, race/ethnicity? 
independ 
Total Count 326 572 10 39 22 969 
% within What 
is your 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
race/ethnicity? 
3.2.1.1 Chi-Square Test 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.496(a) 4 .033 
N of Valid Cases 1 
969
1 
a 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.52. 
4. User-satisfaction with community justice services 
4.1 Survey question #5. Uyou used the services of the community justice program. were 
you satisfied with the outcome? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid very satisfied 72 7.2 66.7 66.7 
somewhat satisfied 27 2.7 25.0 91.7 
somewhat unsatisfied 3 .3 2.8 94.4 
not satisfied at ail 6 .6 5.6 100.0 
Total 108 10.8 100.0 
Missing System 892 89.2 
Total 1000 100.0 
5. Principal sources of daily insecurity 
5.1 Survev question #15. What do vou see as the biggest problem in vour community? 
(more .ban one choice possible): Delinguencv, crime and violencel98 
Valid Percent 1 
Cumulative 
FreQuency Percent Percent 
Valid insecurity and crime 726 72.6 100.0 1 100.0 
Missing System 274 27.4 i 
Total 1000 100.0 , i 
Cumulative 
FreQuency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid drug trafficking and 
use/local gangs 545 54.5 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 455 45.5 
Total 1000 100.0 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent VaUd Percent Percent 
Val id disrespect and 
destruction of 381 38.1 1 100.0 100.0 public property 
Missing System 619 61.9 ! 
Total 1000 100.0 
Cumulative 
Frem ,pnrv Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid noise coming from 
bars and clubs 353 35.3 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 647 64.7 
Total 1000 100.0 
Cumulative 
Frequency 1 Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid fights and arguments 343 34.3 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 657 65.7 
Total 1000 100.0 
209 
198 This broad category includes response-choices for: al insecurity and crime; bJ drug 
trafficking and usel local gangs; 1) disrespect and destruction of public property; n) 
Noise coming from bars and clubs; 0) fights and arguments; pl alcoholism. 
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Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid inappropriate housingl 
301 30.1 100.0 100.0 insufficient private space 
Missing System 699 69.9 
Total 1000 100.0 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid alcoholism 349 34.9 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 651 65.1 
Total 1000 100.0 
5.1.1 Crosstabulation results (for race/ethnicity) 
what is vour race/ethnicity? 
1 afro- asian 
white • descendents indigenous descendents i other Total 
Grouping of v15 no Count 36
1 
80 1 9 8 134 
responses -- any % within what 
response having is your 10.9% 1 13.8% 10.0% 22.5% 36.4% . 13.6% 
to do with race/ethnicity? 
concem about yes Count 295 501 9 31 14 850 
crime/delinquency % within what 
is your 89.1% 86.2% 90.0% 77.5% 63.6% 86.4% 
race/ethnicity? 
Total Count 331 581 10 40 22 984 
% within what 
is your 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
race/ethnicity? 
• 
5.1.1.1 Chi-Square Test 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 14.596(a) 4 .006 
Likelihood Ratio 11.851 4 .018 
Unear -by-Unear 12.0B7 1 .001 Association 
N of VaUd Cases 
984 
a 2 cells (20.0%) have expected cou nt less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.36. 
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5.2. Survey question #15. What do you see as the biggest problem in your community? 
(more than one choice possible): Misrule of lawJ99 
Cumulative 
FreQuency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid police violence 275 27.5 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 725 72.5 
Total 1000 100.0 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid lack of police presence 611 61.1 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 389 38.9 
Total 1000 100.0 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid lack of access to the 
formai justice system 325 32.5 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 675 67.5 
Total 1000 100.0 
5.2.1 Crosstabulation results (fOr race/ethnicity) 
, 
what is your race/ethnicity? i 1 
1 afro- i asian 1 
1 
white 1 descendents j indigenous descendents other 1 Total 
Grouping no Count 75 181 4 14 8 282 
ofv15 % within what 
responses is your 22.7% 31.2% 40.0% 35.0% 36.4% 28.7% 
-- any race/ethnicity? 
response yes Count 256 400 6 26 14 702 having to 
% within what do with 
concern is your 
about race/ethnicity? 77.3% 68.8% 60.0% 65.0% 63.6% 71.3% 
misrule of 
law 
Total Count 331 581 10
1 
40 22 984 
% within what 
is your 100.0% 100.0% i 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
race/ethnicity? i 
199 This broad category includes response-choices for: g) police violence; h) lack of 
police presence; il lack of oc cess to the formol justice system. 
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5.2.1.1 Cbi-Square Test 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.651(a) 4 .047 
N of Valid Cases 
984 
a 1 cells (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.87. 
5.3 Survey questiou #15. What do you see as the biggest problem in your community? 
(more tban one cboice possible): Local developmental issues / guality or lire in tbe 
communitioo 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Jack of public 
100.01 green spaces 379 37.9 100.0 
Missing System 621 62.1 
Total 1000 100.0 i 
! Valid Percent Cumulative Frequency Percent Percent 
Valid lack of sports 
48.5 , centers/entertainment 485 100.0 100.0 
facilities 
Missing System 515 51.5 
Total 1000 100.0 
1 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid urban decay 313 31.3 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 687 68.7 
Total 1000 100.0 i 
1 Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent 
Valid Lack of adequate lighting 227 22.7 • 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 773 77.3 
Total 1000 100.0 
200 This broad category includes response-choices for:cJ inappropriate housingl 
insufficient priva te space; dJ lack of public green spaces; e) lack of sports 
centers/entertainment facilities; f) urban decay; H lack of adequafe lighting; k} lack of 
public transport; m) Lack of basic sanitation (water, sewage) __ _ 
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Frequency 1 
Cumulative 
Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid lack of public transport 307 30.7 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 693 69.3 
Total 1000 100.0 
1 Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
VaUd lack of basic sanitation 217
1 
21.7 100.01 100.0 
Missing System 783 78.3 
Total 1000 1 100.0 
5.3.1 Crosstahulation results (for racelethnicity) 
1 
what is yourfc::tfl'l/ethnicity? 
afro- asian 
white descendents indigenous descendents other Total 
Grouping of v15 no Count 80 207 4 6 5 302 
responses--anyresponse % within what 
having to do with concern is your 24.2% 1 35.6% 400% 15.0% 22.7% 30.7% about local race/ethnicity? 
developmenVinfrastructure yes Count 251 374 6 34 17 682 
% within what 
is your 75.8%. 64.4% 60.0% 85.0% 77.3% 69.3% 
race/ethnicity? 
Total Count 331 581 10 40 22 984 
% within what 
is your 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1100.0% 100.0% 
raceJethnicity? 
5.3.1.1 Chi-Square Test 
1 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.970(a) 1 4 .001 
N of Valid Cases 
984
1 1 
a 1 cens (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.07. 
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